It seems to me, paradoxically, that both long ago and only yesterday I attended my own Class Day in 1975. I am pleased and honored to be invited back by the students of Harvard. Our speaker in 1975 was Dick Gregory, the social critic and comedian, who was inclined toward the sharp-edged and satiric. Central bankers don’t do satire as a rule, so I am going to have to strive for “kind of interesting." 我有一种矛盾的感觉：我仿佛是在很久以前、又仿佛只是昨天参加了自己在1975年的毕业班日活动。很高兴也很荣幸受到哈佛学生的邀请回来。1975年的演讲嘉宾是社会评论家兼喜剧演员迪克·格雷戈里，他的风格尖锐而讽刺。中央银行家通常不做讽刺，所以我得努力做到“有点意思”。
When I attended Class Day as a graduating senior, Gerald Ford was President, and an up-and-coming fellow named Alan Greenspan was his chief economic adviser. Just weeks earlier, the last Americans remaining in Saigon had been evacuated by helicopters. On a happier note, the Red Sox were on their way to winning the American League pennant. I skipped classes to attend a World Series game against the Cincinnati Reds. 我作为毕业生参加毕业班日时，杰拉尔德·福特是总统，一位名叫艾伦·格林斯潘的后起之秀担任他的首席经济顾问。就在几周前，最后一批留在西贡的美国人乘直升机撤离。令人高兴的是，波士顿红袜队正准备赢得美国联盟冠军。我逃了课，去看了他们对阵辛辛那提红人队的一场世界大赛。
As was their wont in those days, the Sox came agonizingly close to a championship but ended up snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. On that score, as on others – disco music and Pet Rocks come to mind – many things are better today than they were then. In fact, that will be a theme of my remarks today. 按照他们当年的惯例，红袜队痛苦地接近冠军，却最终把胜利从嘴边送走。就这一点而言，和迪斯科音乐、宠物石等其他事物一样，今天有许多事情都比那时好。这实际上会成为我今天演讲的主题。
Although 1975 was a pretty good year for the Red Sox, it was not a good one for the U.S. economy. Then as now, we were experiencing a serious oil price shock, sharply rising prices for food and other commodities, and subpar economic growth. But I see the differences between the economy of 1975 and the economy of 2008 as more telling than the similarities. 1975年对红袜队来说算是不错的一年，但对美国经济而言却不是。当时和现在一样，我们都遭遇了严重的石油价格冲击，食品和其他大宗商品价格急剧上涨，经济增长低于正常水平。不过，在我看来，1975年与2008年经济状况之间的差异，比它们的相似之处更能说明问题。
Today’s situation differs from that of 33 years ago in large part because our economy and society have become much more flexible and able to adapt to difficult situations and new challenges. Economic policymaking has improved as well, I believe, partly because we have learned well some of the hard lessons of the past. Of course, I do not want to minimize the challenges we currently face, and I will come back to a few of these. 今天的情况之所以不同于33年前，很大程度上是因为我们的经济和社会变得更加灵活，也更有能力适应困难局面和新的挑战。我认为，经济政策的制定也有所进步，部分原因是我们认真吸取了过去的一些惨痛教训。当然，我并不想淡化当前面临的挑战，稍后我还会谈到其中几项。
But I do think that our demonstrated ability to respond constructively and effectively to past economic problems provides a basis for optimism about the future. 但我确实认为，我们已经证明自己能够建设性、有效地应对过去的经济问题，这为我们对未来保持乐观提供了依据。
I will focus my remarks today on two economic issues that challenged us in the 1970s and that still do so today – energy and productivity. These, obviously, are not the kind of topics chosen by many recent Class Day speakers – Will Farrell, Ali G, or Seth MacFarlane, to name a few. But, then, the Class Marshals presumably knew what they were getting when they invited an economist. 今天我将重点谈两个在20世纪70年代给我们带来挑战、如今仍然如此的经济问题：能源和生产率。显然，这不是许多近期毕业班日演讲者会选择的主题，比如威尔·法瑞尔、阿里·G或塞斯·麦克法兰。不过，班级典礼委员会邀请一位经济学家时，大概就知道自己会听到什么。
Because the members of today’s graduating class – and some of your professors – were not yet born in 1975, let me begin by briefly surveying the economic landscape in the mid-1970s. The economy had just gone through a severe recession, during which output, income, and employment fell sharply and the unemployment rate rose to 9 percent. Meanwhile, consumer price inflation, which had been around 3 percent to 4 percent earlier in the decade, soared to more than 10 percent during my senior year. 由于今天的毕业生、甚至你们中的一些教授，在1975年还没有出生，我先简要回顾一下20世纪70年代中期的经济景象。当时经济刚经历了一场严重衰退，产出、收入和就业大幅下降，失业率升至9%。与此同时，消费者价格通胀在那十年早期还约为3%至4%，到了我大四那年却飙升到10%以上。
