It is a great honor to return to the National Defense University. Here, at Fort McNair, Americans have served in uniform since 1791 -- standing guard in the earliest days of the Republic, and contemplating the future of warfare here in the 21st century. 再次来到国家国防大学，我深感荣幸。自一七九一年起，美国军人就在麦克奈尔堡服役，从共和国初创时期的站岗守卫，到二十一世纪在这里思考未来战争的形态。
For over two centuries, the United States has been bound together by founding documents that defined who we are as Americans, and served as our compass through every type of change. Matters of war and peace are no different. Americans are deeply ambivalent about war, but having fought for our independence, we know a price must be paid for freedom. From the Civil War to our struggle against fascism, on through the long twilight struggle of the Cold War, battlefields have changed and technology has evolved. 两个多世纪以来，美国的建国文献界定了我们是谁，也在种种变化中为我们指引方向。战争与和平同样如此。美国人对战争始终怀有复杂感情，但我们为独立而战，因此知道自由需要付出代价。从南北战争到反法西斯斗争，再到漫长的冷战，战场在变化，技术也在进步。
But our commitment to constitutional principles has weathered every war, and every war has come to an end. 但我们对宪法原则的坚守经受住了每一场战争，而每一场战争最终都会结束。
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a new dawn of democracy took hold abroad, and a decade of peace and prosperity arrived here at home. And for a moment, it seemed the 21st century would be a tranquil time. And then, on September 11, 2001, we were shaken out of complacency. Thousands were taken from us, as clouds of fire and metal and ash descended upon a sun-filled morning. This was a different kind of war. No armies came to our shores, and our military was not the principal target. Instead, a group of terrorists came to kill as many civilians as they could. 柏林墙倒塌后，民主的曙光在海外升起，美国国内迎来十年的和平与繁荣。有那么一刻，二十一世纪似乎会是个宁静的时代。然而二〇〇一年九月十一日，我们从安逸中惊醒。在一个阳光明媚的早晨，火焰、金属和灰烬遮蔽天空，数千人失去生命。这是一种不同的战争：没有军队登陆我国海岸，军方也不是主要目标。一群恐怖分子想杀害尽可能多的平民。
And so our nation went to war. We have now been at war for well over a decade. I won’t review the full history. What is clear is that we quickly drove al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, but then shifted our focus and began a new war in Iraq. And this carried significant consequences for our fight against al Qaeda, our standing in the world, and -- to this day -- our interests in a vital region. 于是国家进入战争。至今我们已打了十多年的仗，我不打算回顾全部历史。明确的是，我们迅速将“基地”组织逐出阿富汗，随后却转移注意力，在伊拉克发动另一场战争。这严重影响了我们打击“基地”组织的努力、国际地位，以及直到今天在一个关键地区的利益。
Meanwhile, we strengthened our defenses -- hardening targets, tightening transportation security, giving law enforcement new tools to prevent terror. Most of these changes were sound. Some caused inconvenience. But some, like expanded surveillance, raised difficult questions about the balance that we strike between our interests in security and our values of privacy. And in some cases, I believe we compromised our basic values -- by using torture to interrogate our enemies, and detaining individuals in a way that ran counter to the rule of law. 与此同时，我们加强防御，保护潜在目标，收紧交通运输安全措施，为执法部门提供预防恐怖主义的新工具。多数改变是合理的，有些带来不便。但扩大监控等做法也提出棘手问题：怎样在安全利益与隐私价值之间取得平衡？在某些情况下，我认为我们甚至牺牲了基本价值，例如用酷刑审讯敌人，以违背法治的方式拘禁人员。
So after I took office, we stepped up the war against al Qaeda but we also sought to change its course. We relentlessly targeted al Qaeda’s leadership. We ended the war in Iraq, and brought nearly 150,000 troops home. We pursued a new strategy in Afghanistan, and increased our training of Afghan forces. We unequivocally banned torture, affirmed our commitment to civilian courts, worked to align our policies with the rule of law, and expanded our consultations with Congress. 因此，上任后我们一方面加强打击“基地”组织，另一方面努力改变战争的方向。我们持续打击其领导层，结束伊拉克战争，带回近十五万军人；在阿富汗实行新战略，加强训练阿富汗部队。我们明确禁止酷刑，重申对民事法庭的承诺，努力使政策符合法治，并扩大与国会的协商。
Today, Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on the United States, and our homeland is more secure. Fewer of our troops are in harm’s way, and over the next 19 months they will continue to come home. Our alliances are strong, and so is our standing in the world. In sum, we are safer because of our efforts. 今天，本·拉登已经死亡，他的大多数高级副手也不在人世。美国本土没有再遭受大规模袭击，国土更加安全。身处险境的军人更少，未来十九个月还会有更多人回家。我们的同盟稳固，国际地位也强健。总而言之，我们的努力使国家更安全。
Now, make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists. From Benghazi to Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth. But we have to recognize that the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on 9/11. With a decade of experience now to draw from, this is the moment to ask ourselves hard questions -- about the nature of today’s threats and how we should confront them. 但不要误会，恐怖分子仍威胁着我们。班加西和波士顿的悲剧再次提醒我们这一点。不过，我们必须认识到，这种威胁已不同于“九一一”时来到美国海岸的威胁。如今有十多年经验可供借鉴，是时候认真追问：当今威胁是什么性质？我们该如何应对？
And these questions matter to every American. 这些问题与每个美国人息息相关。
For over the last decade, our nation has spent well over a trillion dollars on war, helping to explode our deficits and constraining our ability to nation-build here at home. Our servicemembers and their families have sacrificed far more on our behalf. Nearly 7,000 Americans have made the ultimate sacrifice. Many more have left a part of themselves on the battlefield, or brought the shadows of battle back home. From our use of drones to the detention of terrorist suspects, the decisions that we are making now will define the type of nation -- and world -- that we leave to our children. 过去十多年，国家在战争上花费远超一万亿美元，推动赤字激增，也限制了我们在国内建设的能力。军人和他们的家人为我们付出的牺牲远不止于此。近七千名美国人献出生命；更多人在战场上留下身体的一部分，或把战争的阴影带回家。从使用无人机到拘禁恐怖嫌疑人，我们今天作出的决定，将决定留给子女的是怎样的国家和世界。
So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us. We have to be mindful of James Madison’s warning that “No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.” Neither I, nor any President, can promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. 因此，美国正处在十字路口。我们必须界定这场斗争的性质与范围，否则斗争就会反过来定义我们。我们必须牢记詹姆斯·麦迪逊的警告：“没有哪个国家能在持续战争中保住自由。”我和任何一位总统都无法保证彻底消灭恐怖主义。我们永远无法抹去某些人心中的邪恶，也无法消除开放社会面临的所有危险。
But what we can do -- what we must do -- is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend. And to define that strategy, we have to make decisions based not on fear, but on hard-earned wisdom. That begins with understanding the current threat that we face. 但我们能够、也必须瓦解直接威胁我们的网络，降低新团体站稳脚跟的可能性，同时守住我们要捍卫的自由和理想。制定战略必须靠艰辛得来的智慧，而不是恐惧。第一步是认清当前威胁。
Today, the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own safety than plotting against us. They did not direct the attacks in Benghazi or Boston. They’ve not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11. 今天，阿富汗和巴基斯坦境内的“基地”组织核心正走向失败。剩余成员花更多时间担心自身安全，而非策划袭击。他们没有指挥班加西或波士顿的袭击，自“九一一”以来也未能在美国本土成功发动袭击。
