I apologize for the slight delay. Even Presidents have problems with toner. 很抱歉让大家稍等了片刻。即便是总统也会遇到碳粉盒的问题。
It is a great honor to be back at American University, which has prepared generations of young people for service in public life. I want to thank President Kerwin and the American University family for hosting us here today. 能够重返美利坚大学，我深感荣幸。这所大学培养了一代又一代投身公共服务的年轻人。我要感谢克尔文校长和美利坚大学全体师生今天邀请我们来到这里。
Fifty-two years ago, President Kennedy, at the height of the Cold War, addressed this same university on the subject of peace. The Berlin Wall had just been built. The Soviet Union had tested the most powerful weapons ever developed. China was on the verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb. Less than 20 years after the end of World War II, the prospect of nuclear war was all too real. With all of the threats that we face today, it’s hard to appreciate how much more dangerous the world was at that time. 五十二年前，在冷战最激烈的时期，肯尼迪总统就在这同一所大学就和平主题发表了演讲。当时柏林墙刚刚建成，苏联试爆了有史以来威力最大的武器，中国也即将拥有核弹。二战结束不到二十年，核战争的前景无比真实。尽管我们今天面临着种种威胁，但很难想象当时的世界要危险得多。
In light of these mounting threats, a number of strategists here in the United States argued that we had to take military action against the Soviets, to hasten what they saw as inevitable confrontation. But the young President offered a different vision. Strength, in his view, included powerful armed forces and a willingness to stand up for our values around the world. But he rejected the prevailing attitude among some foreign policy circles that equated security with a perpetual war footing. 面对这些日益增长的威胁，美国国内的一些战略家主张我们必须对苏联采取军事行动，以加速他们眼中不可避免的对抗。但这位年轻的总统提出了不同的愿景。在他看来，实力包括强大的武装力量，以及在全世界捍卫我们价值观的决心。但他拒绝了某些外交政策圈子中将安全等同于永久战备状态的普遍态度。
Instead, he promised strong, principled American leadership on behalf of what he called a “practical” and “attainable peace” -- a peace “based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions -- on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements.” 相反，他承诺美国将提供坚定而有原则的领导，致力于他所称之为"切实可行"且"可以实现"的和平——这种和平"并非基于人性的突然革命，而是基于人类制度的渐进演变——基于一系列具体行动和有效协议。"
Such wisdom would help guide our ship of state through some of the most perilous moments in human history. With Kennedy at the helm, the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved peacefully. Under Democratic and Republican Presidents, new agreements were forged -- a Non-Proliferation Treaty that prohibited nations from acquiring nuclear weapons, while allowing them to access peaceful nuclear energy; the SALT and START Treaties which bound the United States and Soviet Union to cooperation on arms control. 这一智慧帮助引导我们的国家航船度过了人类历史上一些最危险的时刻。在肯尼迪的掌舵下，古巴导弹危机得以和平解决。在民主党和共和党历任总统的领导下，新的协议相继达成——禁止各国获取核武器、同时允许其和平利用核能的《不扩散核武器条约》；以及约束美国和苏联进行军备控制合作的《限制战略武器条约》和《削减战略武器条约》。
Not every conflict was averted, but the world avoided nuclear catastrophe, and we created the time and the space to win the Cold War without firing a shot at the Soviets. 并非每一场冲突都得以避免，但世界避免了核灾难，我们创造了时间和空间，在未对苏联开一枪的情况下赢得了冷战。
The agreement now reached between the international community and the Islamic Republic of Iran builds on this tradition of strong, principled diplomacy. After two years of negotiations, we have achieved a detailed arrangement that permanently prohibits Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. It cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a bomb. It contains the most comprehensive inspection and verification regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program. As was true in previous treaties, it does not resolve all problems; it certainly doesn’t resolve all our problems with Iran. 国际社会与伊朗伊斯兰共和国之间目前达成的这项协议，正是建立在这种坚定而有原则的外交传统之上。经过两年的谈判，我们达成了一项详细的安排，永久禁止伊朗获取核武器。它切断了伊朗通往核弹的所有路径。它包含了有史以来为监督核计划而谈判达成的最全面的检查和核查机制。
It does not ensure a warming between our two countries. But it achieves one of our most critical security objectives. As such, it is a very good deal. 与以往的条约一样，这项协议并不能解决所有问题；它当然不能解决我们与伊朗之间的所有问题。它也不能确保两国关系回暖。但它实现了我们最关键的安全目标之一。因此，这是一项非常好的协议。
Today, I want to speak to you about this deal, and the most consequential foreign policy debate that our country has had since the invasion of Iraq, as Congress decides whether to support this historic diplomatic breakthrough, or instead blocks it over the objection of the vast majority of the world. Between now and the congressional vote in September, you’re going to hear a lot of arguments against this deal, backed by tens of millions of dollars in advertising. 今天，我想和你们谈谈这项协议，以及我国自伊拉克战争以来最重要的外交政策辩论——国会将决定是支持这一历史性的外交突破，还是不顾世界绝大多数国家的反对而加以阻挠。从现在到九月国会投票期间，你们会听到大量反对这项协议的论调，背后有数千万美元的广告资金支持。
And if the rhetoric in these ads, and the accompanying commentary, sounds familiar, it should -- for many of the same people who argued for the war in Iraq are now making the case against the Iran nuclear deal. 如果这些广告中的言辞以及随之而来的评论听起来耳熟，那是理所当然的——因为许多当初主张伊拉克战争的人，如今又在反对伊朗核协议。
Now, when I ran for President eight years ago as a candidate who had opposed the decision to go to war in Iraq, I said that America didn’t just have to end that war -- we had to end the mindset that got us there in the first place. It was a mindset characterized by a preference for military action over diplomacy; a mindset that put a premium on unilateral U.S. action over the painstaking work of building international consensus; a mindset that exaggerated threats beyond what the intelligence supported. 八年前，当我作为一名曾反对伊拉克战争决定的候选人竞选总统时，我曾说过，美国不仅需要结束那场战争——我们还需要终结当初将我们引向战争的思维模式。这种思维模式的特点是偏好军事行动而非外交；重视美国的单边行动，而忽视建立国际共识的艰苦工作；将威胁夸大到情报所不能支持的程度。
Leaders did not level with the American people about the costs of war, insisting that we could easily impose our will on a part of the world with a profoundly different culture and history. And, of course, those calling for war labeled themselves strong and decisive, while dismissing those who disagreed as weak -- even appeasers of a malevolent adversary. 领导人没有向美国人民坦诚说明战争的代价，坚称我们可以轻易将自己的意志强加给一个文化和历史截然不同的地区。当然，那些呼吁战争的人标榜自己坚强果断，同时将持不同意见者斥为软弱——甚至是对邪恶对手的绥靖者。
