At the dawn of our Republic, a small, secret surveillance committee borne out of the "The Sons of Liberty" was established in Boston. And the group’s members included Paul Revere. At night, they would patrol the streets, reporting back any signs that the British were preparing raids against America’s early Patriots. 共和国建立之初，波士顿成立了一个源自“自由之子”的秘密小型监视委员会，成员包括保罗·里维尔。他们夜间巡逻街道，一旦发现英国人准备袭击美国早期爱国者的迹象，就回去报告。
Throughout American history, intelligence has helped secure our country and our freedoms. In the Civil War, Union balloon reconnaissance tracked the size of Confederate armies by counting the number of campfires. In World War II, code-breakers gave us insights into Japanese war plans, and when Patton marched across Europe, intercepted communications helped save the lives of his troops. After the war, the rise of the Iron Curtain and nuclear weapons only increased the need for sustained intelligence gathering. 纵观美国历史，情报一直帮助我们保卫国家和自由。内战期间，联邦军用气球侦察通过清点篝火数量来追踪邦联军队规模。第二次世界大战中，密码破译人员让我们了解日本的作战计划；当巴顿横跨欧洲推进时，截获的通信挽救了他的部队成员的生命。战后，铁幕和核武器的兴起进一步增加了持续收集情报的必要性。
And so, in the early days of the Cold War, President Truman created the National Security Agency, or NSA, to give us insights into the Soviet bloc, and provide our leaders with information they needed to confront aggression and avert catastrophe. 因此，在冷战初期，杜鲁门总统创建了国家安全局，也就是NSA，以便了解苏联集团的情况，并向领导人提供应对侵略、避免灾难所需的信息。
Throughout this evolution, we benefited from both our Constitution and our traditions of limited government. U.S. intelligence agencies were anchored in a system of checks and balances -- with oversight from elected leaders, and protections for ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, totalitarian states like East Germany offered a cautionary tale of what could happen when vast, unchecked surveillance turned citizens into informers, and persecuted people for what they said in the privacy of their own homes. 在这一演变过程中，我们同时受益于宪法和有限政府的传统。美国情报机构置于权力制衡体系之中，接受民选领导人的监督，并保护普通公民。与此同时，东德等极权国家提供了一个警示：不受约束的大规模监视可能把公民变成告密者，还会因为人们在家中私下说的话而迫害他们。
In fact, even the United States proved not to be immune to the abuse of surveillance. And in the 1960s, government spied on civil rights leaders and critics of the Vietnam War. And partly in response to these revelations, additional laws were established in the 1970s to ensure that our intelligence capabilities could not be misused against our citizens. In the long, twilight struggle against Communism, we had been reminded that the very liberties that we sought to preserve could not be sacrificed at the altar of national security. 事实上，就连美国也没能完全避免监视滥用。20世纪60年代，政府监视民权领袖和越战批评者。部分由于这些事件被揭露，20世纪70年代制定了更多法律，确保情报能力不会被用来对付本国公民。在与共产主义进行漫长而阴暗的斗争时，我们已经认识到，不能为了国家安全而牺牲我们力图保卫的自由。
If the fall of the Soviet Union left America without a competing superpower, emerging threats from terrorist groups, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction placed new and in some ways more complicated demands on our intelligence agencies. Globalization and the Internet made these threats more acute, as technology erased borders and empowered individuals to project great violence, as well as great good. Moreover, these new threats raised new legal and new policy questions. 苏联解体使美国失去了竞争性超级大国，但恐怖组织带来的新威胁以及大规模杀伤性武器的扩散，给情报机构提出了新的、在某些方面更复杂的要求。全球化和互联网抹去了边界，使个人能够施加巨大暴力，也能带来巨大善举，从而让这些威胁更加严峻。与此同时，新威胁提出了新的法律和政策问题。
For while few doubted the legitimacy of spying on hostile states, our framework of laws was not fully adapted to prevent terrorist attacks by individuals acting on their own, or acting in small, ideologically driven groups on behalf of a foreign power. 很少有人怀疑监视敌对国家的正当性，但我们的法律框架尚未充分适应这样的情况：个人独自行事，或代表外国势力在由意识形态驱动的小团体中行动，可能发动恐怖袭击。
The horror of September 11th brought all these issues to the fore. Across the political spectrum, Americans recognized that we had to adapt to a world in which a bomb could be built in a basement, and our electric grid could be shut down by operators an ocean away. We were shaken by the signs we had missed leading up to the attacks -- how the hijackers had made phone calls to known extremists and traveled to suspicious places. “9·11”惨案使所有这些问题都凸显出来。美国各政治立场的人都认识到，我们必须适应这样的世界：炸弹可以在地下室制造，电网可以被远在海洋另一端的操作者关闭。袭击前我们错过的一些迹象令我们震惊——劫机者曾给已知极端分子打电话，也去过可疑地点。
So we demanded that our intelligence community improve its capabilities, and that law enforcement change practices to focus more on preventing attacks before they happen than prosecuting terrorists after an attack. 因此，我们要求情报界提升能力，要求执法部门改变做法，更重视在袭击发生前预防袭击，而不是在袭击后起诉恐怖分子。
It is hard to overstate the transformation America’s intelligence community had to go through after 9/11. Our agencies suddenly needed to do far more than the traditional mission of monitoring hostile powers and gathering information for policymakers. Instead, they were now asked to identify and target plotters in some of the most remote parts of the world, and to anticipate the actions of networks that, by their very nature, cannot be easily penetrated with spies or informants. “9·11”之后，美国情报界经历的转变之大，很难用语言充分描述。我们的机构突然不能只执行监视敌对势力、为决策者收集信息的传统任务，还被要求在世界最偏远的地方识别并锁定策划者，预测那些天生难以通过间谍或线人渗透的网络会采取什么行动。