Instead, what we’ve seen is the emergence of various al Qaeda affiliates. From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse, with Al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula -- AQAP -- the most active in plotting against our homeland. And while none of AQAP’s efforts approach the scale of 9/11, they have continued to plot acts of terror, like the attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009. 我们看到的反而是各种“基地”组织分支兴起。从也门到伊拉克、从索马里到北非，今天的威胁更加分散。其中，“阿拉伯半岛基地组织”最积极地谋划袭击美国本土。它的企图虽远达不到“九一一”的规模，却仍不断策划恐怖行动，例如二〇〇九年圣诞节企图炸毁客机。
Unrest in the Arab world has also allowed extremists to gain a foothold in countries like Libya and Syria. But here, too, there are differences from 9/11. In some cases, we continue to confront state-sponsored networks like Hezbollah that engage in acts of terror to achieve political goals. Other of these groups are simply collections of local militias or extremists interested in seizing territory. And while we are vigilant for signs that these groups may pose a transnational threat, most are focused on operating in the countries and regions where they are based. 阿拉伯世界的动荡也让极端分子在利比亚和叙利亚等国找到立足点。但这些情况同样与“九一一”不同。有时我们仍面对真主党这样由国家支持、以恐怖活动实现政治目标的网络；另一些团体则只是想夺取领土的地方民兵或极端分子。我们会警惕它们是否形成跨国威胁，但多数团体主要在本国或周边地区活动。
And that means we'll face more localized threats like what we saw in Benghazi, or the BP oil facility in Algeria, in which local operatives -- perhaps in loose affiliation with regional networks -- launch periodic attacks against Western diplomats, companies, and other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal enterprises to fund their operations. 这意味着我们将遇到更多地方性威胁，例如班加西袭击和阿尔及利亚英国石油公司设施遇袭。当地武装人员可能与区域网络有松散联系，间歇袭击西方外交官、企业和其他防守薄弱的目标，或靠绑架等犯罪活动筹款。
And finally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the United States. Whether it’s a shooter at a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin, a plane flying into a building in Texas, or the extremists who killed 168 people at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, America has confronted many forms of violent extremism in our history. Deranged or alienated individuals -- often U.S. citizens or legal residents -- can do enormous damage, particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent jihad. 最后，我们还面临美国国内人员走向激进化的现实威胁。无论是威斯康星州锡克教寺庙的枪击案、有人驾驶飞机撞向得克萨斯州一栋建筑，还是在俄克拉何马城联邦大楼杀害一百六十八人的极端分子，美国历史上曾面对多种形式的暴力极端主义。精神失常或被社会疏离的人——往往是美国公民或合法居民——能够造成巨大伤害，尤其当他们受到暴力“圣战”观念鼓动时。
And that pull towards extremism appears to have led to the shooting at Fort Hood and the bombing of the Boston Marathon. 这种走向极端的力量似乎也导致了胡德堡枪击案和波士顿马拉松爆炸案。
So that’s the current threat -- lethal yet less capable al Qaeda affiliates; threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad; homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We have to take these threats seriously, and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11. 所以，当前威胁包括致命却能力较弱的“基地”组织分支、针对海外外交机构和企业的袭击，以及本土极端分子。这就是恐怖主义的未来。我们必须认真对待，尽一切力量应对；但在制定措施时也要明白，其规模更接近“九一一”之前我们遭遇过的袭击。
In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our Embassy in Beirut; at our Marine Barracks in Lebanon; on a cruise ship at sea; at a disco in Berlin; and on a Pan Am flight -- Flight 103 -- over Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center; at our military facilities in Saudi Arabia; and at our Embassy in Kenya. These attacks were all brutal; they were all deadly; and we learned that left unchecked, these threats can grow. But if dealt with smartly and proportionally, these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve of 9/11. 上世纪八十年代，美国人在贝鲁特使馆、黎巴嫩海军陆战队兵营、海上游轮、柏林迪斯科舞厅，以及洛克比上空的泛美航空一〇三号航班上死于恐怖袭击。九十年代，美国人又在世贸中心、沙特阿拉伯的军事设施和肯尼亚使馆遇害。每起袭击都残酷致命，也使我们认识到，放任威胁会让它扩大。但若以明智、适度的方式应对，它们不一定发展到“九一一”前夕的程度。
Moreover, we have to recognize that these threats don’t arise in a vacuum. Most, though not all, of the terrorism we faced is fueled by a common ideology -- a belief by some extremists that Islam is in conflict with the United States and the West, and that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course, this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is not at war with Islam. And this ideology is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims, who are the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks. 我们还须认识到，这些威胁并非凭空而来。我们面对的大多数——但不是全部——恐怖主义受到一种共同意识形态驱动：有些极端分子认为伊斯兰教与美国及西方势不两立，为了更大目标，对西方目标、包括平民使用暴力也是正当的。这种观念建立在谎言上，因为美国并未与伊斯兰教开战。绝大多数穆斯林也反对它，而他们往往是恐怖袭击最常见的受害者。
Nevertheless, this ideology persists, and in an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can’t depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas. So what I want to discuss here today is the components of such a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. 然而这种意识形态依然存在。在思想和图像转瞬传遍全球的时代，应对恐怖主义不能只靠军队或执法部门。我们必须运用国家力量的各个方面，赢得意志与思想之争。今天我想谈谈这样一套全面反恐战略的组成部分。
First, we must finish the work of defeating al Qaeda and its associated forces. 第一，必须完成击败“基地”组织及其关联势力的工作。
In Afghanistan, we will complete our transition to Afghan responsibility for that country’s security. Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to an end. And we will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counterterrorism force, which ensures that al Qaeda can never again establish a safe haven to launch attacks against us or our allies. 在阿富汗，我们会完成把国家安全责任移交给阿富汗人的过程。我们的军队将回家，作战任务将结束。我们会与阿富汗政府合作训练安全部队，并维持反恐力量，确保“基地”组织无法再次在那里建立安全避难所，向我们或盟友发动袭击。
Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless “global war on terror,” but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America. In many cases, this will involve partnerships with other countries. Already, thousands of Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives fighting extremists. In Yemen, we are supporting security forces that have reclaimed territory from AQAP. In Somalia, we helped a coalition of African nations push al-Shabaab out of its strongholds. 在阿富汗之外，我们的行动不应被定义为没有边界的“全球反恐战争”，而应是一系列持续且有针对性的努力，瓦解威胁美国的具体暴力极端组织网络。许多时候，这需要与其他国家合作。巴基斯坦已有数千名士兵在打击极端分子时牺牲；在也门，我们支持安全部队从“阿拉伯半岛基地组织”手中收复领土；在索马里，我们帮助非洲国家联盟将青年党逐出据点。
In Mali, we’re providing military aid to French-led intervention to push back al Qaeda in the Maghreb, and help the people of Mali reclaim their future. 在马里，我们向法国领导的干预行动提供军事援助，击退伊斯兰马格里布“基地”组织，帮助马里人民重新掌握未来。