More than a decade later, we still live with the consequences of the decision to invade Iraq. Our troops achieved every mission they were given. But thousands of lives were lost, tens of thousands wounded. That doesn’t count the lives lost among Iraqis. Nearly a trillion dollars was spent. Today, Iraq remains gripped by sectarian conflict, and the emergence of al Qaeda in Iraq has now evolved into ISIL. 十多年过去了，我们仍然承受着入侵伊拉克这一决定的后果。我们的军队完成了赋予他们的每一项任务。但数千人失去了生命，数万人受伤。这还不包括伊拉克人民失去的生命。我们花费了近一万亿美元。今天，伊拉克仍深陷宗派冲突，伊拉克境内"基地"组织的兴起如今已演变为"伊斯兰国"。
And ironically, the single greatest beneficiary in the region of that war was the Islamic Republic of Iran, which saw its strategic position strengthened by the removal of its long-standing enemy, Saddam Hussein. 具有讽刺意味的是，那场战争在该地区的最大受益者恰恰是伊朗伊斯兰共和国——其长期敌人萨达姆·侯赛因被推翻，伊朗的战略地位因此得到了加强。
I raise this recent history because now more than ever we need clear thinking in our foreign policy. And I raise this history because it bears directly on how we respond to the Iranian nuclear program. 我之所以提起这段近代历史，是因为我们现在比以往任何时候都更需要在外交政策中保持清晰的思考。我之所以提起这段历史，是因为它与我们如何应对伊朗核计划直接相关。
That program has been around for decades, dating back to the Shah’s efforts -- with U.S. support -- in the 1960s and ‘70s to develop nuclear power. The theocracy that overthrew the Shah accelerated the program after the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, a war in which Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons to brutal effect, and Iran’s nuclear program advanced steadily through the 1990s, despite unilateral U.S. sanctions. When the Bush Administration took office, Iran had no centrifuges -- the machines necessary to produce material for a bomb -- that were spinning to enrich uranium. 伊朗的核计划已经存在了几十年，最早可以追溯到巴列维国王在二十世纪六七十年代——在美国支持下——发展核能的努力。推翻巴列维王朝的神权政权在二十世纪八十年代两伊战争后加速了该计划；在那场战争中，萨达姆·侯赛因使用化学武器造成了残酷后果。尽管美国实施了单边制裁，伊朗的核计划在整个九十年代仍稳步推进。
But despite repeated warnings from the United States government, by the time I took office, Iran had installed several thousand centrifuges, and showed no inclination to slow -- much less halt -- its program. 布什政府上台时，伊朗还没有运转中的离心机——即生产核弹材料所需的机器。但尽管美国政府多次发出警告，到我就职时，伊朗已安装了数千台离心机，并且毫无放缓——更不用说停止——其计划的迹象。
Among U.S. policymakers, there’s never been disagreement on the danger posed by an Iranian nuclear bomb. Democrats and Republicans alike have recognized that it would spark an arms race in the world’s most unstable region, and turn every crisis into a potential nuclear showdown. It would embolden terrorist groups, like Hezbollah, and pose an unacceptable risk to Israel, which Iranian leaders have repeatedly threatened to destroy. More broadly, it could unravel the global commitment to non-proliferation that the world has done so much to defend. 在美国决策者中，对于伊朗核弹所构成的危险从未有过分歧。民主党人和共和党人都认识到，这将在世界上最不稳定的地区引发军备竞赛，并将每一次危机都转化为潜在的核对抗。它将助长真主党等恐怖组织，并对以色列构成不可接受的风险——伊朗领导人曾多次威胁要摧毁以色列。更广泛地说，它可能会瓦解世界为捍卫不扩散原则所做的巨大努力。
The question, then, is not whether to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, but how. Even before taking office, I made clear that Iran would not be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon on my watch, and it’s been my policy throughout my presidency to keep all options -- including possible military options -- on the table to achieve that objective. But I have also made clear my preference for a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of the issue -- not just because of the costs of war, but also because a negotiated agreement offered a more effective, verifiable and durable resolution. 那么，问题不在于是否要阻止伊朗获得核武器，而在于如何阻止。甚至在就职之前，我就已明确表示，在我任内绝不允许伊朗获得核武器；在我整个总统任期内，我的政策一直是将所有选项——包括可能的军事选项——摆上台面，以实现这一目标。但我也明确表示，我更倾向于以和平、外交的方式解决这一问题——不仅因为战争的代价，还因为谈判达成的协议能够提供更有效、可核查且持久的解决方案。
And so, in 2009, we let the Iranians know that a diplomatic path was available. Iran failed to take that path, and our intelligence community exposed the existence of a covert nuclear facility at Fordow. 因此，在2009年，我们让伊朗人知道，外交之路是敞开的。伊朗没有选择这条道路，而我们的情报机构揭露了福尔多一处秘密核设施的存在。
Now, some have argued that Iran’s intransigence showed the futility of negotiations. In fact, it was our very willingness to negotiate that helped America rally the world to our cause, and secured international participation in an unprecedented framework of commercial and financial sanctions. Keep in mind unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran had been in place for decades, but had failed to pressure Iran to the negotiating table. What made our new approach more effective was our ability to draw upon new U.N. 有些人辩称，伊朗的不妥协表明谈判是徒劳的。事实上，正是我们谈判的意愿帮助美国将世界团结到我们的事业中来，并确保国际社会参与了一套前所未有的商业和金融制裁框架。请记住，美国对伊朗的单边制裁已经实施了几十年，但未能迫使伊朗坐到谈判桌前。
Security Council resolutions, combining strong enforcement with voluntary agreements from nations like China and India, Japan and South Korea to reduce their purchases of Iranian oil, as well as the imposition by our European allies of a total oil embargo. 使我们的新方法更加有效的，是我们能够借助联合国安理会的新决议，将强有力的执行与中国、印度、日本和韩国等国自愿减少购买伊朗石油的协议相结合，再加上我们欧洲盟友实施的全面石油禁运。
Winning this global buy-in was not easy -- I know. I was there. In some cases, our partners lost billions of dollars in trade because of their decision to cooperate. But we were able to convince them that absent a diplomatic resolution, the result could be war, with major disruptions to the global economy, and even greater instability in the Middle East. In other words, it was diplomacy -- hard, painstaking diplomacy -- not saber-rattling, not tough talk that ratcheted up the pressure on Iran. 赢得全球的支持并不容易——我知道。我亲历了这一切。在某些情况下，我们的伙伴因为决定合作而损失了数十亿美元的贸易。但我们能够说服他们，如果没有外交解决方案，结果可能是战争，这将严重扰乱全球经济，并给中东带来更大的不稳定。换句话说，是外交——艰难、艰苦的外交——而非武力恫吓，而非强硬言论，加大了对伊朗的压力。
With the world now unified beside us, Iran’s economy contracted severely, and remains about 20 percent smaller today than it would have otherwise been. No doubt this hardship played a role in Iran’s 2013 elections, when the Iranian people elected a new government that promised to improve the economy through engagement with the world. A window had cracked open. Iran came back to the nuclear talks. 随着世界现在团结在我们身边，伊朗经济严重收缩，今天其规模比原本应有的水平缩小了约百分之二十。毫无疑问，这一困境在伊朗2013年的选举中发挥了作用——当时伊朗人民选出了一个承诺通过与世界接触来改善经济的新政府。一扇窗户被打开了。伊朗重返核谈判。