And it is a testimony to the hard work and dedication of the men and women of our intelligence community that over the past decade we’ve made enormous strides in fulfilling this mission. Today, new capabilities allow intelligence agencies to track who a terrorist is in contact with, and follow the trail of his travel or his funding. New laws allow information to be collected and shared more quickly and effectively between federal agencies, and state and local law enforcement. 过去十年里，情报界男女工作人员辛勤努力、恪尽职守，在完成这一使命方面取得了巨大进展，这本身就是最好的证明。如今，新能力让情报机构能够追踪恐怖分子与谁联系，并追查其旅行或资金流向。新法律使联邦机构以及州和地方执法部门能够更迅速、更有效地收集和共享信息。
Relationships with foreign intelligence services have expanded, and our capacity to repel cyber-attacks have been strengthened. And taken together, these efforts have prevented multiple attacks and saved innocent lives -- not just here in the United States, but around the globe. 我们扩大了同外国情报机构的关系，也加强了抵御网络攻击的能力。综合起来，这些努力阻止了多起袭击，挽救了无辜者的生命，不仅在美国如此，在世界各地也是如此。
And yet, in our rush to respond to a very real and novel set of threats, the risk of government overreach -- the possibility that we lose some of our core liberties in pursuit of security -- also became more pronounced. We saw, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, our government engaged in enhanced interrogation techniques that contradicted our values. As a Senator, I was critical of several practices, such as warrantless wiretaps. And all too often new authorities were instituted without adequate public debate. 然而，在急于应对一系列真实而新颖的威胁时，政府越权的风险——为了安全而失去部分核心自由的可能性——也更加明显。“9·11”后不久，我们看到政府采用违背自身价值观的强化审讯手段。作为参议员，我曾批评无证监听等做法。太多时候，新的权力是在缺少充分公众辩论的情况下建立的。
Through a combination of action by the courts, increased congressional oversight, and adjustments by the previous administration, some of the worst excesses that emerged after 9/11 were curbed by the time I took office. But a variety of factors have continued to complicate America’s efforts to both defend our nation and uphold our civil liberties. 法院采取行动、国会加强监督，加上前一届政府进行调整，到我就任时，“9·11”后出现的一些最严重的过度行为已经受到遏制。但多种因素仍使美国难以同时保卫国家、维护公民自由。
First, the same technological advances that allow U.S. intelligence agencies to pinpoint an al Qaeda cell in Yemen or an email between two terrorists in the Sahel also mean that many routine communications around the world are within our reach. And at a time when more and more of our lives are digital, that prospect is disquieting for all of us. 第一，让美国情报机构能够锁定也门的“基地”组织分支或两名萨赫勒地区恐怖分子之间的电子邮件的技术进步，也意味着世界各地大量普通通信都在我们的触及范围内。在越来越多生活转为数字化的时代，这种前景让我们所有人都不安。
Second, the combination of increased digital information and powerful supercomputers offers intelligence agencies the possibility of sifting through massive amounts of bulk data to identify patterns or pursue leads that may thwart impending threats. It’s a powerful tool. But the government collection and storage of such bulk data also creates a potential for abuse. 第二，数字信息增加和超级计算机能力增强，使情报机构有可能筛查海量数据，寻找模式或线索，以挫败迫在眉睫的威胁。这是强大的工具，但政府收集和储存如此大规模的数据也带来滥用的可能。
Third, the legal safeguards that restrict surveillance against U.S. persons without a warrant do not apply to foreign persons overseas. This is not unique to America; few, if any, spy agencies around the world constrain their activities beyond their own borders. And the whole point of intelligence is to obtain information that is not publicly available. But America’s capabilities are unique, and the power of new technologies means that there are fewer and fewer technical constraints on what we can do. That places a special obligation on us to ask tough questions about what we should do. 第三，没有搜查令就限制对美国人的监视的法律保障，并不适用于海外外国人。这并非美国独有；世界各地几乎没有间谍机构会在本国边界之外约束自己的活动。情报工作的目的本来就是取得公众无法获得的信息。但美国的能力独特，新技术又让我们能做的事情受到的技术限制越来越少，因此我们有特殊责任严肃追问：我们应该做什么。
And finally, intelligence agencies cannot function without secrecy, which makes their work less subject to public debate. Yet there is an inevitable bias not only within the intelligence community, but among all of us who are responsible for national security, to collect more information about the world, not less. So in the absence of institutional requirements for regular debate -- and oversight that is public, as well as private or classified -- the danger of government overreach becomes more acute. 最后，情报机构离不开秘密，这使其工作较少受到公众辩论的约束。然而，不仅情报界，所有负责国家安全的人都不可避免地倾向于收集更多而非更少的世界信息。因此，如果没有要求定期辩论的制度，也没有公开以及私下或机密的监督，政府越权的危险就会更加严重。
And this is particularly true when surveillance technology and our reliance on digital information is evolving much faster than our laws. 当监视技术和我们对数字信息的依赖发展得远快于法律时，尤其如此。
For all these reasons, I maintained a healthy skepticism toward our surveillance programs after I became President. I ordered that our programs be reviewed by my national security team and our lawyers, and in some cases I ordered changes in how we did business. We increased oversight and auditing, including new structures aimed at compliance. Improved rules were proposed by the government and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. And we sought to keep Congress continually updated on these activities. 基于这些原因，我就任总统后一直对监视项目保持审慎怀疑。我要求国家安全团队和律师审查这些项目，有时也改变我们的做法。我们加强了监督和审计，建立了合规机制；政府提出更完善的规则，并获外国情报监视法院批准；我们还不断向国会通报这些活动。
What I did not do is stop these programs wholesale -- not only because I felt that they made us more secure, but also because nothing in that initial review, and nothing that I have learned since, indicated that our intelligence community has sought to violate the law or is cavalier about the civil liberties of their fellow citizens. 我没有把这些项目全部叫停，不仅因为我认为它们让我们更安全，也因为最初审查和此后我了解到的一切，都没有显示情报界试图违法，或轻视同胞的公民自由。