The oil price shock of the 1970s began in October 1973 when, in response to the Yom Kippur War, Arab oil producers imposed an embargo on exports. Before the embargo, in 1972, the price of imported oil was about $3.20 per barrel; by 1975, the average price was nearly $14 per barrel, more than four times greater. 20世纪70年代的石油价格冲击始于1973年10月。当时，为回应赎罪日战争，阿拉伯产油国实施了石油出口禁运。禁运前的1972年，进口石油价格约为每桶3.20美元；到1975年，平均价格接近每桶14美元，涨幅超过四倍。
President Nixon had imposed economy-wide controls on wages and prices in 1971, including prices of petroleum products; in November 1973, in the wake of the embargo, the President placed additional controls on petroleum prices. 尼克松总统在1971年实施了覆盖整个经济的工资和价格管制，其中包括石油产品价格；1973年11月，禁运发生后，总统又对石油价格实施了额外管制。
As basic economics predicts, when a scarce resource cannot be allocated by market-determined prices, it will be allocated some other way – in this case, in what was to become an iconic symbol of the times, by long lines at gasoline stations. In 1974, in an attempt to overcome the unintended consequences of price controls, drivers in many places were permitted to buy gasoline only on odd or even days of the month, depending on the last digit of their license plate number. 基础经济学告诉我们，当一种稀缺资源不能由市场决定的价格来分配时，它就会通过其他方式分配。在当时，这种方式成为那个时代的标志性景象：加油站前排起长队。1974年，为了克服价格管制带来的意外后果，许多地方规定，司机只能在月份的奇数日或偶数日购买汽油，具体取决于车牌号码的最后一位。
Moreover, with the controlled price of U.S. crude oil well below world prices, growth in domestic exploration slowed and production was curtailed – which, of course, only made things worse. 此外，由于美国原油的管制价格远低于世界价格，国内勘探增长放缓，产量也受到限制，而这当然只会让情况更加糟糕。
In addition to creating long lines at gasoline stations, the oil price shock exacerbated what was already an intensifying buildup of inflation and inflation expectations. In another echo of today, the inflationary situation was further worsened by rapidly rising prices of agricultural products and other commodities. 石油价格冲击不仅造成加油站长队，还加剧了本已日益累积的通胀和通胀预期。农业产品和其他大宗商品价格迅速上涨，又进一步恶化了通胀形势，这与今天有着另一种呼应。
Economists generally agree that monetary policy performed poorly during this period. In part, this was because policymakers, in choosing what they believed to be the appropriate setting for monetary policy, overestimated the productive capacity of the economy. I’ll have more to say about this shortly. Federal Reserve policymakers also underestimated both their own contributions to the inflationary problems of the time and their ability to curb that inflation. 经济学家普遍认为，这一时期的货币政策表现不佳。部分原因在于，政策制定者选择他们认为合适的货币政策立场时，高估了经济的生产能力。我稍后还会谈到这一点。美联储的政策制定者也低估了自己在当时通胀问题中的责任，以及抑制通胀的能力。
For example, on occasion they blamed inflation on so-called cost-push factors such as union wage pressures and price increases by large, market-dominating firms; however, the abilities of unions and firms to push through inflationary wage and price increases were symptoms of the problem, not the underlying cause. 例如，他们有时把通胀归咎于所谓的成本推动因素，比如工会的工资压力和市场支配性企业的涨价。然而，工会和企业能够推动工资与价格上涨，本身是问题的症状，而不是根本原因。
Several years passed before the Federal Reserve gained a new leadership that better understood the central bank’s role in the inflation process and that sustained anti-inflationary monetary policies would actually work. Beginning in 1979, such policies were implemented successfully – although not without significant cost in terms of lost output and employment –under Fed Chairman Paul Volcker. 几年过去后，美联储才迎来更了解中央银行在通胀过程中的作用、也更清楚持续的反通胀货币政策确实能够奏效的新领导层。1979年起，在美联储主席保罗·沃尔克任内，这类政策得到成功实施，尽管代价不小，产出和就业都因此损失。