Much of our best counterterrorism cooperation results in the gathering and sharing of intelligence, the arrest and prosecution of terrorists. And that’s how a Somali terrorist apprehended off the coast of Yemen is now in a prison in New York. That’s how we worked with European allies to disrupt plots from Denmark to Germany to the United Kingdom. That’s how intelligence collected with Saudi Arabia helped us stop a cargo plane from being blown up over the Atlantic. These partnerships work. 我们许多最有效的反恐合作，是收集、共享情报，逮捕并起诉恐怖分子。因此，一名在也门海岸外被捕的索马里恐怖分子如今关在纽约监狱；我们与欧洲盟友一道挫败了丹麦、德国和英国的袭击阴谋；与沙特阿拉伯共同掌握的情报帮助我们阻止一架货机在大西洋上空被炸毁。这些伙伴关系有效。
But despite our strong preference for the detention and prosecution of terrorists, sometimes this approach is foreclosed. Al Qaeda and its affiliates try to gain foothold in some of the most distant and unforgiving places on Earth. They take refuge in remote tribal regions. They hide in caves and walled compounds. They train in empty deserts and rugged mountains. 尽管我们强烈倾向于拘捕和起诉恐怖分子，有时这种办法却行不通。“基地”组织及其分支试图在地球上一些最偏远、最严酷的地方立足，躲进偏远部落地区、洞穴和设防院落，在空旷沙漠与崎岖山区训练。
In some of these places -- such as parts of Somalia and Yemen -- the state only has the most tenuous reach into the territory. In other cases, the state lacks the capacity or will to take action. And it’s also not possible for America to simply deploy a team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. 在索马里和也门的一些地方，国家对当地几乎没有控制力；另一些地方，政府缺乏行动的能力或意愿。美国也不可能派特种部队去抓捕每一名恐怖分子。
Even when such an approach may be possible, there are places where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local civilians -- where a terrorist compound cannot be breached without triggering a firefight with surrounding tribal communities, for example, that pose no threat to us; times when putting U.S. boots on the ground may trigger a major international crisis. 即使理论上可以抓捕，有些地方也会让我们的军人和当地平民面临重大风险。例如，要闯入恐怖分子的院落，可能与并不威胁我们的周边部落爆发枪战；美军地面进入也可能引发重大国际危机。
To put it another way, our operation in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden cannot be the norm. The risks in that case were immense. The likelihood of capture, although that was our preference, was remote given the certainty that our folks would confront resistance. The fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with civilian casualties, or embroiled in an extended firefight, was a testament to the meticulous planning and professionalism of our Special Forces, but it also depended on some luck. And it was supported by massive infrastructure in Afghanistan. 换句话说，我们在巴基斯坦针对本·拉登的行动不能成为常态。那次风险极大。虽然我们更希望活捉，但几乎确定会遭遇抵抗，成功抓捕的可能性很低。没有造成平民伤亡，也没有陷入持久枪战，证明特种部队计划周密、行动专业，同时也有运气成分；行动还依赖阿富汗的大量基础设施支持。
And even then, the cost to our relationship with Pakistan -- and the backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory -- was so severe that we are just now beginning to rebuild this important partnership. 即便如此，这次行动对美巴关系造成的代价，以及巴基斯坦公众对主权受侵犯的强烈反弹，都十分严重，以至于我们现在才开始重建这一重要伙伴关系。
So it is in this context that the United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones. 正是在这样的背景下，美国对“基地”组织及其关联势力采取了有针对性的致命行动，包括使用通常称作无人机的遥控飞机。
As was true in previous armed conflicts, this new technology raises profound questions -- about who is targeted, and why; about civilian casualties, and the risk of creating new enemies; about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and international law; about accountability and morality. So let me address these questions. 和以往的武装冲突一样，新技术带来深刻问题：谁会成为目标，为什么；平民伤亡及制造新敌人的风险；袭击在美国法和国际法下是否合法；以及问责与道德问题。现在我来回答这些问题。
To begin with, our actions are effective. Don’t take my word for it. In the intelligence gathered at bin Laden’s compound, we found that he wrote, “We could lose the reserves to enemy’s air strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with explosives.” Other communications from al Qaeda operatives confirm this as well. Dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been disrupted that would have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit systems, European cities and our troops in Afghanistan. 首先，我们的行动有效。不要只听我说。在本·拉登住所取得的情报中，他写道：“我们可能因敌人的空袭失去后备力量；炸药无法抵挡空袭。”其他“基地”组织成员的通信也证实了这一点。数十名训练有素的指挥官、教官、炸弹制造者和行动人员已退出战场；针对国际航班、美国交通系统、欧洲城市和驻阿富汗军队的阴谋也被挫败。
Simply put, these strikes have saved lives. 简单说，这些打击挽救了生命。
Moreover, America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war -- a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense. 此外，美国的行动合法。“九一一”时我们遭到袭击，一周内国会以压倒多数授权使用武力。根据国内法和国际法，美国正与“基地”组织、塔利班及其关联势力处于战争状态。若不先阻止，他们此刻会尽可能多地杀害美国人。因此，这是一场正义的战争，以相称方式、作为最后手段、出于自卫而进行。
And yet, as our fight enters a new phase, America’s legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the end of the discussion. To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance. For the same human progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power -- or risk abusing it. 但随着斗争进入新阶段，美国正当的自卫主张不能成为讨论的终点。一种军事手段合法、甚至有效，不代表它在每种情况下都明智或合乎道德。人类进步赋予我们打击半个地球之外目标的技术，同样要求我们以自律约束这种力量，否则就有滥用之虞。
And that’s why, over the last four years, my administration has worked vigorously to establish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists –- insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy Guidance that I signed yesterday. 因此，过去四年里，政府努力建立规范对恐怖分子使用武力的框架，坚持明确准则、监督和问责。我昨天签署的《总统政策指导文件》已将其正式写明。
In the Afghan war theater, we must -- and will -- continue to support our troops until the transition is complete at the end of 2014. And that means we will continue to take strikes against high value al Qaeda targets, but also against forces that are massing to support attacks on coalition forces. But by the end of 2014, we will no longer have the same need for force protection, and the progress we’ve made against core al Qaeda will reduce the need for unmanned strikes. 在阿富汗战区，我们必须也将继续支持军人，直到二〇一四年底完成过渡。这意味着我们会继续打击“基地”组织的重要目标，也会打击正在集结、准备袭击联军的势力。但到二〇一四年底，我们保护驻军的需求将减少；打击“基地”组织核心取得的进展，也会降低无人机打击的必要性。
Beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al Qaeda and its associated forces. And even then, the use of drones is heavily constrained. America does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists; our preference is always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute. America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty. 在阿富汗战区之外，我们只以“基地”组织及其关联势力为目标。即便如此，无人机使用仍受到严格限制。只要能够抓捕个别恐怖分子，美国就不会发动打击；我们始终更愿意拘捕、审讯并起诉。美国也不能想在哪里动手就在哪里动手；我们的行动受与伙伴国磋商以及尊重国家主权的原则约束。
America does not take strikes to punish individuals; we act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat. And before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured -- the highest standard we can set. 美国不会为惩罚个人而发动袭击。只有恐怖分子对美国人民构成持续而迫在眉睫的威胁，且没有其他政府能够有效化解威胁时，我们才采取行动。每次打击前，还必须几乎完全确定不会有平民死伤。这是我们能设定的最高标准。