To the contrary, in an extraordinarily difficult job -- one in which actions are second-guessed, success is unreported, and failure can be catastrophic -- the men and women of the intelligence community, including the NSA, consistently follow protocols designed to protect the privacy of ordinary people. They’re not abusing authorities in order to listen to your private phone calls or read your emails. When mistakes are made -- which is inevitable in any large and complicated human enterprise -- they correct those mistakes. 恰恰相反，情报界包括NSA在内的男女工作人员面对的是极其困难的工作：行动会被事后质疑，成功无人报道，失败却可能造成灾难。他们始终遵循旨在保护普通人隐私的规程。他们没有滥用职权去监听你的私人电话或阅读你的电子邮件。大型而复杂的人类事业必然会犯错；出现错误时，他们会纠正。NSA工作人员默默无闻地工作，
Laboring in obscurity, often unable to discuss their work even with family and friends, the men and women at the NSA know that if another 9/11 or massive cyber-attack occurs, they will be asked, by Congress and the media, why they failed to connect the dots. What sustains those who work at NSA and our other intelligence agencies through all these pressures is the knowledge that their professionalism and dedication play a central role in the defense of our nation. 常常连家人朋友也不能谈论自己的工作。他们知道，如果再次发生“9·11”或大规模网络攻击，国会和媒体会追问他们为何没能把线索串联起来。在所有这些压力下，支撑NSA及其他情报机构工作人员的是这样一种认识：他们的专业精神和奉献精神在保卫国家方面发挥着核心作用。
Now, to say that our intelligence community follows the law, and is staffed by patriots, is not to suggest that I or others in my administration felt complacent about the potential impact of these programs. Those of us who hold office in America have a responsibility to our Constitution, and while I was confident in the integrity of those who lead our intelligence community, it was clear to me in observing our intelligence operations on a regular basis that changes in our technological capabilities were raising new questions about the privacy safeguards currently in place. 说情报界守法、由爱国者组成，并不意味着我或政府中的其他人对这些项目可能造成的影响感到自满。美国公职人员对宪法负有责任。尽管我相信情报界领导人的正直，但我定期观察情报行动时清楚看到，技术能力的变化正在对现有隐私保障提出新的问题。
Moreover, after an extended review of our use of drones in the fight against terrorist networks, I believed a fresh examination of our surveillance programs was a necessary next step in our effort to get off the open-ended war footing that we’ve maintained since 9/11. And for these reasons, I indicated in a speech at the National Defense University last May that we needed a more robust public discussion about the balance between security and liberty. 此外，在对无人机用于打击恐怖网络的方式进行长期审查后，我认为，重新检查监视项目是我们摆脱“9·11”以来一直维持的无限期战争状态的下一步必要工作。基于这些原因，我在去年5月于国防大学发表演讲时指出，我们需要就安全与自由之间的平衡展开更有力的公共讨论。当然，当时我不知道的是，在我演讲后的几周内，大量未经授权的披露会引发国内外争议，而且一直延续到今天。 鉴于调查正在进行，我不会详细讨论斯诺登先生的行为或动机；我要说的是，国家防御部分取决于受托保守国家秘密者的忠诚。如果任何反对政府政策的人
Of course, what I did not know at the time is that within weeks of my speech, an avalanche of unauthorized disclosures would spark controversies at home and abroad that have continued to this day. 都可以自行决定公开披露机密信息，我们就无法保护人民安全，也无法开展外交政策。此外，这些披露以耸人听闻的方式出现，往往增加了热度却减少了光亮，同时向对手暴露了可能影响我们行动的方法，而其后果也许多年都无法完全理解。
And given the fact of an open investigation, I’m not going to dwell on Mr. Snowden’s actions or his motivations; I will say that our nation’s defense depends in part on the fidelity of those entrusted with our nation’s secrets. If any individual who objects to government policy can take it into their own hands to publicly disclose classified information, then we will not be able to keep our people safe, or conduct foreign policy. 不管我们如何走到今天这一步，我们面前的任务都不只是修复行动所受损害，或防止未来发生更多披露。我们必须就如何保护自己、维持世界领导地位，同时维护我们的理想和宪法所要求的公民自由与隐私保障，作出重要决定。我们这样做不仅因为这是正确的，
Moreover, the sensational way in which these disclosures have come out has often shed more heat than light, while revealing methods to our adversaries that could impact our operations in ways that we may not fully understand for years to come. 也因为恐怖主义、扩散和网络攻击等威胁不会很快消失。它们将继续成为重大问题。为了让情报界长期有效，我们必须保持美国人民以及全世界人民的信任。
Regardless of how we got here, though, the task before us now is greater than simply repairing the damage done to our operations or preventing more disclosures from taking place in the future. Instead, we have to make some important decisions about how to protect ourselves and sustain our leadership in the world, while upholding the civil liberties and privacy protections that our ideals and our Constitution require. We need to do so not only because it is right, but because the challenges posed by threats like terrorism and proliferation and cyber-attacks are not going away any time soon. 这项工作不可能一夜完成；鉴于技术变化的速度，我们不应期待这会是美国最后一次就此展开辩论。但我希望美国人民知道，工作已经开始。过去六个月里，我成立了一个独立的情报与通信技术审查小组，提出改革建议。我听取了国会设立的隐私与公民自由监督委员会的意见，也听取了外国伙伴、隐私倡导者和行业领袖的意见。我的政府花费无数时间，
They are going to continue to be a major problem. And for our intelligence community to be effective over the long haul, we must maintain the trust of the American people, and people around the world. 思考如何在威胁分散、技术革命的时代处理情报问题。因此，在概述我下令采取的具体变化前，请允许我先说明这一过程形成的几项总体认识。
