Please have a seat. Good afternoon, everybody. Yesterday was a historic day. The comprehensive, long-term deal that we achieved with our allies and partners to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon represents a powerful display of American leadership and diplomacy. It shows what we can accomplish when we lead from a position of strength and a position of principle, when we unite the international community around a shared vision, and we resolve to solve problems peacefully. 请大家就座。各位下午好。昨天是历史性的一天。我们与盟友和伙伴达成的防止伊朗获得核武器的全面、长期协议，展示了美国领导力与外交的强大力量。它表明，当我们从实力和原则的立场出发，当我们团结国际社会围绕共同愿景，并决心和平解决问题时，我们能够取得怎样的成就。
As I said yesterday, it’s important for the American people and Congress to get a full opportunity to review this deal. That process is now underway. I’ve already reached out to leaders in Congress on both sides of the aisle. My national security team has begun offering extensive briefings. I expect the debate to be robust -- and that’s how it should be. This is an important issue. Our national security policies are stronger and more effective when they are subject to the scrutiny and transparency that democracy demands. 正如我昨天所说，重要的是让美国人民和国会有充分机会审查这项协议。这一进程现已展开。我已经联系了国会两党领袖。我的国家安全团队已经开始提供广泛的情况通报。我预计辩论将十分激烈——理应如此。这是一个重要问题。当我们的国家安全政策接受民主要求的审视和透明时，它们会更强大、更有效。
And as I said yesterday, the details of this deal matter very much. That’s why our team worked so hard for so long to get the details right. At the same time, as this debate unfolds, I hope we don’t lose sight of the larger picture -- the opportunity that this agreement represents. As we go forward, it’s important for everybody to remember the alternative and the fundamental choice that this moment represents. 正如我昨天所说，这项协议的细节至关重要。这就是为什么我们的团队如此努力、如此长时间地工作，以确保细节准确无误。与此同时，随着这场辩论的展开，我希望我们不要忽视大局——这项协议所代表的机遇。在我们向前推进之际，每个人都必须记住替代方案以及这一时刻所代表的根本选择。
With this deal, we cut off every single one of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear program -- a nuclear weapons program, and Iran’s nuclear program will be under severe limits for many years. Without a deal, those pathways remain open; there would be no limits on Iran’s nuclear program, and Iran could move closer to a nuclear bomb. 有了这项协议，我们切断了伊朗通往核计划——核武器计划——的每一条途径，伊朗的核计划将在多年内受到严格限制。没有协议，这些途径仍然敞开；伊朗的核计划将不受限制，伊朗可能离核弹更近一步。
With this deal, we gain unprecedented, around-the-clock monitoring of Iran’s key nuclear facilities and the most comprehensive and intrusive inspection and verification regime ever negotiated. Without a deal, those inspections go away, and we lose the ability to closely monitor Iran’s program and detect any covert nuclear weapons program. 有了这项协议，我们获得了对伊朗关键核设施前所未有的全天候监控，以及有史以来谈判达成的最全面、最深入的检查与核查机制。没有协议，这些检查就会消失，我们将失去密切监控伊朗计划、发现任何秘密核武器计划的能力。
With this deal, if Iran violates its commitments, there will be real consequences. Nuclear-related sanctions that have helped to cripple the Iranian economy will snap back into place. Without a deal, the international sanctions regime will unravel, with little ability to re-impose them. 有了这项协议，如果伊朗违反其承诺，将会有切实后果。曾帮助重创伊朗经济的核相关制裁将迅速恢复。没有协议，国际制裁体系将会瓦解，几乎没有能力重新实施。
With this deal, we have the possibility of peacefully resolving a major threat to regional and international security. Without a deal, we risk even more war in the Middle East, and other countries in the region would feel compelled to pursue their own nuclear programs, threatening a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world. 有了这项协议，我们有可能和平解决对地区和国际安全的重大威胁。没有协议，我们就有在中东引发更多战争的风险，该地区其他国家会感到有必要发展自己的核计划，威胁到世界上最动荡地区的核军备竞赛。