Now, this last point is critical, because much of the criticism about drone strikes -- both here at home and abroad -- understandably centers on reports of civilian casualties. There’s a wide gap between U.S. assessments of such casualties and nongovernmental reports. Nevertheless, it is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in every war. And for the families of those civilians, no words or legal construct can justify their loss. 最后一点至关重要，因为国内外对无人机打击的许多批评，理所当然集中在平民伤亡报告上。美国政府的伤亡评估与非政府组织的报告相差很大。但不可回避的事实是，美方打击确实造成平民伤亡，每场战争都有这种风险。对遇难者家属而言，任何言语或法律说辞都无法为失去亲人开脱。
For me, and those in my chain of command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live, just as we are haunted by the civilian casualties that have occurred throughout conventional fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. 对我和指挥链中的每个人来说，这些死亡将困扰我们终生，正如阿富汗与伊拉克常规战斗造成的平民伤亡也始终困扰着我们。
But as Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the alternatives. To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties -- not just in our cities at home and our facilities abroad, but also in the very places like Sana’a and Kabul and Mogadishu where terrorists seek a foothold. Remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes. So doing nothing is not an option. 但作为三军统帅，我必须把这些令人心碎的悲剧与其他选择相比。面对恐怖网络无所作为，会让更多平民遇害，不仅在美国城市和海外设施，也在萨那、喀布尔、摩加迪沙等恐怖分子试图立足的地方。请记住，我们追捕的恐怖分子以平民为目标；他们袭击穆斯林造成的死亡人数，远超任何对无人机打击平民伤亡的估计。所以，无所作为不是选项。
Where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in their territory, the primary alternative to targeted lethal action would be the use of conventional military options. As I’ve already said, even small special operations carry enormous risks. Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones, and are likely to cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage. 如果外国政府无法或不愿有效遏制境内恐怖活动，有针对性的致命行动之外，主要替代方案就是常规军事行动。正如我所说，即使小规模特种行动也有巨大风险。常规空军或导弹远不如无人机精确，更可能造成平民伤亡和当地民众的愤怒。
And invasions of these territories lead us to be viewed as occupying armies, unleash a torrent of unintended consequences, are difficult to contain, result in large numbers of civilian casualties and ultimately empower those who thrive on violent conflict. 而入侵这些地区会让我们被视作占领军，释放难以控制的一连串意外后果，造成大量平民伤亡，最终反而让依靠暴力冲突壮大的势力得益。
So it is false to assert that putting boots on the ground is less likely to result in civilian deaths or less likely to create enemies in the Muslim world. The results would be more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down, more confrontations with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that could easily escalate into new wars. 所以，声称派地面部队更少造成平民死亡、更少在穆斯林世界制造敌人，是错误的。结果会是更多美国人丧生、更多“黑鹰”直升机坠落、与当地民众更多冲突；为支持突袭而不断扩大任务，也容易升级成新的战争。
Yes, the conflict with al Qaeda, like all armed conflict, invites tragedy. But by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life. 是的，与“基地”组织的冲突和所有武装冲突一样会带来悲剧。但我们把行动严格指向那些想杀害我们的人，而非他们藏身其中的民众，就是在选择最不可能使无辜者丧生的方案。
Our efforts must be measured against the history of putting American troops in distant lands among hostile populations. In Vietnam, hundreds of thousands of civilians died in a war where the boundaries of battle were blurred. In Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the extraordinary courage and discipline of our troops, thousands of civilians have been killed. 衡量我们的努力，还须回顾把美军派到遥远敌对地区的历史。越南战争中，战场界限模糊，数十万平民死亡；伊拉克和阿富汗战争中，尽管军人展现非凡勇气和纪律，仍有数千平民丧生。
So neither conventional military action nor waiting for attacks to occur offers moral safe harbor, and neither does a sole reliance on law enforcement in territories that have no functioning police or security services -- and indeed, have no functioning law. 因此，无论常规军事行动，还是坐等袭击发生，都不能让我们在道德上高枕无忧。在没有正常运作的警察、安全机构，甚至没有有效法律的地区，完全依赖执法也同样做不到。
Now, this is not to say that the risks are not real. Any U.S. military action in foreign lands risks creating more enemies and impacts public opinion overseas. Moreover, our laws constrain the power of the President even during wartime, and I have taken an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States. The very precision of drone strikes and the necessary secrecy often involved in such actions can end up shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also lead a President and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism. 这并不是说风险不真实。美国在海外任何军事行动都可能制造更多敌人、影响海外舆论。我们的法律即使在战时也限制总统权力，而我宣誓捍卫美国宪法。无人机打击高度精确，又常须保密，反而可能让政府避开派兵时会受到的公众审视，也可能使总统及团队误以为无人机是解决恐怖主义的万能药。
And for this reason, I’ve insisted on strong oversight of all lethal action. After I took office, my administration began briefing all strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan to the appropriate committees of Congress. Let me repeat that: Not only did Congress authorize the use of force, it is briefed on every strike that America takes. Every strike. That includes the one instance when we targeted an American citizen -- Anwar Awlaki, the chief of external operations for AQAP. 因此，我坚持对所有致命行动实行严格监督。上任后，我的政府开始向国会相关委员会通报伊拉克和阿富汗以外的每次打击。我再说一遍：国会不仅授权使用武力，而且会获悉美国采取的每一次打击，无一例外。这包括我们以一名美国公民为目标的那一次——“阿拉伯半岛基地组织”对外行动负责人安瓦尔·奥拉基。
This week, I authorized the declassification of this action, and the deaths of three other Americans in drone strikes, to facilitate transparency and debate on this issue and to dismiss some of the more outlandish claims that have been made. For the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any U.S. citizen -- with a drone, or with a shotgun -- without due process, nor should any President deploy armed drones over U.S. soil. 本周我批准解密那次行动，以及另外三名美国人在无人机打击中死亡的情况，以促进透明和讨论，澄清一些离奇的说法。明确地说，我认为政府若未经正当程序便以无人机或猎枪瞄准并杀害任何美国公民，都不符合宪法。任何总统也不应在美国领土上部署武装无人机。
But when a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America and is actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens, and when neither the United States, nor our partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot, his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a SWAT team. 但若一名美国公民前往海外对美国开战，积极策划杀害美国人，而美国及伙伴又无法在阴谋实施前抓获他，公民身份就不应成为护身符，正如向无辜人群开枪的狙击手不能以身份阻止特警采取行动。