This effort will not be completed overnight, and given the pace of technological change, we shouldn’t expect this to be the last time America has this debate. But I want the American people to know that the work has begun. Over the last six months, I created an outside Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies to make recommendations for reform. I consulted with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, created by Congress. I’ve listened to foreign partners, privacy advocates, and industry leaders. 首先，所有研究过这些问题的人，包括现有项目的怀疑者，都承认我们确实面对敌人和威胁，情报在应对它们方面发挥着至关重要的作用。没有一定能力渗透数字通信，我们无法阻止恐怖袭击或网络威胁——无论是解开恐怖阴谋、截获针对证券交易所的恶意软
My administration has spent countless hours considering how to approach intelligence in this era of diffuse threats and technological revolution. So before outlining specific changes that I’ve ordered, let me make a few broad observations that have emerged from this process. 件、确保空中交通管制系统不被入侵，还是防止黑客掏空你的银行账户。人们期望我们保护美国人民；这要求我们具备这一领域的能力。
First, everyone who has looked at these problems, including skeptics of existing programs, recognizes that we have real enemies and threats, and that intelligence serves a vital role in confronting them. We cannot prevent terrorist attacks or cyber threats without some capability to penetrate digital communications -- whether it’s to unravel a terrorist plot; to intercept malware that targets a stock exchange; to make sure air traffic control systems are not compromised; or to ensure that hackers do not empty your bank accounts. 我们不能单方面解除情报机构的武装。黑莓手机和iPhone不能带进白宫战情室，是有原因的。我们知道，其他国家的情报机构——包括一些对斯诺登披露假装惊讶的国家——一直在探测我们的政府和私营部门网络，加快监听我们谈话、截获电子
We are expected to protect the American people; that requires us to have capabilities in this field. 邮件、破坏我们系统的项目。我们知道这一点。
Moreover, we cannot unilaterally disarm our intelligence agencies. There is a reason why BlackBerrys and iPhones are not allowed in the White House Situation Room. We know that the intelligence services of other countries -- including some who feign surprise over the Snowden disclosures -- are constantly probing our government and private sector networks, and accelerating programs to listen to our conversations, and intercept our emails, and compromise our systems. We know that. 此外，我们不能单方面解除情报机构的武装。黑莓和 iPhone 不能带进白宫战情室是有原因的。我们知道，其他国家的情报部门——包括一些假装对斯诺登披露感到惊讶的国家——一直在探测美国政府和私营部门网络，并加快监听谈话、截取电子邮件、破坏系统的项目。我们知道这一点。
Meanwhile, a number of countries, including some who have loudly criticized the NSA, privately acknowledge that America has special responsibilities as the world’s only superpower; that our intelligence capabilities are critical to meeting these responsibilities, and that they themselves have relied on the information we obtain to protect their own people. 与此同时，包括一些公开强烈批评国家安全局的国家在内，许多国家私下承认：美国作为世界唯一超级大国负有特殊责任；我们的情报能力对履行这些责任至关重要；而它们自己也依赖我们获得的信息来保护本国人民。
Second, just as ardent civil libertarians recognize the need for robust intelligence capabilities, those with responsibilities for our national security readily acknowledge the potential for abuse as intelligence capabilities advance and more and more private information is digitized. After all, the folks at NSA and other intelligence agencies are our neighbors. They're our friends and family. They’ve got electronic bank and medical records like everybody else. 他们的孩子在脸书和Instagram上，他们也比我们大多数人更了解隐私面临的脆弱性：在这个交易会被记录、电子邮件和短信会被储
They have kids on Facebook and Instagram, and they know, more than most of us, the vulnerabilities to privacy that exist in a world where transactions are recorded, and emails and text and messages are stored, and even our movements can increasingly be tracked through the GPS on our phones. 存、甚至我们的行动越来越可以通过手机GPS追踪的世界里，隐私存在怎样的风险。
Third, there was a recognition by all who participated in these reviews that the challenges to our privacy do not come from government alone. Corporations of all shapes and sizes track what you buy, store and analyze our data, and use it for commercial purposes; that’s how those targeted ads pop up on your computer and your smartphone periodically. But all of us understand that the standards for government surveillance must be higher. Given the unique power of the state, it is not enough for leaders to say: Trust us, we won’t abuse the data we collect. 第三，所有参与这些审查的人都认识到，对隐私的挑战并不只来自政府。各种规模的企业都会追踪你购买的东西，储存和分析我们的数据，并将其用于商业目的；这就是那些定向广告不时出现在你的电脑和智能手机上的原因。但我们都明白，政府监视的标准必须更高。国家拥有独特权力，领导人不能只说“相信我们，我们不会滥用收集的数据”就够了。
For history has too many examples when that trust has been breached. Our system of government is built on the premise that our liberty cannot depend on the good intentions of those in power; it depends on the law to constrain those in power. 历史上有太多信任遭到破坏的例子。我们的政府制度建立在这样的前提上：自由不能取决于掌权者的善意，而要依靠法律约束掌权者。
I make these observations to underscore that the basic values of most Americans when it comes to questions of surveillance and privacy converge a lot more than the crude characterizations that have emerged over the last several months. Those who are troubled by our existing programs are not interested in repeating the tragedy of 9/11, and those who defend these programs are not dismissive of civil liberties. 我提到这些，是为了说明，在监视和隐私问题上，大多数美国人的基本价值观远比过去几个月出现的粗糙描述更接近。担心现有项目的人并不想重演“9·11”悲剧，支持这些项目的人也并非无视公民自由。
The challenge is getting the details right, and that is not simple. In fact, during the course of our review, I have often reminded myself I would not be where I am today were it not for the courage of dissidents like Dr. King, who were spied upon by their own government. And as President, a President who looks at intelligence every morning, I also can’t help but be reminded that America must be vigilant in the face of threats. 挑战在于把细节做对，而这并不简单。审查期间，我常提醒自己：如果没有金博士等异议人士的勇气——他们曾被自己的政府监视——我不会有今天的地位。作为每天早晨查看情报的总统，我也无法不记得，美国必须面对威胁保持警惕。