As I said yesterday, even with this deal, we will continue to have profound differences with Iran -- its support for terrorism and its use of proxies to destabilize parts of the Middle East. Therefore, the multilateral arms embargo on Iran will remain in place for an additional five years, and restrictions on ballistic missile technology will remain for eight years. 正如我昨天所说，即便有了这项协议，我们与伊朗之间仍将存在深刻分歧——伊朗对恐怖主义的支持及其利用代理人破坏中东部分地区稳定的行为。因此，对伊朗的多边武器禁运将再持续五年，对弹道导弹技术的限制将再持续八年。
In addition, the United States will maintain our own sanctions related to Iran’s support for terrorism, its ballistic missile program, and its human rights violations. And we’ll continue our unprecedented security cooperation with Israel and continue to deepen our partnerships with the Gulf States. 此外，美国将维持与伊朗支持恐怖主义、弹道导弹计划和侵犯人权相关的自身制裁。我们将继续与以色列开展前所未有的安全合作，并继续深化与海湾国家的伙伴关系。
But the bottom line is this: This nuclear deal meets the national security interests of the United States and our allies. It prevents the most serious threat -- Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon, which would only make the other problems that Iran may cause even worse. That’s why this deal makes our country, and the world, safer and more secure. 但底线是：这项核协议符合美国及其盟友的国家安全利益。它阻止了最严重的威胁——伊朗获得核武器，而这只会让伊朗可能造成的其他问题更加恶化。这就是为什么这项协议让我们的国家和世界更加安全、更有保障。
It’s why the alternative -- no limits on Iran’s nuclear program, no inspections, an Iran that’s closer to a nuclear weapon, the risk of a regional nuclear arms race and a greater risk of war -- all that would endanger our security. That’s the choice that we face. If we don’t choose wisely, I believe future generations will judge us harshly for letting this moment slip away. 这就是为什么替代方案——对伊朗核计划不加限制、不进行检查、一个离核弹更近的伊朗、地区核军备竞赛的风险以及更大的战争风险——所有这些都将危及我们的安全。这就是我们面临的选择。如果我们不做出明智选择，我相信后代会严厉评判我们让这一时刻溜走。
And no one suggests that this deal resolves all the threats that Iran poses to its neighbors or the world. Moreover, realizing the promise of this deal will require many years of implementation and hard work. It will require vigilance and execution. But this deal is our best means of assuring that Iran does not get a nuclear weapon. And, from the start, that has been my number-one priority, our number-one priority. 没有人认为这项协议能解决伊朗对其邻国或世界构成的所有威胁。此外，实现这项协议的承诺将需要多年的执行和艰苦努力。这需要警惕和执行。但这项协议是我们确保伊朗不会获得核武器的最佳手段。而且，从一开始，这就是我的首要任务，我们的首要任务。
We’ve got a historic chance to pursue a safer and more secure world -- an opportunity that may not come again in our lifetimes. As President and as Commander-in-Chief, I am determined to seize that opportunity. 我们有一个历史性的机会去追求一个更安全、更有保障的世界——一个在我们有生之年可能不会再出现的机会。作为总统和武装部队总司令，我决心抓住这个机会。
So with that, I’m going to take some questions. And let me see who I’m starting off with. Here you go. I got it. 说了这些，我现在来回答一些问题。让我看看先从谁开始。好，就你。我点到了。
Andrew Beatty, AFP. 安德鲁·比蒂，法新社。
Question: Thank you, Mr. President. Yesterday, you said the deal offered a chance at a new direction in relations with Iran. What steps will you take to enable a more moderate Iran? And does this deal allow you to more forcefully counter Iran’s destabilizing actions in the region quite aside from the nuclear question? Thank you. 记者：谢谢你，总统先生。昨天，你说这项协议为与伊朗关系的新方向提供了机会。你将采取哪些措施来促成一个更加温和的伊朗？除了核问题之外，这项协议是否让你能够更有力地反击伊朗在该地区的破坏稳定行动？谢谢。