For the Federal Reserve, two crucial lessons from this experience were, first, that high inflation can seriously destabilize the economy and, second, that the central bank must take responsibility for achieving price stability over the medium term. 这段经历给美联储带来了两个重要教训：第一，高通胀可能严重破坏经济稳定；第二，中央银行必须承担起在中期实现价格稳定的责任。
Fast-forward now to 2003. In that year, crude oil cost a little more than $30 per barrel. Since then, crude oil prices have increased more than fourfold, proportionally about as much as in the 1970s. Now, as in 1975, adjusting to such high prices for crude oil has been painful. Gas prices around $4 a gallon are a huge burden for many households, as well as for truckers, manufacturers, farmers, and others. But, in many other ways, the economic consequences have been quite different from those of the 1970s. 现在把时间快进到2003年。那一年，原油价格略高于每桶30美元。此后，原油价格上涨了四倍多，按比例计算与20世纪70年代大致相当。如今，适应如此高的原油价格同样令人痛苦。每加仑约4美元的汽油价格给许多家庭带来沉重负担，也让卡车司机、制造商、农民和其他人承受压力。但在许多方面，经济后果与20世纪70年代大不相同。
One obvious difference is what you don’t see: drivers lining up on odd or even days to buy gasoline because of price controls or signs at gas stations that say “No gas.” And until the recent slowdown – which is more the result of conditions in the residential housing market and in financial markets than of higher oil prices – economic growth was solid and unemployment remained low, unlike what we saw following oil price increases in the ’70s. 一个明显的区别是，你看不到某些景象：司机不再因为价格管制而只能在奇数日或偶数日排队买汽油，加油站也不会挂出“无油可售”的牌子。直到最近经济放缓之前，经济增长一直稳健，失业率也保持较低；这与70年代油价上涨之后的情况不同。最近的放缓更多是住宅市场和金融市场状况造成的，而不是油价上涨造成的。
For a central banker, a particularly critical difference between then and now is what has happened to inflation and inflation expectations. The overall inflation rate has averaged about 3-1/2 percent over the past four quarters, significantly higher than we would like but much less than the double-digit rates that inflation reached in the mid-1970s and then again in 1980. 对中央银行家而言，当时与现在之间一个尤其关键的差异，是通胀及通胀预期发生了什么变化。过去四个季度，整体通胀率平均约为3.5%，明显高于我们的期望，但远低于20世纪70年代中期以及1980年曾达到的两位数水平。
Moreover, the increase in inflation has been milder this time – on the order of 1 percentage point over the past year as compared with the 6 percentage point jump that followed the 1973 oil price shock. From the perspective of monetary policy, just as important as the behavior of actual inflation is what households and businesses expect to happen to inflation in the future, particularly over the longer term. 此外，这一次通胀上升更加温和：过去一年大约上升了1个百分点，而1973年石油价格冲击之后曾跳升6个百分点。从货币政策角度看，与实际通胀的表现同样重要的，是家庭和企业，尤其是对更长期通胀的预期。
If people expect an increase in inflation to be temporary and do not build it into their longer-term plans for setting wages and prices, then the inflation created by a shock to oil prices will tend to fade relatively quickly. Some indicators of longer-term inflation expectations have risen in recent months, which is a significant concern for the Federal Reserve. We will need to monitor that situation closely. 如果人们认为价格上涨只是暂时的，不会把它纳入制定长期工资和价格计划的依据，那么石油价格冲击造成的通胀通常会相当快地消退。近几个月，一些长期通胀预期指标有所上升，这令美联储十分担忧。我们需要密切监测这一情况。
However, changes in long-term inflation expectations have been measured in tenths of a percentage point this time around rather than in whole percentage points, as appeared to be the case in the mid-1970s. Importantly, we see little indication today of the beginnings of a 1970s-style wage-price spiral, in which wages and prices chased each other ever upward. 不过，这一次长期通胀预期的变化以十分之一个百分点计，而不是像20世纪70年代中期那样以整个百分点计。更重要的是，我们目前几乎看不到类似70年代的工资—价格螺旋正在形成，也就是工资和价格彼此追逐、不断上涨的局面。
A good deal of economic research has looked at the question of why the inflation response to the oil shock has been relatively muted in the current instance. One factor, which illustrates my point about the adaptability and flexibility of the U.S. economy, is the pronounced decline in the energy intensity of the economy since the 1970s. Since 1975, the energy required to produce a given amount of output in the United States has fallen by about half. 大量经济研究都在探讨，为什么这一次石油冲击对通胀的影响相对温和。一个能够说明美国经济适应性和灵活性的因素，是自20世纪70年代以来经济能源强度显著下降。自1975年以来，美国生产同样数量的产出所需要的能源已经减少了约一半。