And after a series of negotiations, Iran agreed with the international community to an interim deal -- a deal that rolled back Iran’s stockpile of near 20 percent enriched uranium, and froze the progress of its program so that the P5+1 -- the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the European Union -- could negotiate a comprehensive deal without the fear that Iran might be stalling for time. 经过一系列谈判，伊朗与国际社会达成了一项临时协议——该协议削减了伊朗接近百分之二十浓缩铀的库存，并冻结了其计划的进展，以便"5+1"集团——美国、中国、俄罗斯、英国、德国、法国以及欧盟——能够在不用担心伊朗可能拖延时间的情况下谈判一项全面协议。
Now, let me pause here just to remind everybody that when the interim deal was announced, critics -- the same critics we’re hearing from now -- called it “a historic mistake.” They insisted Iran would ignore its obligations. They warned that sanctions would unravel. They warned that Iran would receive a windfall to support terrorism. 现在，请允许我在此稍作停顿，提醒大家，当初临时协议宣布时，批评者——就是我们现在听到的这些批评者——称其为"一个历史性的错误"。他们坚称伊朗会无视其义务。他们警告说制裁会瓦解。他们警告说伊朗会获得意外之财来支持恐怖主义。
The critics were wrong. The progress of Iran’s nuclear program was halted for the first time in a decade. Its stockpile of dangerous materials was reduced. The deployment of its advanced centrifuges was stopped. Inspections did increase. There was no flood of money into Iran, and the architecture of the international sanctions remained in place. In fact, the interim deal worked so well that the same people who criticized it so fiercely now cite it as an excuse not to support the broader accord. Think about that. 批评者错了。伊朗核计划的进展十年来首次被遏制。其危险材料的库存被减少。先进离心机的部署被停止。检查确实增加了。没有资金大量涌入伊朗，国际制裁的架构依然完好。事实上，临时协议执行得如此之好，以至于当初猛烈批评它的那些人，现在反而把它作为不支持更全面协议的借口。
What was once proclaimed as a historic mistake is now held up as a success and a reason to not sign the comprehensive deal. So keep that in mind when you assess the credibility of the arguments being made against diplomacy today. 想想吧。曾经被斥为历史性错误的东西，如今却被奉为成功，并成为不签署全面协议的理由。所以，当你们评估今天反对外交的那些论调的可信度时，请记住这一点。
Despite the criticism, we moved ahead to negotiate a more lasting, comprehensive deal. Our diplomats, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, kept our coalition united. Our nuclear experts -- including one of the best in the world, Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz -- worked tirelessly on the technical details. In July, we reached a comprehensive plan of action that meets our objectives. Under its terms, Iran is never allowed to build a nuclear weapon. 尽管受到批评，我们还是继续推进，以谈判达成一项更持久、更全面的协议。我们的外交官在国务卿约翰·克里的带领下，保持了联盟的团结。我们的核专家——包括世界上最顶尖的专家之一、能源部长欧内斯特·莫尼兹——在技术细节上不懈努力。今年七月，我们达成了一项符合我们目标的全面行动计划。
And while Iran, like any party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is allowed to access peaceful nuclear energy, the agreement strictly defines the manner in which its nuclear program can proceed, ensuring that all pathways to a bomb are cut off. 根据协议条款，伊朗永远不被允许制造核武器。虽然伊朗与《不扩散核武器条约》的任何缔约方一样，有权和平利用核能，但该协议严格界定了其核计划可进行的方式，确保通往核弹的所有路径都被切断。
Here’s how: Under this deal, Iran cannot acquire the plutonium needed for a bomb. The core of its heavy-water reactor at Arak will be pulled out, filled with concrete, and replaced with one that will not produce plutonium for a weapon. The spent fuel from that reactor will be shipped out of the country, and Iran will not build any new heavy-water reactors for at least 15 years. 具体安排如下：根据这项协议，伊朗不能获取制造核弹所需的钚。其阿拉克重水反应堆的堆芯将被拆除，灌入混凝土，并替换为一个不会生产武器级钚的反应堆。该反应堆的乏燃料将被运出该国，并且伊朗在至少十五年内不会建造任何新的重水反应堆。
Iran will also not be able to acquire the enriched uranium that could be used for a bomb. As soon as this deal is implemented, Iran will remove two-thirds of its centrifuges. For the next decade, Iran will not enrich uranium with its more advanced centrifuges. Iran will not enrich uranium at the previously undisclosed Fordow facility, which is buried deep underground, for at least 15 years. Iran will get rid of 98 percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium, which is currently enough for up to 10 nuclear bombs, for the next 15 years. 伊朗也将无法获取可用于制造核弹的浓缩铀。这项协议一旦实施，伊朗将拆除其三分之二的离心机。在未来十年内，伊朗不得使用其更先进的离心机进行铀浓缩。伊朗不得在此前未公开的、深埋地下的福尔多设施进行铀浓缩，为期至少十五年。
Even after those 15 years have passed, Iran will never have the right to use a peaceful program as cover to pursue a weapon. 在未来十五年内，伊朗将处理掉其百分之九十八的浓缩铀库存——这些库存目前足以制造多达十枚核弹。即便在那十五年之后，伊朗也永远无权以和平计划为掩护来追求核武器。
And, in fact, this deal shuts off the type of covert path Iran pursued in the past. There will be 24/7 monitoring of Iran’s key nuclear facilities. For decades, inspectors will have access to Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain -- from the uranium mines and mills where they get raw materials, to the centrifuge production facilities where they make machines to enrich it. And understand why this is so important: For Iran to cheat, it has to build a lot more than just one building or a covert facility like Fordow. It would need a secret source for every single aspect of its program. 而且，事实上，这项协议堵住了伊朗过去所走的那种秘密路径。伊朗的关键核设施将接受全天候监控。在数十年内，检查人员将能够进入伊朗的整个核供应链——从获取原材料的铀矿和铀厂，到制造浓缩机器的离心机生产设施。请理解这一点为什么如此重要：伊朗要想作弊，它需要建造的远不止一座建筑或像福尔多那样的秘密设施。
No nation in history has been able to pull off such subterfuge when subjected to such rigorous inspections. And under the terms of the deal, inspectors will have the permanent ability to inspect any suspicious sites in Iran. 它需要为其计划的每一个方面都找到一个秘密来源。历史上没有任何一个国家在受到如此严格的检查时能够成功实施这种欺骗。根据协议条款，检查人员将拥有永久权力检查伊朗境内任何可疑地点。
And finally, Iran has powerful incentives to keep its commitments. Before getting sanctions relief, Iran has to take significant, concrete steps like removing centrifuges and getting rid of its stockpile. If Iran violates the agreement over the next decade, all of the sanctions can snap back into place. We won’t need the support of other members of the U.N. Security Council; America can trigger snapback on our own. On the other hand, if Iran abides by the deal and its economy begins to reintegrate with the world, the incentive to avoid snapback will only grow. 最后，伊朗有强烈的动机遵守其承诺。在获得制裁缓解之前，伊朗必须采取重大、具体的步骤，例如拆除离心机和处理掉其库存。如果伊朗在未来十年违反协议，所有制裁都可以迅速恢复。我们不需要联合国安理会其他成员的支持；美国可以自行触发制裁快速恢复机制。另一方面，如果伊朗遵守协议，其经济开始与世界重新融合，那么避免制裁恢复的动机只会越来越强。