President Obama: Andrew, if you don’t mind, just because I suspect that there’s going to be a common set of questions that are touched on -- I promise I will get to your question, but I want to start off just by stepping back and reminding folks of what is at stake here. And I already did in my opening statement, but I just want to reiterate it because I’ve heard already some of the objections to the deal. 奥巴马总统：安德鲁，如果你不介意的话，因为我怀疑会有一系列共同的问题被触及——我保证我会回答你的问题，但我想先退一步，提醒大家这里的利害关系是什么。我在开场白中已经讲过了，但我想重申一下，因为我已经听到了一些对这项协议的反对意见。
The starting premise of our strategy with respect to Iran has been that it would be a grave threat to the United States and to our allies if they obtained a nuclear weapon. And so everything that we’ve done over the last six and a half years has been designed to make sure that we address that number-one priority. That’s what the sanctions regime was all about. That’s how we were able to mobilize the international community, including some folks that we are not particularly close to, to abide by these sanctions. 我们对伊朗战略的基本前提是，如果他们获得核武器，将对美国和我们的盟友构成严重威胁。因此，我们在过去六年半中所做的一切都是为了确保我们解决这一首要任务。这就是制裁体系的全部意义所在。这就是我们能够动员国际社会，包括一些我们并不特别亲近的国家，遵守这些制裁的原因。
That’s how these crippling sanctions came about, was because we were able to gain global consensus that Iran having a nuclear weapon would be a problem for everybody. 这些制裁之所以能够产生如此毁灭性的效果，是因为我们能够达成全球共识，即伊朗拥有核武器对每个人来说都是个问题。
That’s the reason that Iran’s accounts got frozen and they were not able to get money for the oil sales that they’ve made. That’s the reason that they had problems operating with respect to international commerce -- because we built that international consensus around this very specific, narrow, but profound issue -- the possibility of Iran getting a nuclear weapon. 这就是伊朗账户被冻结、他们无法从石油销售中获得资金的原因。这就是他们在国际贸易方面遇到困难的原因——因为我们围绕这个非常具体、范围狭窄但影响深远的问题——伊朗可能获得核武器——建立了国际共识。
And, by the way, that was not simply my priority. If you look back at all the debates that have taken place over the last five, six years, this has been a Democratic priority, this has been a Republican priority, this has been Prime Minister Netanyahu’s priority. It’s been our Gulf allies’ priority -- is making sure Iran does not get a nuclear weapon. 顺便说一句，这不仅仅是我的首要任务。如果你回顾过去五六年发生的所有辩论，这一直是民主党的优先事项，也是共和党的优先事项，也是内塔尼亚胡总理的优先事项。这一直是我们海湾盟友的优先事项——就是确保伊朗不会获得核武器。
The deal negotiated by John Kerry, Wendy Sherman, Ernie Moniz, our allies, our partners, the P5+1 achieves that goal. It achieves our top priority -- making sure that Iran does not get a nuclear weapon. But we have always recognized that even if Iran doesn’t get a nuclear weapon, Iran still poses challenges to our interests and our values, both in the region and around the world. 由约翰·克里、温迪·谢尔曼、厄尼·莫尼兹以及我们的盟友和伙伴、五常加一谈判达成的这项协议实现了这一目标。它实现了我们的首要任务——确保伊朗不会获得核武器。但我们一直认识到，即使伊朗不获得核武器，伊朗仍然对我们的利益和价值观构成挑战，无论是在该地区还是在全世界。
So when this deal gets implemented, we know that we will have dismantled the immediate concerns around Iran’s nuclear program. We will have brought their stockpiles down to 98 percent. We will have significantly reduced the number of centrifuges that they operate. We will have installed an unprecedented inspections regime, and that will remain in place not just for 10 years but, for example, on the stockpiles, will continue to 15 years. 因此，当这项协议得到实施时，我们知道我们将消除围绕伊朗核计划的直接担忧。我们将把他们的浓缩铀库存减少98%。我们将大幅减少他们运行的离心机数量。我们将建立一个前所未有的检查机制，这一机制不仅会持续10年，例如，在库存方面，将持续15年。