This great improvement in energy efficiency was less the result of government programs than of steps taken by households and businesses in response to higher energy prices, including substantial investments in more energy-efficient equipment and means of transportation. This improvement in energy efficiency is one of the reasons why a given increase in crude oil prices does less damage to the U.S. economy today than it did in the 1970s. 能源效率的巨大改善，与其说来自政府项目，不如说更多来自家庭和企业对高能源价格作出的反应，其中包括对更节能的设备和交通工具进行大量投资。这种能源效率的提升，是同样幅度的原油价格上涨如今对美国经济造成的损害小于70年代的原因之一。
Another reason is the performance of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve and other central banks have learned the lessons of the 1970s. Because monetary policy works with a lag, the short-term inflationary effects of a sharp increase in oil prices can generally not be fully offset. However, since Paul Volcker’s time, the Federal Reserve has been firmly committed to maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation over the longer term. 另一个原因是货币政策的表现。美联储和其他中央银行已经吸取了70年代的教训。由于货币政策存在时滞，油价大幅上涨带来的短期通胀影响通常无法完全抵消。不过，自保罗·沃尔克时期以来，美联储一直坚定地致力于在更长期内保持低而稳定的通胀率。
And we recognize that keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored is essential to achieving the goal of low and stable inflation. Maintaining confidence in the Fed’s commitment to price stability remains a top priority as the central bank navigates the current complex situation. 我们认识到，让长期通胀预期保持稳定，是实现低而稳定通胀目标的关键。在中央银行应对当前复杂局势之际，维持公众对美联储价格稳定承诺的信心仍然是首要任务。
Although our economy has thus far dealt with the current oil price shock comparatively well, the United States and the rest of the world still face significant challenges in dealing with the rising global demand for energy, especially if continued demand growth and constrained supplies maintain intense pressure on prices. 虽然到目前为止，我们的经济相对较好地应对了当前的石油价格冲击，但美国和世界其他地区在应对不断增长的全球能源需求方面仍面临重大挑战，尤其是在需求持续增长而供应受限、价格压力保持高位的情况下。
The silver lining of high energy prices is that they provide a powerful incentive for action – for conservation, including investment in energy-saving technologies; for the investment needed to bring new oil supplies to market; and for the development of alternative conventional and nonconventional energy sources. 高能源价格带来的积极一面是，它们为采取行动提供了强大激励：推动节约能源，包括投资节能技术；推动必要的投资，以便让新的石油供应进入市场；以及推动开发传统和非传统的替代能源。
The government, in addition to the market, can usefully address energy concerns, for example, by supporting basic research and adopting well-designed regulatory policies to promote important social objectives such as protecting the environment. As we saw after the oil price shock of the 1970s, given some time, the economy can become much more energy-efficient even as it continues to grow and living standards improve. 除了市场之外，政府也可以通过支持基础研究、制定设计良好的监管政策来促进保护环境等重要社会目标，从而有效应对能源问题。正如我们在20世纪70年代石油价格冲击之后看到的，只要给予经济一些时间，它就能够在继续增长、生活水平继续提高的同时，变得更加节能。
Let me turn now to the other economic challenge that I want to highlight today – the productivity performance of our economy. At this point you may be saying to yourself, “Is it too late to book Ali G?” However, anyone who stayed awake through EC 10 understands why this issue is so important. As Adam Smith pointed out in 1776, in the long run, more than any other factor, the productivity of the workforce determines a nation’s standard of living. 现在谈谈我今天想强调的另一个经济挑战：我们经济的生产率表现。此时此刻，你们也许会想：“现在预订阿里·G还来得及吗？”不过，凡是上过经济学导论课程且没有睡着的人，都明白这个问题为什么如此重要。正如亚当·斯密在1776年指出的，从长期看，劳动者的生产率比任何其他因素都更能决定一个国家的生活水平。