Fortunately, by focusing on facts and specifics rather than speculation and hypotheticals, this review process has given me -- and hopefully the American people -- some clear direction for change. And today, I can announce a series of concrete and substantial reforms that my administration intends to adopt administratively or will seek to codify with Congress. 幸运的是，这次审查着眼于事实和具体问题，而不是猜测和假设，已经为我，也希望为美国人民，指明了改革方向。今天，我可以宣布一系列具体而重大的改革，政府将通过行政措施采取，或寻求国会以法律形式确定。
First, I have approved a new presidential directive for our signals intelligence activities both at home and abroad. This guidance will strengthen executive branch oversight of our intelligence activities. It will ensure that we take into account our security requirements, but also our alliances; our trade and investment relationships, including the concerns of American companies; and our commitment to privacy and basic liberties. 第一，我批准了一项新的总统指令，规范我们在国内外开展的信号情报活动。这份指导将加强行政部门对情报活动的监督，确保我们既考虑安全要求，也考虑联盟关系、贸易和投资关系（包括美国企业的关切），以及我们对隐私和基本自由的承诺。
And we will review decisions about intelligence priorities and sensitive targets on an annual basis so that our actions are regularly scrutinized by my senior national security team. 我们还将每年审查有关情报重点和敏感目标的决定，让我的高级国家安全团队定期审视我们的行动。
Second, we will reform programs and procedures in place to provide greater transparency to our surveillance activities, and fortify the safeguards that protect the privacy of U.S. persons. Since we began this review, including information being released today, we have declassified over 40 opinions and orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which provides judicial review of some of our most sensitive intelligence activities -- including the Section 702 program targeting foreign individuals overseas, and the Section 215 telephone metadata program. 第二，我们将改革现有项目和程序，提高监视活动的透明度，并加强保护美国人隐私的保障。审查开始以来，包括今天公布的内容在内，我们已经解密了外国情报监视法院40多份意见和命令，其中涉及第702条款项目和第215条电话元数据项目等敏感情报活动。
And going forward, I’m directing the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, to annually review for the purposes of declassification any future opinions of the court with broad privacy implications, and to report to me and to Congress on these efforts. To ensure that the court hears a broader range of privacy perspectives, I am also calling on Congress to authorize the establishment of a panel of advocates from outside government to provide an independent voice in significant cases before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 今后，我将指示国家情报总监与司法部长协商，每年审查法院未来发布的、涉及重大隐私问题的意见，以决定是否解密，并向我和国会报告。为确保法院听取更广泛的隐私观点，我还呼吁国会授权成立一个由政府外部人士组成的辩护人小组，在外国情报监视法院的重要案件中提供独立声音。
Third, we will provide additional protections for activities conducted under Section 702, which allows the government to intercept the communications of foreign targets overseas who have information that’s important for our national security. Specifically, I am asking the Attorney General and DNI to institute reforms that place additional restrictions on government’s ability to retain, search, and use in criminal cases communications between Americans and foreign citizens incidentally collected under Section 702. 第三，我们将为第702条款下的活动提供额外保护。该条款允许政府截取海外外国目标的通信，而这些目标掌握对国家安全重要的信息。具体而言，我要求司法部长和国家情报总监改革制度，进一步限制政府保留、搜索和在刑事案件中使用第702条款附带收集的美国人与外国公民之间通信的能力。
Fourth, in investigating threats, the FBI also relies on what's called national security letters, which can require companies to provide specific and limited information to the government without disclosing the orders to the subject of the investigation. These are cases in which it's important that the subject of the investigation, such as a possible terrorist or spy, isn’t tipped off. But we can and should be more transparent in how government uses this authority. 第四，调查威胁时，联邦调查局还依靠所谓的国家安全信函，要求公司向政府提供具体而有限的信息，却不向调查对象披露命令。在涉及可能的恐怖分子或间谍时，不能让调查对象提前得知是很重要的。但政府如何使用这项权力，我们可以也应该更加透明。
I have therefore directed the Attorney General to amend how we use national security letters so that this secrecy will not be indefinite, so that it will terminate within a fixed time unless the government demonstrates a real need for further secrecy. We will also enable communications providers to make public more information than ever before about the orders that they have received to provide data to the government. 因此，我已指示司法部长修改国家安全信函的使用方式，使这种保密不会无限期持续，而是在固定期限内终止，除非政府证明确有继续保密的需要。我们还将允许通信服务商比以往公开更多信息，说明它们收到的、要求向政府提供数据的命令。
This brings me to the program that has generated the most controversy these past few months -- the bulk collection of telephone records under Section 215. Let me repeat what I said when this story first broke: This program does not involve the content of phone calls, or the names of people making calls. Instead, it provides a record of phone numbers and the times and lengths of calls -- metadata that can be queried if and when we have a reasonable suspicion that a particular number is linked to a terrorist organization. 这让我谈到过去几个月争议最大的项目——第215条款下的电话记录大规模收集。让我重申新闻最初曝光时说过的话：这个项目不涉及电话内容，也不涉及打电话者姓名，只记录电话号码、通话时间和时长，也就是元数据；只有在合理怀疑某个号码与恐怖组织有关时，才会查询这些数据。