Iran will have pledged to the international community that it will not develop a nuclear weapon and now will be subject to an Additional Protocol, a more vigorous inspection and monitoring regime that lasts in perpetuity. We will have disabled a facility like Arak, the Arak facility, from allowing Iran to develop plutonium that could be used for a bomb. We will have greatly reduced the stockpile of uranium that’s enriched. And we will have put in place inspections along the entire supply chain so that if uranium was diverted into a covert program we would catch it. 伊朗将向国际社会承诺不发展核武器，并将接受《附加议定书》——一个更严格的检查和监督机制，永久有效。我们将使阿拉克这样的设施失去能力，不让伊朗发展可用于制造炸弹的钚。我们将大幅减少浓缩铀库存。我们将在整个供应链上建立检查机制，这样如果铀被转用于秘密计划，我们就能发现。
So I can say with confidence but, more importantly, nuclear experts can say with confidence that Iran will not be in a position to develop a nuclear bomb. We will have met our number-one priority. 因此，我可以有信心地说，但更重要的是，核专家可以有信心地说，伊朗将没有能力发展核弹。我们将实现我们的首要任务。
Now, we’ll still have problems with Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism; its funding of proxies like Hezbollah that threaten Israel and threaten the region; the destabilizing activities that they're engaging in, including in places like Yemen. And my hope is that building on this deal we can continue to have conversations with Iran that incentivize them to behave differently in the region, to be less aggressive, less hostile, more cooperative, to operate the way we expect nations in the international community to behave. 现在，我们仍然会对伊朗赞助恐怖主义的问题感到担忧；他们资助像真主党这样威胁以色列和威胁地区的代理人；他们正在从事的破坏稳定的活动，包括在也门等地。我的希望是，在这项协议的基础上，我们可以继续与伊朗对话，激励他们在该地区采取不同的行为方式，减少攻击性、减少敌意、增加合作，按照我们期望国际社会各国的行事方式行事。
But we're not counting on it. So this deal is not contingent on Iran changing its behavior. It’s not contingent on Iran suddenly operating like a liberal democracy. 但我们并不指望这一点。因此，这项协议并不以伊朗改变其行为为条件。它不以伊朗突然像自由民主国家那样运作为条件。
It solves one particular problem, which is making sure they don't have a bomb. And the point I’ve repeatedly made -- and is, I believe, hard to dispute -- is that it will be a lot easier for us to check Iran’s nefarious activities, to push back against the other areas where they operate contrary to our interests or our allies’ interests, if they don't have a bomb. 它解决了一个特定的问题，那就是确保他们没有炸弹。我反复提出的一点——而且我认为这一点很难反驳——是，如果他们没有炸弹，我们制止伊朗的邪恶活动、反击他们在其他违背我们利益或盟友利益领域的行动将会容易得多。
And so will they change their behavior? Will we seek to gain more cooperation from them in resolving issues like Syria, or what’s happening in Iraq, to stop encouraging Houthis in Yemen? We’ll continue to engage with them. Although, keep in mind that unlike the Cuba situation, we're not normalizing diplomatic relations here. So the contacts will continue to be limited. But will we try to encourage them to take a more constructive path? Of course. But we're not betting on it. 那么他们会改变行为吗？我们会寻求从他们那里获得更多合作来解决像叙利亚这样的问题，或者伊拉克正在发生的事情，停止鼓励也门的胡塞武装吗？我们将继续与他们接触。不过，请记住，与古巴情况不同，我们在这里没有实现外交关系正常化。因此，接触仍将是有限的。但我们会尝试鼓励他们走一条更具建设性的道路吗？当然会。但我们并不把赌注押在这上面。
And in fact, having resolved the nuclear issue, we will be in a stronger position to work with Israel, work with the Gulf countries, work with our other partners, work with the Europeans to bring additional pressure to bear on Iran around those issues that remain of concern. 事实上，在解决了核问题之后，我们将处于更有利的地位，可以与以色列合作，与海湾国家合作，与我们的其他伙伴合作，与欧洲人合作，对伊朗在那些仍然令人关切的问题上施加更多压力。