That’s who Anwar Awlaki was -- he was continuously trying to kill people. He helped oversee the 2010 plot to detonate explosive devices on two U.S.-bound cargo planes. He was involved in planning to blow up an airliner in 2009. When Farouk Abdulmutallab -- the Christmas Day bomber -- went to Yemen in 2009, Awlaki hosted him, approved his suicide operation, helped him tape a martyrdom video to be shown after the attack, and his last instructions were to blow up the airplane when it was over American soil. 安瓦尔·奥拉基正是这样的人。他持续谋划杀人，协助指挥二〇一〇年炸毁两架飞往美国的货机的阴谋，并参与策划二〇〇九年炸毁一架客机。那年，圣诞节未遂炸机者法鲁克·阿卜杜勒穆塔拉布到也门后，奥拉基接待了他，批准其自杀式行动，帮他录制准备在袭击后播放的殉难视频，最后还指示他等飞机飞到美国领空上方再引爆。
I would have detained and prosecuted Awlaki if we captured him before he carried out a plot, but we couldn’t. And as President, I would have been derelict in my duty had I not authorized the strike that took him out. 如果能在他实施阴谋前抓获，我会拘捕并起诉奥拉基，但我们做不到。身为总统，若不授权将他击毙，我就是失职。
Of course, the targeting of any American raises constitutional issues that are not present in other strikes -- which is why my administration submitted information about Awlaki to the Department of Justice months before Awlaki was killed, and briefed the Congress before this strike as well. But the high threshold that we’ve set for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are American citizens. This threshold respects the inherent dignity of every human life. 当然，以任何美国人为目标，都会提出其他打击所没有的宪法问题。因此，在奥拉基被击毙数月前，政府已向司法部提交其资料，打击前也向国会作了通报。但我们为致命行动设定的高门槛，适用于所有可能成为目标的恐怖分子，无论是否美国公民。这一门槛尊重每个人生命固有的尊严。
Alongside the decision to put our men and women in uniform in harm’s way, the decision to use force against individuals or groups -- even against a sworn enemy of the United States -- is the hardest thing I do as President. But these decisions must be made, given my responsibility to protect the American people. 除了决定让身着军装的男女军人身陷险境外，决定对个人或团体使用武力，即使对象是美国的死敌，也是我作为总统所作的最艰难决定。但保护美国人民是我的责任，这些决定必须作出。
Going forward, I’ve asked my administration to review proposals to extend oversight of lethal actions outside of warzones that go beyond our reporting to Congress. Each option has virtues in theory, but poses difficulties in practice. For example, the establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action has the benefit of bringing a third branch of government into the process, but raises serious constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority. 今后，我已要求政府审查各种提案，在向国会通报之外，加强对战区外致命行动的监督。每种方案理论上都有优点，实践中也有难题。例如设立特别法院评估并授权致命行动，可让政府第三部门参与，却会引出有关总统权力和司法权力的重大宪法问题。
Another idea that’s been suggested -- the establishment of an independent oversight board in the executive branch -- avoids those problems, but may introduce a layer of bureaucracy into national security decision-making, without inspiring additional public confidence in the process. But despite these challenges, I look forward to actively engaging Congress to explore these and other options for increased oversight. 另一个建议是在行政部门设立独立监督委员会。它能避开上述问题，却可能给国家安全决策增加一层官僚程序，而未必能让公众对过程更有信心。尽管如此，我期待与国会积极探讨这些和其他加强监督的方案。
I believe, however, that the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have about a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy -- because for all the focus on the use of force, force alone cannot make us safe. We cannot use force everywhere that a radical ideology takes root; and in the absence of a strategy that reduces the wellspring of extremism, a perpetual war -- through drones or Special Forces or troop deployments -- will prove self-defeating, and alter our country in troubling ways. 不过我认为，讨论使用武力，必须放在更广泛的全面反恐战略中。尽管使用武力备受关注，仅靠武力无法确保安全。我们不能在激进意识形态生根的每个地方使用武力；若没有减少极端主义滋生土壤的战略，无论靠无人机、特种部队还是部署地面部队，永久战争终将适得其反，并以令人忧虑的方式改变国家。
So the next element of our strategy involves addressing the underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism -- from North Africa to South Asia. As we’ve learned this past decade, this is a vast and complex undertaking. We must be humble in our expectation that we can quickly resolve deep-rooted problems like poverty and sectarian hatred. Moreover, no two countries are alike, and some will undergo chaotic change before things get better. But our security and our values demand that we make the effort. 因此，战略的下一部分，是处理从北非到南亚滋养极端主义的深层不满和冲突。过去十年告诉我们，这是一项庞大而复杂的任务。对于迅速解决贫困和宗派仇恨等根深蒂固的问题，我们必须保持谦逊。没有两个国家完全相同，有些国家在好转前还会经历混乱变化。但我们的安全与价值观要求我们作出努力。
This means patiently supporting transitions to democracy in places like Egypt and Tunisia and Libya -- because the peaceful realization of individual aspirations will serve as a rebuke to violent extremists. We must strengthen the opposition in Syria, while isolating extremist elements -- because the end of a tyrant must not give way to the tyranny of terrorism. We are actively working to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians -- because it is right and because such a peace could help reshape attitudes in the region. 这意味着耐心支持埃及、突尼斯、利比亚等国向民主过渡，因为个人理想若能和平实现，就是对暴力极端分子的有力驳斥。我们必须壮大叙利亚反对派，同时孤立极端分子，因为暴君倒台之后不应由恐怖主义的暴政接替。我们也积极促进以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之间的和平，因为这本身是正确的，也可能帮助改变该地区的观念。
And we must help countries modernize economies, upgrade education, and encourage entrepreneurship -- because American leadership has always been elevated by our ability to connect with people’s hopes, and not simply their fears. 我们还必须帮助各国实现经济现代化、改善教育、鼓励创业。美国领导力之所以强大，始终在于我们能回应人们的希望，而非只利用他们的恐惧。
And success on all these fronts requires sustained engagement, but it will also require resources. I know that foreign aid is one of the least popular expenditures that there is. That’s true for Democrats and Republicans -- I’ve seen the polling -- even though it amounts to less than one percent of the federal budget. In fact, a lot of folks think it’s 25 percent, if you ask people on the streets. Less than one percent -- still wildly unpopular. But foreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to our national security. 要在这些领域取得成功，既需要持续参与，也需要资源。我知道对外援助是最不受欢迎的支出之一。民主党人和共和党人都一样，我看过民调，尽管它占联邦预算还不到百分之一。问街上的人，不少人以为是百分之二十五。不到百分之一，仍极不受欢迎。但对外援助不应被视为施舍；它是国家安全的基础。
And it’s fundamental to any sensible long-term strategy to battle extremism. 它也是任何合理的长期反极端主义战略的基础。
Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent. For what we spent in a month in Iraq at the height of the war, we could be training security forces in Libya, maintaining peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors, feeding the hungry in Yemen, building schools in Pakistan, and creating reservoirs of goodwill that marginalize extremists. That has to be part of our strategy. 况且，对外援助花费的只是战争开支的一小部分，而援助最终可能防止战争。伊拉克战争最激烈时，我们一个月的开支足以训练利比亚安全部队，维持以色列与邻国的和平协议，给也门饥民提供食物，在巴基斯坦建学校，并积累善意，使极端分子日益孤立。这必须成为战略的一部分。