Why is this necessary? The program grew out of a desire to address a gap identified after 9/11. One of the 9/11 hijackers -- Khalid al-Mihdhar -- made a phone call from San Diego to a known al Qaeda safe-house in Yemen. NSA saw that call, but it could not see that the call was coming from an individual already in the United States. The telephone metadata program under Section 215 was designed to map the communications of terrorists so we can see who they may be in contact with as quickly as possible. And this capability could also prove valuable in a crisis. 为什么有必要这样做？这一项目源于解决“9·11”之后发现的一处漏洞。“9·11”劫机者之一哈立德·穆赫达尔曾从圣迭戈打电话给也门一个已知的基地组织安全屋。NSA看到了这通电话，却看不出电话来自一个已经身在美国的人。第215条电话元数据项目旨在绘制恐怖分子的通信关系，让我们尽快了解他们可能联系了谁。这一能力在危机中也可能很有价值。
For example, if a bomb goes off in one of our cities and law enforcement is racing to determine whether a network is poised to conduct additional attacks, time is of the essence. Being able to quickly review phone connections to assess whether a network exists is critical to that effort. 比如，一座城市发生爆炸，执法部门急于判断某个网络是否准备发动更多袭击时，时间至关重要。快速查看电话联系、判断是否存在一个网络，对这项工作十分关键。
In sum, the program does not involve the NSA examining the phone records of ordinary Americans. Rather, it consolidates these records into a database that the government can query if it has a specific lead -- a consolidation of phone records that the companies already retained for business purposes. The review group turned up no indication that this database has been intentionally abused. And I believe it is important that the capability that this program is designed to meet is preserved. 总的来说，该项目并不涉及国家安全局检查普通美国人的电话记录，而是把电话公司出于业务目的已经保留的记录汇总到一个数据库中，政府只有获得具体线索时才能查询。审查小组没有发现数据库被故意滥用的迹象。我认为，保留这一项目旨在提供的能力很重要。
Having said that, I believe critics are right to point out that without proper safeguards, this type of program could be used to yield more information about our private lives, and open the door to more intrusive bulk collection programs in the future. They’re also right to point out that although the telephone bulk collection program was subject to oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and has been reauthorized repeatedly by Congress, it has never been subject to vigorous public debate. 话虽如此，批评者指出，没有适当保障，这类项目可能被用来获取更多私人生活信息，并为未来更具侵入性的大规模收集项目打开大门，我认为他们是对的。他们还指出，尽管电话大规模收集项目受外国情报监视法院监督，并一再得到国会重新授权，却从未经过充分的公众辩论，这一点也对。
For all these reasons, I believe we need a new approach. I am therefore ordering a transition that will end the Section 215 bulk metadata program as it currently exists, and establish a mechanism that preserves the capabilities we need without the government holding this bulk metadata. 基于这些原因，我认为需要采取新方法。因此，我下令启动过渡，结束现行形式的第215条款大规模元数据项目，并建立一种机制，在政府不持有这些大规模元数据的情况下保留我们需要的能力。
This will not be simple. The review group recommended that our current approach be replaced by one in which the providers or a third party retain the bulk records, with government accessing information as needed. Both of these options pose difficult problems. Relying solely on the records of multiple providers, for example, could require companies to alter their procedures in ways that raise new privacy concerns. 审查期间，有人建议，我们也许可以通过现有授权、更好的信息共享和最新技术的结合来保留所需能力。
On the other hand, any third party maintaining a single, consolidated database would be carrying out what is essentially a government function but with more expense, more legal ambiguity, potentially less accountability -- all of which would have a doubtful impact on increasing public confidence that their privacy is being protected. 但还需要更多工作，才能准确确定这套系统如何运行。
During the review process, some suggested that we may also be able to preserve the capabilities we need through a combination of existing authorities, better information sharing, and recent technological advances. But more work needs to be done to determine exactly how this system might work. 审查期间，有人提出，可以结合现有权力、更好的信息共享和近期技术进步，保留我们需要的能力。但要确定这一系统究竟如何运行，还需要更多工作。
Because of the challenges involved, I’ve ordered that the transition away from the existing program will proceed in two steps. Effective immediately, we will only pursue phone calls that are two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist organization instead of the current three. And I have directed the Attorney General to work with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court so that during this transition period, the database can be queried only after a judicial finding or in the case of a true emergency. 由于面临这些挑战，我已下令分两步完成从现有项目的过渡。立即生效：我们只追查与恐怖组织相关号码相隔两步的电话，而不是目前的三步；我还指示司法部长与外国情报监视法院合作，在过渡期内，只有经过司法认定或确有紧急情况，才能查询数据库。
Next, step two, I have instructed the intelligence community and the Attorney General to use this transition period to develop options for a new approach that can match the capabilities and fill the gaps that the Section 215 program was designed to address without the government holding this metadata itself. They will report back to me with options for alternative approaches before the program comes up for reauthorization on March 28th. 我今天提出的改革应当让美国人民更加确信，即使情报和执法机构继续保有保障我们安全所需的工具，他们的权利仍会得到保护。我也承认，还有一些问题需要进一步辩论。例如，参与审查的一些人以及一些国会议员希望对国家安全信函的使用进行更彻底改革，使我们每次发出请求前都必须先向法官申请。对此我担心，