So this deal is not just the best choice among alternatives -– this is the strongest non-proliferation agreement ever negotiated. And because this is such a strong deal, every nation in the world that has commented publicly, with the exception of the Israeli government, has expressed support. The United Nations Security Council has unanimously supported it. The majority of arms control and non-proliferation experts support it. Over 100 former ambassadors -- who served under Republican and Democratic Presidents -- support it. 因此，这项协议不仅仅是备选方案中的最佳选择——这是有史以来谈判达成的最有力的不扩散协议。正因为这是一项如此强有力的协议，世界上每一个公开发表意见的国家，除了以色列政府之外，都表示了支持。联合国安理会一致支持它。大多数军备控制和不扩散专家支持它。
I’ve had to make a lot of tough calls as President, but whether or not this deal is good for American security is not one of those calls. It’s not even close. 一百多位前大使——他们曾在共和党和民主党总统任内任职——都支持它。作为总统，我不得不做出许多艰难的决定，但这项协议是否有利于美国安全，根本算不上一个艰难的决定。这是毋庸置疑的。
Unfortunately, we’re living through a time in American politics where every foreign policy decision is viewed through a partisan prism, evaluated by headline-grabbing sound bites. And so before the ink was even dry on this deal -- before Congress even read it -- a majority of Republicans declared their virulent opposition. Lobbyists and pundits were suddenly transformed into arm-chair nuclear scientists, disputing the assessments of experts like Secretary Moniz, challenging his findings, offering multiple -- and sometimes contradictory -- arguments about why Congress should reject this deal. 不幸的是，我们生活在这样一个美国政治时代：每一项外交政策决定都被透过党派的棱镜来看待，都用吸引眼球的口号来评判。因此，协议墨迹未干——国会甚至还没来得及读它——大多数共和党人就宣布了强烈反对。说客和评论员们摇身一变成了纸上谈兵的核科学家，对莫尼兹部长等专家的评估提出异议，质疑他的结论，提出多种多样——有时甚至相互矛盾——的理由来说明国会为什么应该拒绝这项协议。
But if you repeat these arguments long enough, they can get some traction. So let me address just a few of the arguments that have been made so far in opposition to this deal. 但如果你把这些论调重复得足够久，它们就会获得一些影响力。所以，请允许我回应几个迄今为止反对这项协议的论点。
First, there are those who say the inspections are not strong enough because inspectors can’t go anywhere in Iran at any time with no notice. 首先，有些人说检查不够有力，因为检查人员不能在任何时候不打招呼就去伊朗的任何地方。
Well, here’s the truth: Inspectors will be allowed daily access to Iran’s key nuclear sites. If there is a reason for inspecting a suspicious, undeclared site anywhere in Iran, inspectors will get that access, even if Iran objects. This access can be with as little as 24 hours’ notice. And while the process for resolving a dispute about access can take up to 24 days, once we’ve identified a site that raises suspicion, we will be watching it continuously until inspectors get in. And by the way, nuclear material isn’t something you hide in the closet. It can leave a trace for years. 那么，事实是这样的：检查人员将被允许每日进入伊朗的关键核设施。如果有理由检查伊朗境内任何一处可疑的、未申报的地点，检查人员将获得进入权限，即便伊朗反对也不行。这种进入最短可以提前二十四小时通知。虽然解决进入争议的过程可能长达二十四天，但一旦我们确定了一个引起怀疑的地点，在检查人员进入之前，我们将持续对其进行监视。
The bottom line is, if Iran cheats, we can catch them -- and we will. 顺便说一句，核材料不是你能藏在衣柜里的东西。它可以留下数年的痕迹。底线是：如果伊朗作弊，我们能发现——而且我们一定会发现。
Second, there are those who argue that the deal isn’t strong enough because some of the limitations on Iran’s civilian nuclear program expire in 15 years. Let me repeat: The prohibition on Iran having a nuclear weapon is permanent. The ban on weapons-related research is permanent. Inspections are permanent. It is true that some of the limitations regarding Iran’s peaceful program last only 15 years. But that’s how arms control agreements work. The first SALT Treaty with the Soviet Union lasted five years. The first START Treaty lasted 15 years. 其次，有些人辩称，这项协议不够有力，因为对伊朗民用核计划的一些限制将在十五年后到期。请允许我重申：禁止伊朗拥有核武器的规定是永久性的。禁止武器相关研究的规定是永久性的。检查是永久性的。诚然，关于伊朗和平计划的一些限制只持续十五年。但军备控制协议就是这样运作的。与苏联的第一个《限制战略武器条约》持续了五年。第一个《削减战略武器条约》持续了十五年。
And in our current situation, if 15 or 20 years from now, Iran tries to build a bomb, this deal ensures that the United States will have better tools to detect it, a stronger basis under international law to respond, and the same options available to stop a weapons program as we have today, including -- if necessary -- military options. 而在我们当前的形势下，如果十五年或二十年后伊朗试图制造核弹，这项协议确保美国将有更好的工具来发现它，有更坚实的国际法基础来做出回应，并且拥有与今天同样的选择来阻止其武器计划，包括——必要时——军事选项。
On the other hand, without this deal, the scenarios that critics warn about happening in 15 years could happen six months from now. By killing this deal, Congress would not merely pave Iran’s pathway to a bomb, it would accelerate it. 另一方面，如果没有这项协议，批评者所警告的十五年后才会发生的情况可能在六个月后就会发生。如果国会否决这项协议，它不仅会为伊朗通往核弹铺平道路，还会加速这一进程。
Third, a number of critics say the deal isn’t worth it because Iran will get billions of dollars in sanctions relief. Now, let’s be clear: The international sanctions were put in place precisely to get Iran to agree to constraints on its program. That's the point of sanctions. Any negotiated agreement with Iran would involve sanctions relief. So an argument against sanctions relief is effectively an argument against any diplomatic resolution of this issue. 第三，许多批评者说这项协议不值得，因为伊朗将从制裁缓解中获得数十亿美元。那么，让我们明确一点：实施国际制裁的目的正是为了让伊朗同意对其计划施加限制。这就是制裁的意义所在。任何与伊朗谈判达成的协议都将涉及制裁缓解。因此，反对制裁缓解实际上就是反对以任何外交方式解决这一问题。
It is true that if Iran lives up to its commitments, it will gain access to roughly 56 billion dollars of its own money -- revenue frozen overseas by other countries. But the notion that this will be a game-changer, with all this money funneled into Iran’s pernicious activities, misses the reality of Iran’s current situation. Partly because of our sanctions, the Iranian government has over half a trillion dollars in urgent requirements -- from funding pensions and salaries, to paying for crumbling infrastructure. 诚然，如果伊朗履行其承诺，它将获得大约五百六十亿美元属于自己的资金——这些是被其他国家冻结在海外的收入。但那种认为这将改变游戏规则、所有这些钱都会被用于伊朗有害活动的说法，忽视了伊朗当前局势的现实。部分由于我们的制裁，伊朗政府有超过五千亿美元的迫切需求——从支付养老金和工资，到为破败的基础设施买单。伊朗领导人提高了本国人民的期望，让他们以为制裁缓解会改善生活。即使是像伊朗这样的压制性政权，也不能完全无视这些期望。
Iran’s leaders have raised the expectations of their people that sanctions relief will improve their lives. Even a repressive regime like Iran’s cannot completely ignore those expectations. And that’s why our best analysts expect the bulk of this revenue to go into spending that improves the economy and benefits the lives of the Iranian people. 这就是为什么我们最优秀的分析人士预计，这笔收入的大部分将用于改善经济、惠及伊朗人民生活的支出。