Moreover, America cannot carry out this work if we don’t have diplomats serving in some very dangerous places. Over the past decade, we have strengthened security at our embassies, and I am implementing every recommendation of the Accountability Review Board, which found unacceptable failures in Benghazi. I’ve called on Congress to fully fund these efforts to bolster security and harden facilities, improve intelligence, and facilitate a quicker response time from our military if a crisis emerges. 此外，如果没有外交官在危险地区服务，美国也无法开展这些工作。过去十年，我们加强了使馆安全。我正落实问责审查委员会的全部建议；该委员会发现，班加西的安全保障存在不可接受的失误。我已呼吁国会为加强安全和设施防护、改善情报、让军队在危机时更快响应提供充足经费。
But even after we take these steps, some irreducible risks to our diplomats will remain. This is the price of being the world’s most powerful nation, particularly as a wave of change washes over the Arab World. And in balancing the trade4offs between security and active diplomacy, I firmly believe that any retreat from challenging regions will only increase the dangers that we face in the long run. And that's why we should be grateful to those diplomats who are willing to serve. 但即使采取这些措施，外交官仍会面临无法完全消除的风险。这是身为世界最强大国家要付出的代价，尤其在变革浪潮席卷阿拉伯世界之时。在安全与积极外交之间权衡，我坚信从困难地区撤退只会增加长远危险。因此，我们应感谢愿意在那里服务的外交官。
Targeted action against terrorists, effective partnerships, diplomatic engagement and assistance -- through such a comprehensive strategy we can significantly reduce the chances of large-scale attacks on the homeland and mitigate threats to Americans overseas. But as we guard against dangers from abroad, we cannot neglect the daunting challenge of terrorism from within our borders. 有针对性地打击恐怖分子、建立有效伙伴关系、开展外交和援助——凭借这样全面的战略，我们可以大幅降低本土遭受大规模袭击的可能性，减轻海外美国人面临的威胁。但防范外部危险时，我们不能忽略境内恐怖主义这一严峻挑战。
As I said earlier, this threat is not new. But technology and the Internet increase its frequency and in some cases its lethality. Today, a person can consume hateful propaganda, commit themselves to a violent agenda, and learn how to kill without leaving their home. To address this threat, two years ago my administration did a comprehensive review and engaged with law enforcement. 如前所述，这种威胁并不新鲜，但科技和互联网使它更常出现，有时杀伤力也更强。今天，一个人不出家门，就能接触仇恨宣传、投身暴力议程，并学会杀人。为应对这种威胁，两年前我的政府作过全面审查，并与执法部门合作。
And the best way to prevent violent extremism inspired by violent jihadists is to work with the Muslim American community -- which has consistently rejected terrorism -- to identify signs of radicalization and partner with law enforcement when an individual is drifting towards violence. And these partnerships can only work when we recognize that Muslims are a fundamental part of the American family. In fact, the success of American Muslims and our determination to guard against any encroachments on their civil liberties is the ultimate rebuke to those who say that we’re at war with Islam. 预防暴力“圣战”思想激发的极端主义，最好的办法是与一贯反对恐怖主义的美国穆斯林社区合作，发现激进化迹象，并在有人走向暴力时与执法部门携手。这种伙伴关系只有在我们承认穆斯林是美国家庭不可或缺的一部分时才能奏效。事实上，美国穆斯林的成功，以及我们坚决防止其公民自由受到侵害，就是对那些声称美国与伊斯兰教开战的人最有力的驳斥。
Thwarting homegrown plots presents particular challenges in part because of our proud commitment to civil liberties for all who call America home. That’s why, in the years to come, we will have to keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are. That means reviewing the authorities of law enforcement, so we can intercept new types of communication, but also build in privacy protections to prevent abuse. 阻止本土阴谋有特殊难处，部分原因是我们引以为傲地承诺保障所有以美国为家之人的公民自由。因此，未来几年我们必须继续努力，在安全需要与塑造我们国家的自由之间取得适当平衡。这意味着审查执法部门权限，使其能够截获新形式的通信，同时建立隐私保护，防止滥用。
That means that -- even after Boston -- we do not deport someone or throw somebody in prison in the absence of evidence. That means putting careful constraints on the tools the government uses to protect sensitive information, such as the state secrets doctrine. And that means finally having a strong Privacy and Civil Liberties Board to review those issues where our counterterrorism efforts and our values may come into tension. 这意味着即使波士顿袭击发生后，我们也不能在缺乏证据时驱逐或监禁任何人；必须谨慎限制政府保护敏感信息的工具，例如国家机密原则；还要有强有力的隐私与公民自由委员会，审查反恐努力与价值观可能发生冲突的问题。
The Justice Department’s investigation of national security leaks offers a recent example of the challenges involved in striking the right balance between our security and our open society. As Commander-in-Chief, I believe we must keep information secret that protects our operations and our people in the field. To do so, we must enforce consequences for those who break the law and breach their commitment to protect classified information. But a free press is also essential for our democracy. That’s who we are. 司法部最近调查国家安全信息泄露的做法，就显示了平衡安全与开放社会的困难。作为三军统帅，我认为必须保守机密，保护行动和前线人员。为此，违法并违背保密承诺的人应承担后果。但新闻自由对民主同样不可或缺。这也是我们国家的一部分。
And I’m troubled by the possibility that leak investigations may chill the investigative journalism that holds government accountable. 我担心泄密调查可能使监督政府的调查性报道受到寒蝉效应。
Journalists should not be at legal risk for doing their jobs. Our focus must be on those who break the law. And that’s why I’ve called on Congress to pass a media shield law to guard against government overreach. And I’ve raised these issues with the Attorney General, who shares my concerns. So he has agreed to review existing Department of Justice guidelines governing investigations that involve reporters, and he’ll convene a group of media organizations to hear their concerns as part of that review. And I’ve directed the Attorney General to report back to me by July 12th. 记者不应因履行职责而面临法律风险。我们的重点应是违法者。因此，我呼吁国会通过媒体保护法，防止政府权力越界。我也向司法部长提出这些问题，他与我有同样的担忧。他同意审查司法部涉及记者的调查准则，并邀请媒体机构表达意见。我已要求他在七月十二日前向我报告。
Now, all these issues remind us that the choices we make about war can impact -- in sometimes unintended ways -- the openness and freedom on which our way of life depends. And that is why I intend to engage Congress about the existing Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we can continue to fight terrorism without keeping America on a perpetual wartime footing. 所有这些问题提醒我们，战争中的选择可能以意想不到的方式影响我们生活所依赖的开放与自由。因此，我打算与国会讨论现行《使用武力授权》，研究如何继续打击恐怖主义，而不让美国永远处于战时状态。
The AUMF is now nearly 12 years old. The Afghan war is coming to an end. Core al Qaeda is a shell of its former self. Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves al Qaeda will pose a credible threat to the United States. Unless we discipline our thinking, our definitions, our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don’t need to fight, or continue to grant Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed conflicts between nation states. 这项授权已近十二年。阿富汗战争即将结束，“基地”组织核心只剩昔日的空壳。我们必须应对“阿拉伯半岛基地组织”等团体，但未来并非每一伙自称“基地”组织的暴徒都会对美国构成可信威胁。若不约束我们的思维、定义与行动，就可能陷入本不必打的更多战争，或继续赋予总统更适合国家间传统战争的无限权力。