And during this period, I will consult with the relevant committees in Congress to seek their views, and then seek congressional authorization for the new program as needed. 我们不应为恐怖主义调查设定高于普通犯罪调查的标准。但我同意，对这些信函的使用加强监督可能是适当的，我愿意与国会就此合作。
Now, the reforms I’m proposing today should give the American people greater confidence that their rights are being protected, even as our intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain the tools they need to keep us safe. And I recognize that there are additional issues that require further debate. For example, some who participated in our review, as well as some members of Congress, would like to see more sweeping reforms to the use of national security letters so that we have to go to a judge each time before issuing these requests. 还有人希望对外国情报监视法院作出不同于我所提议的改变。对于所有这些问题，我都愿意与国会合作，确保我们就如何前进建立广泛共识。我相信，
Here, I have concerns that we should not set a standard for terrorism investigations that is higher than those involved in investigating an ordinary crime. But I agree that greater oversight on the use of these letters may be appropriate, and I’m prepared to work with Congress on this issue. 我们可以制定一种既满足安全需要、又维护每一位美国人公民自由的方案。
There are also those who would like to see different changes to the FISA Court than the ones I’ve proposed. On all these issues, I am open to working with Congress to ensure that we build a broad consensus for how to move forward, and I’m confident that we can shape an approach that meets our security needs while upholding the civil liberties of every American. 也有人希望对外国情报监视法院进行不同于我所提方案的改革。对于所有这些问题，我愿与国会合作，确保我们就前进方向建立广泛共识。我相信，我们能够制定既满足安全需要、又维护每一位美国人公民自由的方案。
Let me now turn to the separate set of concerns that have been raised overseas, and focus on America’s approach to intelligence collection abroad. As I’ve indicated, the United States has unique responsibilities when it comes to intelligence collection. Our capabilities help protect not only our nation, but our friends and our allies, as well. But our efforts will only be effective if ordinary citizens in other countries have confidence that the United States respects their privacy, too. 因此，我今天发布的新总统指令将明确规定，在境外监视方面我们做什么、不做什么。首先，指令明确，美国只为合法国家安全目的使用信号情报，不是为了不加区别地查看普通人的电子邮件或电话。我还明确表示，
And the leaders of our close friends and allies deserve to know that if I want to know what they think about an issue, I’ll pick up the phone and call them, rather than turning to surveillance. In other words, just as we balance security and privacy at home, our global leadership demands that we balance our security requirements against our need to maintain the trust and cooperation among people and leaders around the world. 美国不会收集情报来压制批评或异议，也不会因为人的族裔、种族、性别、性取向或宗教信仰而使其处于不利地位。我们不会收集情报来给美国企业或美国商业部门提供竞争优势。
For that reason, the new presidential directive that I’ve issued today will clearly prescribe what we do, and do not do, when it comes to our overseas surveillance. To begin with, the directive makes clear that the United States only uses signals intelligence for legitimate national security purposes, and not for the purpose of indiscriminately reviewing the emails or phone calls of ordinary folks. 至于信号情报的大规模收集，美国情报机构只会将这些数据用于具体安全要求：反情报、反恐
I’ve also made it clear that the United States does not collect intelligence to suppress criticism or dissent, nor do we collect intelligence to disadvantage people on the basis of their ethnicity, or race, or gender, or sexual orientation, or religious beliefs. We do not collect intelligence to provide a competitive advantage to U.S. companies or U.S. commercial sectors. 、反扩散、网络安全、保护我们和盟友的部队，以及打击包括逃避制裁在内的跨国犯罪。
And in terms of our bulk collection of signals intelligence, U.S. intelligence agencies will only use such data to meet specific security requirements: counterintelligence, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, cybersecurity, force protection for our troops and our allies, and combating transnational crime, including sanctions evasion. 至于信号情报的大规模收集，美国情报机构只会将这些数据用于特定安全要求：反间谍、反恐、防止大规模杀伤性武器扩散、网络安全、保护美国及盟国军队，以及打击包括逃避制裁在内的跨国犯罪。
In this directive, I have taken the unprecedented step of extending certain protections that we have for the American people to people overseas. I’ve directed the DNI, in consultation with the Attorney General, to develop these safeguards, which will limit the duration that we can hold personal information, while also restricting the use of this information. 在这份指令中，我采取了前所未有的步骤，把我们为美国人民提供的某些保护延伸到海外人士。我已指示国家情报总监与司法部长协商制定保障措施，限制我们保存个人信息的期限，同时限制这些信息的使用。
The bottom line is that people around the world, regardless of their nationality, should know that the United States is not spying on ordinary people who don’t threaten our national security, and that we take their privacy concerns into account in our policies and procedures. This applies to foreign leaders as well. Given the understandable attention that this issue has received, I have made clear to the intelligence community that unless there is a compelling national security purpose, we will not monitor the communications of heads of state and government of our close friends and allies. 现在让我说清楚：我们的情报机构将继续像其他国家的情报机构一样，收集世界各国政府的意图信息，而不是普通公民的信息。我们不会仅仅因为自身机构可能更有效就道歉。但同我们密切合作、并依赖其合作的国家元首和政府首脑应当确信，
And I’ve instructed my national security team, as well as the intelligence community, to work with foreign counterparts to deepen our coordination and cooperation in ways that rebuild trust going forward. 我们把他们当作真正的伙伴。我下令的这些改变正是为了做到这一点。