Now, this is not to say that sanctions relief will provide no benefit to Iran’s military. Let’s stipulate that some of that money will flow to activities that we object to. We have no illusions about the Iranian government, or the significance of the Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Force. Iran supports terrorist organizations like Hezbollah. It supports proxy groups that threaten our interests and the interests of our allies -- including proxy groups who killed our troops in Iraq. They try to destabilize our Gulf partners. But Iran has been engaged in these activities for decades. 但这并不是说制裁缓解不会给伊朗军队带来任何好处。我们不妨承认，其中一些资金会流向我们反对的活动。我们对伊朗政府，对革命卫队和圣城旅的重要性不抱任何幻想。伊朗支持真主党等恐怖组织。它支持威胁我们和我们盟友利益的代理组织——包括那些在伊拉克杀害我们军队的代理组织。
They engaged in them before sanctions and while sanctions were in place. In fact, Iran even engaged in these activities in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War -- a war that cost them nearly a million lives and hundreds of billions of dollars. 他们试图破坏我们海湾伙伴的稳定。但伊朗从事这些活动已有几十年。在制裁之前他们就在做，制裁期间他们也在做。事实上，伊朗甚至在两伊战争期间也在从事这些活动——那场战争使他们付出了近百万人的生命和数千亿美元的代价。
The truth is that Iran has always found a way to fund these efforts, and whatever benefit Iran may claim from sanctions relief pales in comparison to the danger it could pose with a nuclear weapon. 事实是，伊朗总能找到资助这些行动的方法，而伊朗可能从制裁缓解中获得的任何好处，与它拥有核武器可能造成的危险相比，都相形见绌。
Moreover, there’s no scenario where sanctions relief turns Iran into the region’s dominant power. Iran’s defense budget is eight times smaller than the combined budget of our Gulf allies. Their conventional capabilities will never compare with Israel’s, and our commitment to Israel’s qualitative military edge helps guarantee that. Over the last several years, Iran has had to spend billions of dollars to support its only ally in the Arab World -- Bashar al-Assad -- even as he’s lost control of huge chunks of his country. And Hezbollah has suffered significant blows on the same battlefield. 此外，没有任何情况会让制裁缓解把伊朗变成地区主导力量。伊朗的国防预算比我们海湾盟友的总预算小八倍。他们的常规能力永远无法与以色列相比，而我们对以色列质量军事优势的承诺有助于保证这一点。过去几年里，伊朗不得不花费数十亿美元来支持其在阿拉伯世界的唯一盟友——巴沙尔·阿萨德——尽管他已经失去了对国家大片地区的控制。
And Iran, like the rest of the region, is being forced to respond to the threat of ISIL in Iraq. 真主党也在同一场战场上遭受了重大打击。而伊朗，如同该地区其他国家一样，正被迫应对伊拉克境内"伊斯兰国"的威胁。
So contrary to the alarmists who claim that Iran is on the brink of taking over the Middle East, or even the world, Iran will remain a regional power with its own set of challenges. The ruling regime is dangerous and it is repressive. We will continue to have sanctions in place on Iran’s support for terrorism and violation of human rights. We will continue to insist upon the release of Americans detained unjustly. We will have a lot of differences with the Iranian regime. 因此，与那些声称伊朗即将接管中东、甚至全世界的危言耸听者相反，伊朗仍将是一个面临自身一系列挑战的地区大国。其统治政权是危险的，是压制性的。我们将继续对伊朗支持恐怖主义和侵犯人权的行为实施制裁。我们将继续坚持释放被不公正拘留的美国人。我们与伊朗政权之间将存在许多分歧。
But if we’re serious about confronting Iran’s destabilizing activities, it is hard to imagine a worse approach than blocking this deal. Instead, we need to check the behavior that we're concerned about directly: By helping our allies in the region strengthen their own capabilities to counter a cyber-attack or a ballistic missile; by improving the interdiction of weapons shipments that go to groups like Hezbollah; by training our allies’ special forces so that they can more effectively respond to situations like Yemen. All these capabilities will make a difference. 但如果我们真的要对抗伊朗的破坏稳定活动，很难想象还有比阻挠这项协议更糟糕的做法。相反，我们需要直接制止我们所担忧的行为：通过帮助我们在该地区的盟友加强自身能力，以应对网络攻击或弹道导弹；通过加强对运往真主党等组织的武器 shipment 的拦截；通过训练我们盟友的特种部队，使他们能够更有效地应对也门那样的局势。
We will be in a stronger position to implement them with this deal. And, by the way, such a strategy also helps us effectively confront the immediate and lethal threat posed by ISIL. 所有这些能力都将发挥作用。有了这项协议，我们将处于更有利的地位来实施这些措施。顺便说一句，这样的战略也有助于我们有效应对"伊斯兰国"构成的直接致命威胁。
Now, the final criticism -- this sort of a catch-all that you may hear -- is the notion that there’s a better deal to be had. “We should get a better deal” -- that’s repeated over and over again. “It's a bad deal, need a better deal” -- one that relies on vague promises of toughness, and, more recently, the argument that we can apply a broader and indefinite set of sanctions to squeeze the Iranian regime harder. 最后一种批评——你可能听到的这种包罗万象的说法——是认为还有更好的协议可谈。"我们应该达成更好的协议"——这句话被一遍又一遍地重复。"这是个坏协议，需要更好的协议"——这种论调依赖于关于强硬态度的模糊承诺，以及最近的一种说法，即我们可以实施更广泛、无限期的制裁，以更有力地挤压伊朗政权。
Those making this argument are either ignorant of Iranian society, or they’re just not being straight with the American people. Sanctions alone are not going to force Iran to completely dismantle all vestiges of its nuclear infrastructure -- even those aspects that are consistent with peaceful programs. That oftentimes is what the critics are calling “a better deal.” Neither the Iranian government, or the Iranian opposition, or the Iranian people would agree to what they would view as a total surrender of their sovereignty. 提出这种论点的人要么是对伊朗社会无知，要么就是没有对美国人民讲真话。仅靠制裁不会迫使伊朗完全拆除其核基础设施的所有痕迹——即便是那些与和平计划相符的方面。而这往往就是批评者口中的"更好的协议"。无论是伊朗政府、伊朗反对派，还是伊朗人民，都不会同意他们所认为的完全放弃主权。
Moreover, our closest allies in Europe, or in Asia -- much less China or Russia -- certainly are not going to agree to enforce existing sanctions for another 5, 10, 15 years according to the dictates of the U.S. Congress. Because their willingness to support sanctions in the first place was based on Iran ending its pursuit of nuclear weapons. It was not based on the belief that Iran cannot have peaceful nuclear power. And it certainly wasn’t based on a desire for regime change in Iran. 此外，我们在欧洲和亚洲最亲密的盟友——更不用说中国或俄罗斯了——当然不会同意按照美国国会的旨意，再将现有制裁执行五年、十年或十五年。因为他们当初愿意支持制裁，是基于伊朗停止追求核武器，而不是基于认为伊朗不能拥有和平核能的信念，当然更不是基于希望伊朗政权更迭的愿望。
As a result, those who say we can just walk away from this deal and maintain sanctions are selling a fantasy. Instead of strengthening our position as some have suggested, Congress’s rejection would almost certainly result in multilateral sanctions unraveling. If, as has also been suggested, we tried to maintain unilateral sanctions, beefen them up, we would be standing alone. We cannot dictate the foreign, economic and energy policies of every major power in the world. 因此，那些说我们可以一走了之、继续维持制裁的人是在兜售幻想。国会的拒绝不仅不会像某些人所说的那样加强我们的地位，反而几乎肯定会导致多边制裁瓦解。如果——也有人这样建议——我们试图维持单边制裁并加以强化，我们将孤军奋战。我们不能左右世界上每一个主要大国的外交、经济和能源政策。