So I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to expand this mandate further. Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. That’s what our democracy demands. 我期待与国会和美国人民一道，努力修订并最终废除这项授权的效力。我不会签署旨在进一步扩大授权的法律。系统性瓦解恐怖组织的工作必须继续，但这场战争和所有战争一样，必须结束。历史如此告诫我们，民主也如此要求我们。
And that brings me to my final topic: the detention of terrorist suspects. I’m going to repeat one more time: As a matter of policy, the preference of the United States is to capture terrorist suspects. When we do detain a suspect, we interrogate them. And if the suspect can be prosecuted, we decide whether to try him in a civilian court or a military commission. 这就引出最后一个话题：拘禁恐怖嫌疑人。我再重申一次，美国的政策倾向是抓捕嫌疑人。拘捕后我们会审讯；若可以起诉，再决定在民事法庭或军事委员会审判。
During the past decade, the vast majority of those detained by our military were captured on the battlefield. In Iraq, we turned over thousands of prisoners as we ended the war. In Afghanistan, we have transitioned detention facilities to the Afghans, as part of the process of restoring Afghan sovereignty. So we bring law of war detention to an end, and we are committed to prosecuting terrorists wherever we can. 过去十年，军方拘押的绝大多数人是在战场上抓获的。结束伊拉克战争时，我们移交了数千名囚犯；在阿富汗，作为恢复阿富汗主权的一部分，我们把拘押设施移交给阿方。因此，我们正结束依战争法实施的拘押，并致力于在一切可能的情况下起诉恐怖分子。
The glaring exception to this time-tested approach is the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. The original premise for opening GTMO -- that detainees would not be able to challenge their detention -- was found unconstitutional five years ago. In the meantime, GTMO has become a symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law. Our allies won’t cooperate with us if they think a terrorist will end up at GTMO. 这种经过时间检验的做法有一个刺眼的例外：关塔那摩湾拘押中心。设立关塔那摩的原始前提是被拘押者无法对拘押提出法律异议，但五年前这一前提已被裁定违宪。与此同时，关塔那摩在世界各地成了美国藐视法治的象征。盟友如果认为恐怖嫌疑人最终会被送往那里，也不愿与我们合作。
During a time of budget cuts, we spend $150 million each year to imprison 166 people -- almost $1 million per prisoner. And the Department of Defense estimates that we must spend another $200 million to keep GTMO open at a time when we’re cutting investments in education and research here at home, and when the Pentagon is struggling with sequester and budget cuts. 在削减预算的时期，我们每年花一亿五千万美元关押一百六十六人，平均每人将近一百万美元。国防部估计，维持关塔那摩还须再花两亿美元，而我们正在削减国内教育和研究投资，五角大楼也在应对自动削减预算和其他经费削减。
As President, I have tried to close GTMO. I transferred 67 detainees to other countries before Congress imposed restrictions to effectively prevent us from either transferring detainees to other countries or imprisoning them here in the United States. 作为总统，我一直试图关闭关塔那摩。国会设限之前，我已将六十七名被拘押者移送其他国家；之后的限制实际上使我们既无法把他们送往国外，也无法在美国境内关押。
These restrictions make no sense. After all, under President Bush, some 530 detainees were transferred from GTMO with Congress’s support. When I ran for President the first time, John McCain supported closing GTMO -- this was a bipartisan issue. No person has ever escaped one of our super-max or military prisons here in the United States -- ever. Our courts have convicted hundreds of people for terrorism or terrorism-related offenses, including some folks who are more dangerous than most GTMO detainees. They're in our prisons. 这些限制毫无道理。毕竟，布什总统任内，在国会支持下约五百三十名被拘押者从关塔那摩转移出去。我第一次竞选总统时，约翰·麦凯恩也支持关闭关塔那摩，这是两党共有的主张。美国境内最高安全等级监狱或军事监狱，从来没有任何人越狱。法院已判定数百人犯有恐怖主义或相关罪行，其中有些人比大多数关塔那摩被拘押者更危险，他们现在就在我们的监狱里。
And given my administration’s relentless pursuit of al Qaeda’s leadership, there is no justification beyond politics for Congress to prevent us from closing a facility that should have never have been opened. 我的政府持续追捕“基地”组织领导层。国会阻止我们关闭一个原本就不该设立的设施，除政治因素外，没有其他正当理由。
Audience Member: Excuse me, President Obama -- 观众：打扰一下，奥巴马总统——
President Obama: So -- let me finish, ma'am. So today, once again -- 奥巴马总统：那么——请让我说完，女士。今天，我再次——
Audience Member: There are 102 people on a hunger strike. These are desperate people. 观众：有一百零二人在绝食。他们已经走投无路。
President Obama: I'm about to address it, ma'am, but you've got to let me speak. I'm about to address it. 奥巴马总统：女士，我正要谈这件事，但你得让我说话。我马上会谈到。
Audience Member: You're our Commander-In-Chief -- 观众：您是我们的三军统帅——
President Obama: Let me address it. 奥巴马总统：让我先说完。
Audience Member: -- you an close Guantanamo Bay. 观众：——您能关闭关塔那摩湾。
President Obama: Why don’t you let me address it, ma'am. 奥巴马总统：女士，为什么不让我来回答呢？
Audience Member: There’s still prisoners -- 观众：那里还有囚犯——
President Obama: Why don’t you sit down and I will tell you exactly what I'm going to do. 奥巴马总统：请坐下，我会告诉你我究竟要做什么。
Audience Member: That includes 57 Yemenis. 观众：其中有五十七名也门人。
President Obama: Thank you, ma'am. Thank you. Ma'am, thank you. You should let me finish my sentence. Today, I once again call on Congress to lift the restrictions on detainee transfers from GTMO. 奥巴马总统：谢谢，女士，谢谢。女士，谢谢。请让我把话说完。今天，我再次呼吁国会取消对转移关塔那摩被拘押者的限制。
I have asked the Department of Defense to designate a site in the United States where we can hold military commissions. I’m appointing a new senior envoy at the State Department and Defense Department whose sole responsibility will be to achieve the transfer of detainees to third countries. 我已要求国防部在美国境内指定一个地点举行军事委员会审判。我还将在国务院和国防部任命新的高级特使，他们的唯一职责是促成把被拘押者移送第三国。
I am lifting the moratorium on detainee transfers to Yemen so we can review them on a case-by-case basis. To the greatest extent possible, we will transfer detainees who have been cleared to go to other countries. 我将解除向也门移送被拘押者的暂停令，以便逐案审查。我们会尽可能把获准转移的人送往其他国家。
Audience Member: -- prisoners already. Release them today. 观众：——早就该释放他们。今天就放人。
President Obama: Where appropriate, we will bring terrorists to justice in our courts and our military justice system. And we will insist that judicial review be available for every detainee. 奥巴马总统：适当情况下，我们会通过民事法院和军事司法体系将恐怖分子绳之以法，并坚持每名被拘押者都能获得司法审查。
Audience Member: It needs to be -- 观众：这必须——
President Obama: Now, ma'am, let me finish. Let me finish, ma'am. Part of free speech is you being able to speak, but also, you listening and me being able to speak. 奥巴马总统：女士，让我说完。让我说完。言论自由意味着你可以说话，也意味着你要听别人说话，让我也能说话。
Now, even after we take these steps one issue will remain -- just how to deal with those GTMO detainees who we know have participated in dangerous plots or attacks but who cannot be prosecuted, for example, because the evidence against them has been compromised or is inadmissible in a court of law. But once we commit to a process of closing GTMO, I am confident that this legacy problem can be resolved, consistent with our commitment to the rule of law. 即使采取这些措施，还有一个问题：那些我们知道参与过危险阴谋或袭击、却无法起诉的关塔那摩被拘押者该怎么办？例如针对他们的证据遭到污染，或在法庭上不能采纳。但只要我们致力于关闭关塔那摩的进程，我相信就能按照法治承诺解决这个历史遗留问题。