The decades following the end of World War II were remarkable for their industrial innovation and creativity. From 1948 to 1973, output per hour of work grew by nearly 3 percent per year, on average. But then, for the next 20 years or so, productivity growth averaged only about 1-1/2 percent per year, barely half its previous rate. Predictably, the rate of increase in the standard of living slowed as well, and to about the same extent. The difference between 3 percent and 1-1/2 percent may sound small. 第二次世界大战结束后的几十年，在工业创新和创造力方面极为非凡。1948年至1973年，平均而言，每小时劳动产出每年增长近3%。但随后约20年间，生产率增长平均每年只有约1.5%，几乎只有此前速度的一半。生活水平的增长率也相应放缓，程度大致相同。3%和1.5%之间的差异听起来也许很小。
But at 3 percent per year, the standard of living would double about every 23 years, or once every generation; by contrast, at 1-1/2 percent, a doubling would occur only roughly every 47 years, or once every other generation. 但如果每年增长3%，生活水平大约每23年，也就是每一代人，便会翻一番；相比之下，如果每年增长1.5%，翻番大约需要47年，也就是每两代人才一次。
Among the many consequences of the productivity slowdown was a further complication for the monetary policy makers of the 1970s. Detecting shifts in economic trends is difficult in real time, and most economists and policymakers did not fully appreciate the extent of the productivity slowdown until the late 1970s. This further influenced the policymakers of the time toward running a monetary policy that was too accommodative. 生产率放缓给70年代货币政策制定者带来的众多后果之一，是让局势更加复杂。实时识别经济趋势的变化很困难，大多数经济学家和政策制定者直到70年代末才充分认识到生产率放缓的程度。这进一步促使当时的政策制定者采取过于宽松的货币政策。
The resulting overheating of the economy probably exacerbated the inflation problem of that decade. 由此造成的经济过热，很可能加剧了那个年代的通胀问题。
Productivity growth revived in the mid-1990s, as I mentioned, illustrating once again the resilience of the American economy. Since 1995, productivity has increased at about a 2-1/2 percent annual rate. A great deal of intellectual effort has been expended in trying to explain the recent performance and to forecast the future evolution of productivity. 正如我刚才提到的，生产率增长在20世纪90年代中期恢复，再一次展现了美国经济的韧性。自1995年以来，生产率每年增长约2.5%。许多优秀的智力工作都在试图解释近期表现，并预测生产率未来的演变。
Much very good work has been conducted here at Harvard by Dale Jorgenson (my senior thesis adviser in 1975, by the way) and his colleagues, and other important research in the area has been done at the Federal Reserve Board. One key finding of that research is that, to have an economic impact, technological innovations must be translated into successful commercial applications. 哈佛的戴尔·乔根森及其同事在这方面完成了大量出色研究——顺便说一句，他是我1975年的毕业论文导师——美联储理事会也开展了其他重要研究。这些研究的一个关键发现是，技术创新要产生经济影响，就必须转化为成功的商业应用。
This country’s competitive, market-based system, its flexible capital and labor markets, its tradition of entrepreneurship, and its technological strengths – to which Harvard and other universities make a critical contribution – help ensure that that happens on an ongoing basis. 美国具有竞争性的市场经济体系、灵活的资本和劳动力市场、创业传统以及技术优势——哈佛和其他大学为这些优势作出了重要贡献——帮助确保这一转化持续发生。
While private-sector initiative was the key ingredient in generating the pickup in productivity growth, government policy was constructive, in part through support of basic research but also to a substantial degree by promoting economic competition. Beginning in the late 1970s, the federal government deregulated a number of key industries, including air travel, trucking, telecommunications, and energy. 私营部门的主动性是生产率增长回升的关键因素，但政府政策也发挥了建设性作用，一方面支持基础研究，另一方面在很大程度上促进经济竞争。从20世纪70年代末开始，联邦政府放松了对航空运输、卡车运输、电信和能源等多个关键行业的管制。
The resulting increase in competition promoted cost reductions and innovation, leading in turn to new products and industries. It is difficult to imagine that we would have online retailing today if the transportation and telecommunications industries had not been deregulated. In addition, the lowering of trade barriers promoted productivity gains by increasing competition, expanding markets, and increasing the pace of technology transfer. 竞争加剧带来了成本下降和创新，进而催生了新的产品和产业。如果交通运输和电信行业没有放松管制，很难想象今天会有网上零售。此外，降低贸易壁垒也通过加强竞争、扩大市场和加快技术转移，促进了生产率增长。