In order to even try to do that, we would have to sanction, for example, some of the world’s largest banks. We’d have to cut off countries like China from the American financial system. And since they happen to be major purchasers of or our debt, such actions could trigger severe disruptions in our own economy and, by the way, raise questions internationally about the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. 即便只是尝试这样做，我们也不得不制裁——例如——一些世界上最大的银行。我们将不得不切断中国等国家与美国金融体系的联系。而由于它们恰好是我们债务的主要购买国，这样的行动可能会引发我们自身经济的严重动荡，并且顺便提一句，还会在国际上引发对美元作为世界储备货币地位的质疑。
That’s part of the reason why many of the previous unilateral sanctions were waived. What’s more likely to happen, should Congress reject this deal, is that Iran would end up with some form of sanctions relief without having to accept any of the constraints or inspections required by this deal. So in that sense, the critics are right: Walk away from this agreement and you will get a better deal -- for Iran. 这就是此前许多单边制裁被放弃的部分原因。如果国会拒绝这项协议，更可能发生的情况是，伊朗将以某种形式获得制裁缓解，却不必接受这项协议要求的任何限制或检查。所以从这个意义上说，批评者是对的：放弃这项协议，你会得到一个更好的协议——对伊朗而言。
Now, because more sanctions won’t produce the results that the critics want, we have to be honest. Congressional rejection of this deal leaves any U.S. Administration that is absolutely committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon with one option -- another war in the Middle East. 既然更多制裁不会产生批评者想要的结果，我们就必须诚实面对。国会拒绝这项协议，将使任何绝对致力于阻止伊朗获得核武器的美国政府只剩下一个选择——在中东再打一场战争。
I say this not to be provocative. I am stating a fact. Without this deal, Iran will be in a position -- however tough our rhetoric may be –- to steadily advance its capabilities. Its breakout time, which is already fairly small, could shrink to near zero. Does anyone really doubt that the same voices now raised against this deal will be demanding that whoever is President bomb those nuclear facilities? 我这样说不是为了挑衅。我是在陈述一个事实。没有这项协议，无论我们的言辞多么强硬，伊朗都将处于一个能够稳步推进其能力的位置。其突破时间——本来就已经相当短——可能会缩短到接近于零。难道真的有人怀疑，现在反对这项协议的那些声音，到时会要求无论谁当总统都去轰炸那些核设施吗？
And as someone who does firmly believes that Iran must not get a nuclear weapon, and who has wrestled with this issue since the beginning of my presidency, I can tell you that alternatives to military action will have been exhausted once we reject a hard-won diplomatic solution that the world almost unanimously supports. 作为一个坚信伊朗绝不能获得核武器、且自总统任期之初就一直在努力应对这一问题的人，我可以告诉你们，一旦我们拒绝了一项世界几乎一致支持的来之不易的外交解决方案，军事行动之外的替代方案就已经穷尽了。
So let’s not mince words. The choice we face is ultimately between diplomacy or some form of war -- maybe not tomorrow, maybe not three months from now, but soon. And here’s the irony. As I said before, military action would be far less effective than this deal in preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. That’s not just my supposition. Every estimate, including those from Israeli analysts, suggest military action would only set back Iran’s program by a few years at best, which is a fraction of the limitations imposed by this deal. 所以让我们直截了当地说。我们面临的选择最终是外交与某种形式的战争之间的选择——也许不是明天，也许不是三个月后，但很快就会到来。而讽刺的是，正如我之前所说，军事行动在阻止伊朗获得核武器方面的效果，将远远不如这项协议。这不仅仅是我的推测。每一项评估，包括以色列分析人士的评估，都表明军事行动最多只能将伊朗的计划推迟几年——这只是这项协议所施加限制的一小部分。
It would likely guarantee that inspectors are kicked out of Iran. It is probable that it would drive Iran’s program deeper underground. It would certainly destroy the international unity that we’ve spent so many years building. 它很可能会导致检查人员被驱逐出伊朗。它很可能会将伊朗的计划逼入更深的地下。它肯定会破坏我们花了这么多年建立的国际团结。
Now, there are some opponents -- I have to give them credit; there are opponents of this deal who accept the choice of war. In fact, they argue that surgical strikes against Iran’s facilities will be quick and painless. But if we’ve learned anything from the last decade, it’s that wars in general and wars in the Middle East in particular are anything but simple. The only certainty in war is human suffering, uncertain costs, unintended consequences. 现在，有些反对者——我得承认这一点——有些反对这项协议的人接受战争的选择。事实上，他们辩称，对伊朗设施进行外科手术式打击将是迅速而无痛的。但如果说我们从过去十年中学到了什么，那就是战争——尤其是中东的战争——绝不是简单的。
We can also be sure that the Americans who bear the heaviest burden are the less than 1 percent of us, the outstanding men and women who serve in uniform, and not those of us who send them to war. 战争中唯一确定的是人类的苦难、不确定的代价和意想不到的后果。我们还可以确定的是，承受最沉重负担的美国人是我们中不到百分之一的人，是那些杰出的穿军装的男女，而不是我们这些把他们送上战场的人。
As Commander-in-Chief, I have not shied from using force when necessary. I have ordered tens of thousands of young Americans into combat. I have sat by their bedside sometimes when they come home. I’ve ordered military action in seven countries. There are times when force is necessary, and if Iran does not abide by this deal, it’s possible that we don’t have an alternative. 作为三军统帅，在必要时我从不回避使用武力。我已命令数万名美国年轻人投入战斗。他们回国时，我有时会坐在他们的病床边。我已在七个国家下令采取军事行动。有些时候武力是必要的，如果伊朗不遵守这项协议，我们有可能别无选择。
But how can we in good conscience justify war before we’ve tested a diplomatic agreement that achieves our objectives; that has been agreed to by Iran; that is supported by the rest of the world; and that preserves our options if the deal falls short? How could we justify that to our troops? How could we justify that to the world or to future generations? 但是，在我们检验一项能够实现我们目标的外交协议之前——一项伊朗已同意的协议，一项得到世界其他地区支持的协议，一项在协议不达预期时我们仍保留选项的协议——我们怎能问心无愧地为战争辩护呢？我们怎能向我们的军队证明这是正当的？我们怎能向世界或子孙后代证明这是正当的？
In the end, that should be a lesson that we’ve learned from over a decade of war. On the front end, ask tough questions. Subject our own assumptions to evidence and analysis. Resist the conventional wisdom and the drumbeat of war. Worry less about being labeled weak; worry more about getting it right. 归根结底，这应该是我们从十多年战争中学到的教训。在开战之前，提出尖锐的问题。用证据和分析来检验我们自己的假设。抵制传统智慧和战争的鼓点。少担心被贴上软弱的标签，多担心把事情做对。
I recognize that resorting to force may be tempting in the face of the rhetoric and behavior that emanates from parts of Iran. It is offensive. It is incendiary. We do take it seriously. But superpowers should not act impulsively in response to taunts, or even provocations that can be addressed short of war. Just because Iranian hardliners chant “Death to America” does not mean that that’s what all Iranians believe. 我认识到，面对来自伊朗部分地区的言论和行为，诉诸武力可能很有诱惑力。那些言论是冒犯性的，是煽动性的。我们确实认真对待。但超级大国不应在面对奚落——甚至是可以在不诉诸战争的情况下应对的挑衅——时冲动行事。仅仅因为伊朗强硬派高呼"打倒美国"，并不意味着所有伊朗人都这么认为。