But the argument that I’ve been already hearing -- and this was foreshadowed even before the deal was announced -- that because this deal does not solve all those other problems, that that's an argument for rejecting this deal, defies logic. It makes no sense. And it loses sight of what was our original number-one priority, which is making sure that they don't have a bomb. 但我已经听到的论点——这在协议宣布之前就已经有所预示——即因为这项协议不能解决所有其他问题，所以就有理由拒绝这项协议，这是违背逻辑的。这毫无意义。而且它忽视了我们最初的首要任务是什么，那就是确保他们没有炸弹。
Jon Karl. 乔恩·卡尔。
Question: Mr. President, does it give you any pause to see this deal praised by Syrian dictator Assad as a “great victory for Iran,” or praised by those in Tehran who still shout “death to America,” and yet our closest ally in the Middle East calls it “a mistake of historic proportions”? And here in Congress, it looks like a large majority will vote to reject this deal. I know you can veto that rejection, but do you have any concerns about seeing a majority of the people’s representatives in Congress saying that this is a bad deal? 记者：总统先生，看到这项协议被叙利亚独裁者阿萨德称赞为"伊朗的伟大胜利"，或者被德黑兰那些仍在高呼"打倒美国"的人称赞，而我们在中东最亲密的盟友却称其为"历史性比例的错误"，这难道不让你有所迟疑吗？而在国会这边，似乎绝大多数人将投票否决这项协议。我知道你可以否决这项否决，但看到国会中大多数人民代表说这是一项糟糕的协议，你难道没有任何担忧吗？
And if I can just ask you quick political question, a very quick one. 我还可以问你一个简短的政治问题吗，非常短的一个。
President Obama: Jon, I think -- 奥巴马总统：乔恩，我认为——
Question: Donald -- 记者：唐纳德——
President Obama: Let me answer the question that you asked. It does not give me pause that Mr. Assad or others in Tehran may be trying to spin the deal in a way that they think is favorable to what their constituencies want to hear. That’s what politicians do. 奥巴马总统：让我先回答你刚才问的问题。阿萨德先生或德黑兰的其他人可能会试图以他们认为有利于其选民想听的方式来解读这项协议，这并不会让我感到迟疑。政客们就是这么做的。
And that’s been the case throughout. I mean, you’ll recall that during the course of these negotiations over the last couple of months every time the Supreme Leader or somebody tweeted something out, for some reason we all bought into the notion, well, the Obama administration must be giving this or capitulating to that. Well, now we have a document so you can see what the deal is. 一直以来都是如此。我的意思是，你应该还记得，在过去几个月的谈判过程中，每次最高领导人或某人发了什么推文，不知为何我们所有人都接受了这样一种说法，哦，奥巴马政府一定是在这个或那个方面妥协了。好吧，现在我们有了文件，你可以看看协议到底是什么。
We don’t have to speculate, we don’t have to engage in spin, you can just read what it says and what is required. And nobody has disputed that as a consequence of this agreement Iran has to drastically reduce its stockpiles of uranium, is cut off from plutonium; the Fordow facility that is underground is converted; that we have an unprecedented inspections regime; that we have snap-back provisions if they cheat. The facts are the facts. And I'm not concerned about what others say about it. 我们不必猜测，不必进行解读，你只需要读一读它说了什么、要求什么。没有人质疑，作为这项协议的结果，伊朗必须大幅减少其铀库存，被切断钚的获取途径；地下的福尔多设施被改造；我们有了前所未有的检查机制；如果他们作弊，我们有快速恢复制裁的条款。事实就是事实。我不关心别人怎么说。
Now, with respect to Congress, my hope -- I won’t prejudge this -- my hope is, is that everyone in Congress also evaluates this agreement based on the facts -- not on politics, not on posturing, not on the fact that this is a deal I bring to Congress as opposed to a Republican President, not based on lobbying, but based on what’s in the national interest of the United States of America. 现在，关于国会，我的希望——我不会预判——我的希望是，国会中的每个人也都基于事实来评估这项协议——不是基于政治，不是基于姿态，不是基于这是我带给国会的协议而不是共和党总统的协议这一事实，不是基于游说，而是基于什么符合美利坚合众国的国家利益。
And I think that if Congress does that, then, in fact, based on the facts, the majority of Congress should approve of this deal. But we live in Washington and politics do intrude. And as I said in an interview yesterday, I am not betting on the Republican Party rallying behind this agreement. I do expect the debate to be based on facts and not speculation or misinformation. 我认为，如果国会这样做，那么事实上，基于事实，国会多数应该批准这项协议。但我们生活在华盛顿，政治确实会介入。正如我昨天在一次采访中所说，我不指望共和党会团结支持这项协议。我确实期望辩论基于事实，而不是猜测或错误信息。