Finally, as a central banker, I would be remiss if I failed to mention the contribution of monetary policy to the improved productivity performance. By damping business cycles and by keeping inflation under control, a sound monetary policy improves the ability of households and firms to plan and increases their willingness to undertake the investments in skills, research, and physical capital needed to support continuing gains in productivity. 最后，作为一名中央银行家，如果不提货币政策对生产率表现改善的贡献，我就失职了。稳健的货币政策能够抑制商业周期并控制通胀，从而提高家庭和企业进行规划的能力，也增强它们在技能、研究和实物资本方面投资的意愿，而这些投资正是持续提高生产率所需要的。
Just as the productivity slowdown was associated with a slower growth of real per capita income, the productivity resurgence since the mid-1990s has been accompanied by a pickup in real income growth. One measure of average living standards, real consumption per capita, is nearly 35 percent higher today than in 1995. In addition, the flood of innovation that helped spur the productivity resurgence has created many new job opportunities, and more than a few fortunes. 正如生产率放缓伴随着人均实际收入增长减慢一样，20世纪90年代中期以来的生产率复苏也伴随着实际收入增长加快。衡量平均生活水平的一个指标是人均实际消费，如今比1995年高出近35%。此外，推动生产率复苏的创新浪潮创造了许多新的就业机会，也造就了不少财富。
But changing technology has also reduced job opportunities for some others – bank tellers and assembly-line workers, for example. And that is the crux of a whole new set of challenges. 但技术变化也减少了另一些人的就业机会，例如银行出纳员和流水线工人。这正是全新一组挑战的核心。
Even though average economic well-being has increased considerably over time, the degree of inequality in economic outcomes over the past three decades has increased as well. Economists continue to grapple with the reasons for this trend. But as best we can tell, the increase in inequality probably is due to a number of factors, notably including technological change that seems to have favored higher-skilled workers more than lower-skilled ones. 尽管随着时间推移，平均经济福祉大幅提高，但过去30年来经济结果的不平等程度也在上升。经济学家仍在努力理解这一趋势的原因。不过，据我们目前所知，不平等加剧很可能源于多种因素，其中一个显著因素是技术变化似乎更有利于高技能劳动者，而不是低技能劳动者。
In addition, some economists point to increased international trade and the declining role of labor unions as other, probably lesser contributing factors. 此外，一些经济学家还指出，国际贸易增加和工会作用下降也是因素，不过它们的贡献可能较小。
What should we do about rising economic inequality? Answering this question inevitably involves difficult value judgments and tradeoffs. But approaches that inhibit the dynamism of our economy would clearly be a step in the wrong direction. To be sure, new technologies and increased international trade can lead to painful dislocations as some workers lose their jobs or see the demand for their particular skills decline. 我们该如何应对日益加剧的经济不平等？回答这个问题不可避免地涉及艰难的价值判断和取舍。但抑制经济活力的做法显然会把我们引向错误方向。诚然，新技术和国际贸易增加可能造成痛苦的动荡：一些工人会失去工作，或者市场对他们特定技能的需求会下降。
However, hindering the adoption of new technologies or inhibiting trade flows would do far more harm than good over the longer haul. In the short term, the better approach is to adopt policies that help those who are displaced by economic change. By doing so, we not only provide assistance to those who need it but help to secure public support for the economic flexibility that is essential for prosperity. 然而，从更长远看，阻碍新技术采用或限制贸易流动造成的伤害远大于益处。短期内，更好的做法是采取政策帮助那些因经济变化而被迫离开原有岗位的人。这样做不仅能为需要帮助的人提供援助，也有助于争取公众支持，而经济繁荣离不开这种经济灵活性。