In fact, it’s those hardliners who are most comfortable with the status quo. It’s those hardliners chanting “Death to America” who have been most opposed to the deal. They’re making common cause with the Republican caucus. 事实上，最安于现状的正是那些强硬派。正是那些高呼"打倒美国"的强硬派最反对这项协议。他们正在与共和党国会党团结成同盟。
The majority of the Iranian people have powerful incentives to urge their government to move in a different, less provocative direction -- incentives that are strengthened by this deal. We should offer them that chance. We should give them that opportunity. It’s not guaranteed to succeed. But if they take it, that would be good for Iran, it would be good for the United States. It would be good for a region that has known too much conflict. It would be good for the world. 大多数伊朗人民有强烈的动机敦促他们的政府朝着不同的、不那么挑衅的方向前进——而这项协议强化了这些动机。我们应该给他们这个机会。我们应该给他们这个机遇。这不能保证成功。但如果他们抓住了这个机会，那将对伊朗有利，对美国有利，对一个经历了太多冲突的地区有利，对世界有利。
And if Iran does not move in that direction, if Iran violates this deal, we will have ample ability to respond. The agreements pursued by Kennedy and Reagan with the Soviet Union, those agreements, those treaties involved America accepting significant constraints on our arsenal. As such, they were riskier. This agreement involves no such constraints. The defense budget of the United States is more than 600 billion dollars. To repeat, Iran’s is about 15 billion dollars. Our military remains the ultimate backstop to any security agreement that we make. 如果伊朗不朝那个方向前进，如果伊朗违反这项协议，我们将有充分的能力做出回应。肯尼迪和里根与苏联达成的那些协议、那些条约，涉及美国接受对我们军火库的重大限制。因此，它们的风险更大。这项协议不涉及这样的限制。美国的国防预算超过六千亿美元。
I have stated that Iran will never be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon. I have done what is necessary to make sure our military options are real. And I have no doubt that any President who follows me will take the same position. 再说一遍，伊朗的国防预算约为一百五十亿美元。我们的军队仍然是我们达成的任何安全协议的最终后盾。我已经声明，绝不允许伊朗获得核武器。我已采取必要措施，确保我们的军事选项是切实可行的。而且我毫不怀疑，我的任何继任者都会采取同样的立场。
So let me sum up here. When we carefully examine the arguments against this deal, none of them stand up to scrutiny. That may be why the rhetoric on the other side is so strident. I suppose some of it can be ascribed to knee-jerk partisanship that has become all too familiar; rhetoric that renders every decision that’s made a disaster, a surrender -- “you're aiding terrorists; you're endangering freedom.” 那么请允许我在此总结一下。当我们仔细审视反对这项协议的种种论点时，没有一个经得起推敲。这也许就是对方言辞如此尖锐的原因。我想其中一部分可以归因于我们已经太熟悉的本能党派偏见；那种将每一个决定都说成灾难、投降的言辞——"你在帮助恐怖分子；你在危及自由。"
On the other hand, I do think it’s important to acknowledge another, more understandable motivation behind the opposition to this deal, or at least skepticism to this deal, and that is a sincere affinity for our friend and ally, Israel -- an affinity that, as someone who has been a stalwart friend to Israel throughout my career, I deeply share. 另一方面，我确实认为，重要的是要承认反对这项协议——或至少对其持怀疑态度——背后的另一个更可以理解的动机，那就是对我们的朋友和盟友以色列的真挚情谊——作为一名在整个职业生涯中一直是以色列坚定朋友的人，我深怀这种情谊。
When the Israeli government is opposed to something, people in the United States take notice. And they should. No one can blame Israelis for having a deep skepticism about any dealings with a government like Iran’s -- which includes leaders who have denied the Holocaust, embrace an ideology of anti-Semitism, facilitate the flow of rockets that are arrayed on Israel’s borders, are pointed at Tel Aviv. In such a dangerous neighborhood, Israel has to be vigilant, and it rightly insists that it cannot depend on any other country -- even its great friend the United States -- for its own security. 当以色列政府反对某件事时，美国人民会注意到。他们也应该如此。没有人能责怪以色列人对与伊朗这样的政府打交道深感怀疑——伊朗的一些领导人否认大屠杀，信奉反犹太主义意识形态，为运往以色列边境、瞄准特拉维夫的火箭弹提供便利。
So we have to take seriously concerns in Israel. 在这样一个危险的地区，以色列必须保持警惕，它理所当然地坚持认为，自己的安全不能依赖任何其他国家——即便是它的好朋友美国。所以我们必须认真对待以色列的关切。
But the fact is, partly due to American military and intelligence assistance, which my Administration has provided at unprecedented levels, Israel can defend itself against any conventional danger -- whether from Iran directly or from its proxies. On the other hand, a nuclear-armed Iran changes that equation. 但事实是，部分由于美国的军事和情报援助——本届政府提供了前所未有的援助——以色列能够抵御任何常规危险——无论是来自伊朗直接的，还是来自其代理人的。另一方面，拥有核武器的伊朗会改变这一格局。
And that’s why this deal ultimately must be judged by what it achieves on the central goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. This deal does exactly that. I say this as someone who has done more than any other President to strengthen Israel’s security. And I have made clear to the Israeli government that we are prepared to discuss how we can deepen that cooperation even further. Already we’ve held talks with Israel on concluding another 10-year plan for U.S. security assistance to Israel. 这就是为什么这项协议最终必须以其在防止伊朗获得核武器这一核心目标上取得的成效来评判。这项协议正是这么做的。我是以比任何其他总统都更多地加强了以色列安全的人的身份说这番话的。我已向以色列政府明确表示，我们准备讨论如何进一步深化这种合作。
We can enhance support for areas like missile defense, information sharing, interdiction -- all to help meet Israel’s pressing security needs, and to provide a hedge against any additional activities that Iran may engage in as a consequence of sanctions relief. 我们已经与以色列举行了会谈，商讨再制定一项为期十年的美国对以色列安全援助计划。我们可以加强在导弹防御、信息共享、拦截等领域的支持——所有这些都是为了帮助满足以色列紧迫的安全需求，并对冲伊朗因制裁缓解而可能从事的任何额外活动。
But I have also listened to the Israeli security establishment, which warned of the danger posed by a nuclear-armed Iran for decades. In fact, they helped develop many of the ideas that ultimately led to this deal. 但我也听取了以色列安全部门的意见，他们几十年来一直警告拥有核武器的伊朗所构成的危险。事实上，许多最终促成这项协议的构想，正是他们帮助提出的。
So to friends of Israel, and to the Israeli people, I say this: A nuclear-armed Iran is far more dangerous to Israel, to America, and to the world than an Iran that benefits from sanctions relief. 所以，对以色列的朋友们，对以色列人民，我要说：拥有核武器的伊朗对以色列、对美国、对世界的危险，远远大于从制裁缓解中获益的伊朗。