And that I welcome -- in part because, look, there are legitimate real concerns here. We’ve already talked about it. We have huge differences with Iran. Israel has legitimate concerns about its security relative to Iran. You have a large country with a significant military that has proclaimed that Israel shouldn’t exist, that has denied the Holocaust, that has financed Hezbollah, and as a consequence there are missiles that are pointed towards Tel Aviv. 我欢迎这一点——部分原因是，听着，这里有合理的、切实的关切。我们已经谈过了。我们与伊朗存在巨大分歧。以色列对其相对于伊朗的安全有合理的关切。你面对的是一个拥有重要军事力量的大国，它曾宣称以色列不应该存在，否认大屠杀的发生，资助了真主党，因此有导弹指向特拉维夫。
And so I think there are very good reasons why Israelis are nervous about Iran’s position in the world generally. And I’ve said this to Prime Minister Netanyahu, I’ve said it directly to the Israeli people. But what I’ve also said is that all those threats are compounded if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. And for all the objections of Prime Minister Netanyahu, or, for that matter, some of the Republican leadership that’s already spoken, none of them have presented to me, or the American people, a better alternative. 因此，我认为以色列人对伊朗在世界上的总体地位感到紧张是有充分理由的。我已经对内塔尼亚胡总理说过这番话，我也直接对以色列人民说过。但我也说过，如果伊朗获得核武器，所有这些威胁都会变得更加严重。尽管内塔尼亚胡总理，或者说，一些已经发言的共和党领导人提出了种种反对意见，但他们中没有一个人向我或美国人民提出更好的替代方案。
I'm hearing a lot of talking points being repeated about “this is a bad deal” -- “this is a historically bad deal,” “this will threaten Israel and threaten the world and threaten the United States.” I mean, there’s been a lot of that. 我听到很多人在重复说"这是一项糟糕的协议"——"这是一项历史性的糟糕协议"，"这将威胁以色列、威胁世界、威胁美国"。我的意思是，这种说法已经很多了。
What I haven’t heard is, what is your preferred alternative? If 99 percent of the world community and the majority of nuclear experts look at this thing and they say, this will prevent Iran from getting a nuclear bomb, and you are arguing either that it does not, or that even if it does it’s temporary, or that because they’re going to get a windfall of their accounts being unfrozen that they’ll cause more problems, then you should have some alternative to present. And I haven’t heard that. 我没有听到的是，你们的首选替代方案是什么？如果99%的国际社会和大多数核专家审视这件事，他们说，这将阻止伊朗获得核弹，而你们要么争辩说它不会，要么争辩说即使会也是暂时的，要么争辩说因为他们的账户被解冻会获得一笔意外之财，他们会制造更多问题，那么你们应该提出一些替代方案。而我没有听到。
And the reason is because there really are only two alternatives here: Either the issue of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon is resolved diplomatically through a negotiation, or it’s resolved through force, through war. Those are the options. 原因是这里真的只有两种选择：要么伊朗获得核武器的问题通过谈判外交解决，要么通过武力、通过战争解决。这就是选项。
Now, you’ll hear some critics say, well, we could have negotiated a better deal. Okay. What does that mean? I think the suggestion among a lot of the critics has been that a better deal, an acceptable deal would be one in which Iran has no nuclear capacity at all, peaceful or otherwise. The problem with that position is that there is nobody who thinks that Iran would or could ever accept that, and the international community does not take the view that Iran can’t have a peaceful nuclear program. They agree with us that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. 现在，你会听到一些批评者说，嗯，我们本可以谈判出一项更好的协议。好吧。那是什么意思？我认为很多批评者的暗示是，一项更好的协议、一项可接受的协议将是伊朗完全没有核能力的协议，无论是和平用途还是其他用途。这种立场的问题在于，没有人认为伊朗会或可能接受这一点，而且国际社会并不认为伊朗不能拥有和平核计划。他们同意我们的观点，即伊朗不能拥有核武器。