I know the politics are hard. But history will cast a harsh judgment on this aspect of our fight against terrorism and those of us who fail to end it. Imagine a future -- 10 years from now or 20 years from now -- when the United States of America is still holding people who have been charged with no crime on a piece of land that is not part of our country. Look at the current situation, where we are force-feeding detainees who are being held on a hunger strike. I'm willing to cut the young lady who interrupted me some slack because it's worth being passionate about. Is this who we are? 我知道政治上很困难，但历史会严厉评判我们反恐斗争中的这一方面，以及未能终结它的人。设想十年或二十年后，美国仍在一块不属于我国本土的土地上关押从未被指控犯罪的人。看看今天，我们还在强制给绝食的被拘押者喂食。刚才打断我的年轻女士情绪激动，我愿意体谅她，因为这件事值得认真关切。这是我们想成为的国家吗？
Is that something our Founders foresaw? Is that the America we want to leave our children? Our sense of justice is stronger than that. 这是建国者设想过的情景吗？这是我们想留给孩子的美国吗？我们的正义感应比这更坚定。
We have prosecuted scores of terrorists in our courts. That includes Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit; and Faisal Shahzad, who put a car bomb in Times Square. It's in a court of law that we will try Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is accused of bombing the Boston Marathon. Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, is, as we speak, serving a life sentence in a maximum security prison here in the United States. In sentencing Reid, Judge William Young told him, “The way we treat you…is the measure of our own liberties.” 我们已在法庭起诉数十名恐怖分子，包括试图在底特律上空炸毁客机的乌马尔·法鲁克·阿卜杜勒穆塔拉布，以及在时代广场放置汽车炸弹的费萨尔·沙赫扎德。被控策划波士顿马拉松爆炸案的焦哈尔·察尔纳耶夫，也将在法庭受审。此刻，“鞋子炸弹客”理查德·里德正关在美国的最高安全等级监狱，服无期徒刑。威廉·扬法官判刑时告诉他：“我们如何对待你，衡量的正是我们自身的自由。”
Audience Member: How about Abdulmutallab -- locking up a 16-year-old -- is that the way we treat a 16-year old? [Inaudible] -- can you take the drones out of the hands of the CIA? Can you stop the signature strikes killing people on the basis of suspicious activities? 观众：那阿卜杜勒穆塔拉布呢？关押一名十六岁的孩子，这就是我们对待十六岁孩子的方式吗？［听不清］能否不让中央情报局掌握无人机？能否停止只凭可疑活动就杀人的“特征打击”？
President Obama: We’re addressing that, ma’am. 奥巴马总统：女士，我们正在处理这些问题。
Audience Member: -- thousands of Muslims that got killed -- will you compensate the innocent families -- that will make us safer here at home. I love my country. I love [inaudible] -- 观众：——成千上万的穆斯林被杀害——您会赔偿无辜家庭吗？那会让国内更安全。我爱我的国家，我爱［听不清］——
President Obama: I think that -- and I’m going off script, as you might expect here. The voice of that woman is worth paying attention to. Obviously, I do not agree with much of what she said, and obviously she wasn’t listening to me in much of what I said. But these are tough issues, and the suggestion that we can gloss over them is wrong. 奥巴马总统：我想——你们大概也料到了，我要暂时离开讲稿。那位女士的声音值得我们注意。显然，她说的很多话我并不同意，她也显然没有认真听我说的许多话。但这些都是艰难问题，认为可以轻描淡写地带过，是错误的。
When that judge sentenced Mr. Reid, the shoe bomber, he went on to point to the American flag that flew in the courtroom. “That flag,” he said, “will fly there long after this is all forgotten. That flag still stands for freedom.” 当年法官给“鞋子炸弹客”里德判刑时，指向法庭里的美国国旗，说：“即使这一切早被遗忘，那面旗帜仍会在那里飘扬，它依然象征自由。”
So, America, we’ve faced down dangers far greater than al Qaeda. By staying true to the values of our founding, and by using our constitutional compass, we have overcome slavery and Civil War and fascism and communism. In just these last few years as President, I’ve watched the American people bounce back from painful recession, mass shootings, natural disasters like the recent tornados that devastated Oklahoma. These events were heartbreaking; they shook our communities to the core. But because of the resilience of the American people, these events could not come close to breaking us. 美国同胞们，我们曾战胜远比“基地”组织更大的危险。坚守建国价值，以宪法为罗盘，我们克服了奴隶制、内战、法西斯主义和共产主义。在我担任总统的近几年，我看到美国人民从痛苦的经济衰退、大规模枪击，以及最近摧毁俄克拉何马州社区的龙卷风等自然灾害中重新站起。这些事件令人心碎，震撼了社区根基，但美国人民的韧性使它们无法击垮我们。
I think of Lauren Manning, the 9/11 survivor who had severe burns over 80 percent of her body, who said, “That’s my reality. I put a Band-Aid on it, literally, and I move on.” 我想到“九一一”幸存者劳伦·曼宁。她全身百分之八十严重烧伤，却说：“这就是我的现实。我真的贴上创可贴，然后继续向前。”
I think of the New Yorkers who filled Times Square the day after an attempted car bomb as if nothing had happened. 我想到汽车炸弹袭击未遂后的第二天，仍像什么都没发生一样挤满时代广场的纽约人。
I think of the proud Pakistani parents who, after their daughter was invited to the White House, wrote to us, “We have raised an American Muslim daughter to dream big and never give up because it does pay off.” 我想到一对自豪的巴基斯坦裔父母。他们的女儿获邀到白宫后，写信给我们说：“我们培养美国穆斯林女儿敢于做大梦、永不放弃，因为努力终有回报。”
I think of all the wounded warriors rebuilding their lives, and helping other vets to find jobs. 我想到所有重建生活、还帮助其他退伍军人找工作的负伤军人。
I think of the runner planning to do the 2014 Boston Marathon, who said, “Next year, you’re going to have more people than ever. Determination is not something to be messed with.” 我想到一位计划参加二〇一四年波士顿马拉松的跑者。他说：“明年参赛的人会比以往更多。坚定的决心可不是好惹的。”
That’s who the American people are -- determined, and not to be messed with. And now we need a strategy and a politics that reflects this resilient spirit. 这就是美国人民：意志坚定，不容恐吓。现在我们需要体现这种坚韧精神的战略和政治。
Our victory against terrorism won’t be measured in a surrender ceremony at a battleship, or a statue being pulled to the ground. Victory will be measured in parents taking their kids to school; immigrants coming to our shores; fans taking in a ballgame; a veteran starting a business; a bustling city street; a citizen shouting her concerns at a President. 我们战胜恐怖主义，不会以战舰上的投降仪式或被拉倒的雕像来衡量。胜利体现在父母送孩子上学、移民来到我们的海岸、球迷观看比赛、退伍军人创业、城市街道熙熙攘攘，也体现在一位公民向总统高声表达忧虑。
The quiet determination; that strength of character and bond of fellowship; that refutation of fear -- that is both our sword and our shield. And long after the current messengers of hate have faded from the world’s memory, alongside the brutal despots, and deranged madmen, and ruthless demagogues who litter history -- the flag of the United States will still wave from small-town cemeteries to national monuments, to distant outposts abroad. And that flag will still stand for freedom. 这种沉静的决心、坚强的品格和团结的纽带、对恐惧的拒绝，既是我们的利剑，也是我们的盾牌。终有一天，今天传播仇恨的人将和历史上残暴的暴君、疯狂之徒与冷酷的煽动者一起被世人淡忘，而美国国旗仍将在小镇墓园、国家纪念碑和遥远的海外哨所飘扬，仍将象征自由。
Thank you very, everybody. God bless you. May God bless the United States of America. 非常感谢大家。愿上帝保佑你们，愿上帝保佑美利坚合众国。