I recognize that Prime Minister Netanyahu disagrees -- disagrees strongly. I do not doubt his sincerity. But I believe he is wrong. I believe the facts support this deal. I believe they are in America’s interest and Israel’s interest. And as President of the United States, it would be an abrogation of my constitutional duty to act against my best judgment simply because it causes temporary friction with a dear friend and ally. I do not believe that would be the right thing to do for the United States. I do not believe it would be the right thing to do for Israel. 我认识到内塔尼亚胡总理不同意——强烈不同意。我毫不怀疑他的真诚。但我认为他是错的。我认为事实支持这项协议。我认为这符合美国的利益，也符合以色列的利益。作为美国总统，如果仅仅因为这会与一位亲密朋友和盟友产生暂时摩擦，就违背我最佳的判断行事，那将是对我宪法职责的背弃。我不认为那样做对美国是正确的。我不认为那样做对以色列是正确的。
Over the last couple weeks, I have repeatedly challenged anyone opposed to this deal to put forward a better, plausible alternative. I have yet to hear one. What I’ve heard instead are the same types of arguments that we heard in the run-up to the Iraq War: Iran cannot be dealt with diplomatically; we can take military strikes without significant consequences; we shouldn’t worry about what the rest of the world thinks, because once we act, everyone will fall in line; tougher talk, more military threats will force Iran into submission; we can get a better deal. 过去几周，我一再要求任何反对这项协议的人提出一个更好的、可信的替代方案。我至今没有听到。我听到的反而是我们在伊拉克战争前夕听到的同一类论点：伊朗不能通过外交方式打交道；我们可以实施军事打击而不会产生重大后果；我们不必担心世界其他国家怎么想，因为一旦我们采取行动，所有人都会跟进；更强硬的言论、更多的军事威胁会迫使伊朗屈服；我们可以达成更好的协议。
I know it’s easy to play on people’s fears, to magnify threats, to compare any attempt at diplomacy to Munich. But none of these arguments hold up. They didn’t back in 2002 and 2003; they shouldn’t now. The same mindset, in many cases offered by the same people who seem to have no compunction with being repeatedly wrong, led to a war that did more to strengthen Iran, more to isolate the United States than anything we have done in the decades before or since. 我知道，利用人们的恐惧、夸大威胁、将任何外交努力与慕尼黑相提并论，都是很容易的。但这些论点没有一个站得住脚。它们在2002年和2003年就站不住脚；现在也站不住脚。同样的思维模式——在很多情况下是由同样的人提出的，他们似乎对一错再错毫无愧疚——导致了一场战争，其加强伊朗的程度、孤立美国的程度，超过了我们在此之前或之后几十年所做的任何事情。
It’s a mindset out of step with the traditions of American foreign policy, where we exhaust diplomacy before war, and debate matters of war and peace in the cold light of truth. 这种思维模式与美国外交政策的传统背道而驰；在我们的传统中，我们在战争之前穷尽外交，我们在冷静的真相之光中辩论战争与和平的问题。
“Peace is not the absence of conflict,” President Reagan once said. It is “the ability to cope with conflict by peaceful means.” President Kennedy warned Americans, “not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than the exchange of threats.” It is time to apply such wisdom. "和平不是没有冲突，"里根总统曾说过。和平是"以和平手段应对冲突的能力。"肯尼迪总统告诫美国人，"不要认为冲突不可避免，和解不可能，沟通只不过是威胁的交换。"是时候运用这样的智慧了。
The deal before us doesn’t bet on Iran changing, it doesn’t require trust; it verifies and requires Iran to forsake a nuclear weapon, just as we struck agreements with the Soviet Union at a time when they were threatening our allies, arming proxies against us, proclaiming their commitment to destroy our way of life, and had nuclear weapons pointed at all of our major cities -- a genuine existential threat. 摆在我们面前的这项协议并不押注于伊朗会改变，它不需要信任；它进行核查，并要求伊朗放弃核武器，正如我们当年与苏联达成协议一样——当时苏联威胁着我们的盟友，武装代理人反对我们，宣称他们致力于摧毁我们的生活方式，并且将核武器对准了我们所有的主要城市——那是一种真正的生存威胁。
We live in a complicated world -- a world in which the forces unleashed by human innovation are creating opportunities for our children that were unimaginable for most of human history. It is also a world of persistent threats, a world in which mass violence and cruelty is all too common, and human innovation risks the destruction of all that we hold dear. In this world, the United States of America remains the most powerful nation on Earth, and I believe that we will remain such for decades to come. But we are one nation among many. 我们生活在一个复杂的世界里——在这个世界上，人类创新释放的力量正在为我们的孩子创造人类历史上大部分时期都难以想象的机遇。这也是一个充满持续威胁的世界，一个大规模暴力和残酷行为太常见的世界，一个人类创新有可能摧毁我们所珍视的一切的世界。在这个世界上，美利坚合众国仍然是地球上最强大的国家，我相信我们在未来几十年仍将如此。但我们只是众多国家中的一个。
And what separates us from the empires of old, what has made us exceptional, is not the mere fact of our military might. Since World War II, the deadliest war in human history, we have used our power to try to bind nations together in a system of international law. We have led an evolution of those human institutions President Kennedy spoke about -- to prevent the spread of deadly weapons, to uphold peace and security, and promote human progress. 将我们与古老帝国区分开来的，使我们与众不同的，不仅仅是我们的军事力量。自第二次世界大战——人类历史上最致命的战争——以来，我们一直运用我们的力量，努力将各国凝聚在一个国际法体系之中。我们领导了肯尼迪总统所谈到的那些人类制度的演进——以防止致命武器的扩散，维护和平与安全，并促进人类进步。
We now have the opportunity to build on that progress. We built a coalition and held it together through sanctions and negotiations, and now we have before us a solution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, without resorting to war. As Americans, we should be proud of this achievement. And as members of Congress reflect on their pending decision, I urge them to set aside political concerns, shut out the noise, consider the stakes involved with the vote that you will cast. 我们现在有机会在这一进展的基础上继续前进。我们建立了一个联盟，并通过制裁和谈判将其凝聚在一起；现在，我们面前有一个解决方案，能够在不诉诸战争的情况下阻止伊朗获得核武器。作为美国人，我们应该为这一成就感到自豪。当国会议员们思考他们即将做出的决定时，我敦促他们把政治关切放在一边，屏蔽噪音，认真考虑他们的投票所涉及的利害关系。
If Congress kills this deal, we will lose more than just constraints on Iran’s nuclear program, or the sanctions we have painstakingly built. We will have lost something more precious: America’s credibility as a leader of diplomacy; America’s credibility as the anchor of the international system. 如果国会否决这项协议，我们失去的将不仅仅是对伊朗核计划的限制，或我们苦心建立的制裁。我们将失去更宝贵的东西：美国作为外交领导者的信誉；美国作为国际体系锚点的信誉。
John F. Kennedy cautioned here, more than 50 years ago, at this university, that “the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war.” But it’s so very important. It is surely the pursuit of peace that is most needed in this world so full of strife. 五十多年前，约翰·F·肯尼迪在这所大学告诫说，"追求和平不如追求战争那般戏剧化。"但它是如此重要。在这个充满纷争的世界上，最需要的正是对和平的追求。
My fellow Americans, contact your representatives in Congress. Remind them of who we are. Remind them of what is best in us and what we stand for, so that we can leave behind a world that is more secure and more peaceful for our children. 我的美国同胞们，请联系你们在国会的代表。提醒他们我们是谁。提醒他们我们最优秀的品质和我们所代表的立场，这样我们才能为子孙后代留下一个更安全、更和平的世界。
Thank you very much. 非常感谢大家。