Now let me be clear: Our intelligence agencies will continue to gather information about the intentions of governments -- as opposed to ordinary citizens -- around the world, in the same way that the intelligence services of every other nation does. We will not apologize simply because our services may be more effective. But heads of state and government with whom we work closely, and on whose cooperation we depend, should feel confident that we are treating them as real partners. And the changes I’ve ordered do just that. 我要明确说明：我们的情报机构将继续像其他国家的情报机构一样，在全世界收集关于各国政府意图的信息，而不是普通公民的信息。我们不会仅仅因为自己的机构可能更有效就道歉。但与我们密切合作、依赖我们合作的国家元首和政府首脑，应当相信我们把他们当作真正的伙伴；我下令的改革正是为了做到这一点。
Finally, to make sure that we follow through on all these reforms, I am making some important changes to how our government is organized. The State Department will designate a senior officer to coordinate our diplomacy on issues related to technology and signals intelligence. We will appoint a senior official at the White House to implement the new privacy safeguards that I have announced today. 我还请我的顾问约翰·波德斯塔领导一项关于大
I will devote the resources to centralize and improve the process we use to handle foreign requests for legal assistance, keeping our high standards for privacy while helping foreign partners fight crime and terrorism. 数据和隐私的全面审查。
I have also asked my counselor, John Podesta, to lead a comprehensive review of big data and privacy. 这一小组将由政府官员组成，
And this group will consist of government officials who, along with the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, will reach out to privacy experts, technologists and business leaders, and look how the challenges inherent in big data are being confronted by both the public and private sectors; whether we can forge international norms on how to manage this data; and how we can continue to promote the free flow of information in ways that are consistent with both privacy and security. 他们将与总统科学技术顾问委员会一起，联系隐私专家、技术人员和企业领导者，研究公共与私营部门如何应对大数据固有的挑战；研究我们能否形成管理这些数据的国际规范；并研究我们如何以兼顾隐私和安全的方式继续促进信息自由流动。
For ultimately, what’s at stake in this debate goes far beyond a few months of headlines, or passing tensions in our foreign policy. When you cut through the noise, what’s really at stake is how we remain true to who we are in a world that is remaking itself at dizzying speed. 归根结底，这场辩论所涉及的利害远远超出几个月的新闻头条，或外交政策中短暂的紧张。拨开噪音，真正攸关的是：在世界以令人眩晕的速度重塑自己的时代，
Whether it’s the ability of individuals to communicate ideas; to access information that would have once filled every great library in every country in the world; or to forge bonds with people on other sides of the globe, technology is remaking what is possible for individuals, and for institutions, and for the international order. So while the reforms that I have announced will point us in a new direction, I am mindful that more work will be needed in the future. 我们如何忠于自己的本色。无论是个人交流思想的能力，还是获取曾经需要填满世界每个国家所有大型图书馆的信息的能力，抑或是与地球另一端的人建立联系的能力，技术都在重塑个人、机构和国际秩序的可能性。因此，尽管我宣布的改革将把我们引向新的方向，我也清楚，未来仍需做更多工作。
One thing I’m certain of: This debate will make us stronger. And I also know that in this time of change, the United States of America will have to lead. It may seem sometimes that America is being held to a different standard. And I'll admit the readiness of some to assume the worst motives by our government can be frustrating. No one expects China to have an open debate about their surveillance programs, or Russia to take privacy concerns of citizens in other places into account. 有一点我确信：这场辩论会让我们更强大。我也知道，在这个变革时代，美利坚合众国必须发挥领导作用。有时，美国似乎正被用不同标准衡量。我承认，有些人随时准备假定我国政府动机最坏，这会令人沮丧。但我们要记住：正因为我们一
But let’s remember: We are held to a different standard precisely because we have been at the forefront of defending personal privacy and human dignity. 直处于捍卫个人隐私和人的尊严的最前沿，我们才会被用不同的标准衡量。
As the nation that developed the Internet, the world expects us to ensure that the digital revolution works as a tool for individual empowerment, not government control. Having faced down the dangers of totalitarianism and fascism and communism, the world expects us to stand up for the principle that every person has the right to think and write and form relationships freely -- because individual freedom is the wellspring of human progress. 作为互联网的发明国，世界期待我们确保数字革命成为赋予个人力量的工具，而不是政府控制的工具。在战胜极权主义、法西斯主义和共产主义的危险后，世界期待我们捍卫这样一项原则：每个人都有权自由思考、写作和建立关系，因为个人自由是人类进步的源泉。
Those values make us who we are. And because of the strength of our own democracy, we should not shy away from high expectations. For more than two centuries, our Constitution has weathered every type of change because we have been willing to defend it, and because we have been willing to question the actions that have been taken in its defense. Today is no different. I believe we can meet high expectations. Together, let us chart a way forward that secures the life of our nation while preserving the liberties that make our nation worth fighting for. 这些价值塑造了我们。正因为自身民主制度强大，我们不应回避高标准。两个多世纪以来，宪法经受住了各种变化，因为我们愿意捍卫它，也愿意质疑那些以捍卫它为名采取的行动。今天也不例外。我相信我们能够达到高标准。让我们共同开辟前路，保障国家的生活，同时守护那些使我们的国家值得为之奋斗的自由。
Thank you. God bless you. May God bless the United States of America. 谢谢大家。愿上帝保佑你们，愿上帝保佑美利坚合众国。