In the long term, however, the best way by far to improve economic opportunity and to reduce inequality is to increase the educational attainment and skills of American workers. The productivity surge in the decades after World War II corresponded to a period in which educational attainment was increasing rapidly; in recent decades, progress on that front has been far slower. Moreover, inequalities in education and in access to education remain high. 不过从长期看，提高美国劳动者的教育程度和技能，绝对是改善经济机会、减少不平等的最佳途径。第二次世界大战后几十年的生产率跃升，发生在受教育程度快速提高的时期；近几十年来，这方面的进步慢得多。此外，教育机会及其获得渠道仍然存在很大不平等。
As we think about improving education and skills, we should also look beyond the traditional K-12 and 4-year-college system – as important as it is – to recognize that education should be lifelong and can come in many forms. Early childhood education, community colleges, vocational schools, on-the-job training, online courses, adult education – all of these are vehicles of demonstrated value in increasing skills and lifetime earning power. 当我们思考如何改善教育和技能时，也应超越传统的幼儿园至高中教育和四年制大学体系——尽管它们非常重要——认识到教育应当是终身的，也可以采取多种形式。幼儿早期教育、社区学院、职业学校、在职培训、在线课程和成人教育，都是已经证明能够提升技能和终身收入能力的途径。
The use of a wide range of methods to address the pressing problems of inadequate skills and economic inequality would be entirely consistent with the themes of economic adaptability and flexibility that I have emphasized in my remarks. 运用多种方法解决技能不足和经济不平等这些紧迫问题，完全符合我在演讲中强调的经济适应性和灵活性主题。
I will close by shifting from the topic of education in general to your education specifically. Through effort, talent, and doubtless some luck, you have succeeded in acquiring an excellent education. Your education – more precisely, your ability to think critically and creatively – is your greatest asset. And unlike many assets, the more you draw on it, the faster it grows. Put it to good use. 最后，我想从一般意义上的教育转到你们所接受的教育。通过努力、才能，当然也少不了一些运气，你们已经获得了优良教育。你们的教育，更准确地说，你们批判性和创造性思考的能力，是自己最宝贵的资产。与许多资产不同，你越多使用它，它增长得越快。请善加利用。
The poor forecasting record of economists is legendary, but I will make a forecast in which I am very confident: Whatever you expect your life and work to be like 10, 20, or 30 years from now, the reality will be quite different. In looking over the 30th anniversary report on my own class, I was struck by the great diversity of vocations and avocations that have engaged my classmates. 经济学家糟糕的预测记录已经成了传奇，但我会做出一个非常有把握的预测：无论你们预计自己10年、20年或30年后的生活和工作会是什么样，现实都会大不相同。翻阅自己班级的毕业30周年纪念册时，我对同学们从事的职业和发展出的兴趣之丰富感到惊讶。
To be sure, the volume was full of attorneys and physicians and professors as well as architects, engineers, editors, bankers, and even a few economists. Many listed the title “vice president,” and, not a few, “president.” But the Class of 1975 also includes those who listed their occupations as composer, environmental advocate, musician, playwright, rabbi, conflict resolution coach, painter, community organizer, and essayist. 当然，纪念册里有许多律师、医生和教授，也有建筑师、工程师、编辑、银行家，甚至还有几位经济学家。许多人把职务写成“副总裁”，也有不少人写成“总裁”。但1975届同学中还包括作曲家、环境倡导者、音乐家、剧作家、拉比、冲突调解教练、画家、社区组织者和随笔作者。
And even for those of us with the more conventional job descriptions, the nature of our daily work and its relationship to the economy and society is, I am sure, very different from what we might have guessed in 1975. My point is only that you cannot predict your path. You can only try to be as prepared as possible for the opportunities, as well as the disappointments, that will come your way. For people, as for economies, adaptability and flexibility count for a great deal. 即使对我们这些职业名称较为传统的人来说，我相信，我们日常工作的性质，以及它与经济和社会的关系，也与1975年时我们可能设想的十分不同。我想说的只是，你无法预测自己将走上什么道路。你只能尽可能为即将到来的机遇和失望做好准备。对个人而言，正如对经济而言，适应性和灵活性都极其重要。
Wherever your path leads, I hope you use your considerable talents and energy in endeavors that engage and excite you and benefit not only yourselves, but also in some measure your country and your world. Today, I wish you and your families a day of joyous celebration. Congratulations. 无论你们最终走向何方，我希望你们把自己的才华和精力投入那些能让你们投入其中、使你们兴奋，并且不仅有益于自己、也在某种程度上有益于国家和世界的事业。今天，祝你们和家人享受喜悦的庆祝时光。祝贺大家。