And so we don’t have diplomatic leverage to eliminate every vestige of a peaceful nuclear program in Iran. What we do have the leverage to do is to make sure they don’t have a weapon. That’s exactly what we’ve done. 因此，我们没有外交影响力来消除伊朗和平核计划的每一丝痕迹。我们确实有影响力做的是确保他们没有武器。这正是我们所做的。
So to go back to Congress, I challenge those who are objecting to this agreement, number one, to read the agreement before they comment on it; number two, to explain specifically where it is that they think this agreement does not prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and why they’re right and people like Ernie Moniz, who is an MIT nuclear physicist and an expert in these issues, is wrong, why the rest of the world is wrong, and then present an alternative. 所以回到国会的问题上，我向那些反对这项协议的人提出挑战，第一，在评论之前先读一读协议；第二，具体解释他们认为这项协议在哪些方面没有阻止伊朗获得核武器，以及为什么他们是对的，而像厄尼·莫尼兹这样的人——他是麻省理工学院的核物理学家，也是这些问题的专家——是错的，为什么世界其他地方都错了，然后提出一个替代方案。
And if the alternative is that we should bring Iran to heel through military force, then those critics should say so. And that will be an honest debate. 如果替代方案是我们应该通过军事力量让伊朗屈服，那么那些批评者就应该直说。那将是一场诚实的辩论。
All right. 好的。
Question: Mr. President, if I can -- 记者：总统先生，我能不能——
President Obama: No, no -- 奥巴马总统：不，不——
Question: Prime Minister Netanyahu said that you have a situation where Iran can delay 24 days before giving access to military facilities -- 记者：内塔尼亚胡总理说，你们的情况是，伊朗可以延迟24天才能允许进入军事设施——
President Obama: I’m happy to -- that’s a good example. So let’s take the issue of 24 days. This has been I think swirling today, the notion that this is insufficient in terms of inspections. 奥巴马总统：我很乐意——这是个好例子。那我们就来谈谈24天的问题。我想今天这个问题一直在发酵，认为这在检查方面是不够的。
Now, keep in mind, first of all, that we’ll have 24/7 inspections of declared nuclear facilities -- Fordow, Natanz, Arak, their uranium mines; facilities that are known to produce centrifuges, parts. That entire infrastructure that we know about we will have sophisticated, 24/7 monitoring of those facilities. 请记住，首先，我们将对已申报的核设施进行24小时不间断的检查——福尔多、纳坦兹、阿拉克、他们的铀矿；那些已知生产离心机及其零部件的设施。我们所知的那整个基础设施，我们将对这些设施进行精密的全天候监控。
So then the issue is, what if they try to develop a covert program? Now, one of the advantages of having inspections across the entire production chain is that it makes it very difficult to set up a covert program. There are only so many uranium mines in Iran. And if, in fact, we’re counting the amount of uranium that’s being mined and suddenly some is missing on the back end, they got some explaining to do. 那么问题来了，如果他们试图发展秘密计划怎么办？现在，在整个生产链上都有检查的优势之一是，这使得建立秘密计划非常困难。伊朗的铀矿数量有限。而且，如果事实上我们正在统计开采的铀量，突然后端少了一些，他们就得做出解释。
So we’re able to track what’s happening along the existing facilities to make sure that there is not diversion into a covert program. But let’s say that Iran is so determined that it now wants to operate covertly. The IAEA, the international organization charged with implementing the non-proliferation treaty and monitoring nuclear activities in countries around the world -- the IAEA will have the ability to say, that undeclared site we’re concerned about, we see something suspicious. And they will be able to say to Iran, we want to go inspect that. 因此，我们能够跟踪现有设施中发生的情况，以确保没有转用于秘密计划。但假设伊朗如此决心，现在想要秘密运作。国际原子能机构——负责执行《不扩散条约》并监督世界各国核活动的国际组织——将有能力说，那个未申报的地点我们感到担忧，我们看到了可疑之处。他们将能够对伊朗说，我们要去检查那个地方。
Now, if Iran objects, we can override it. In the agreement, we’ve set it up so we can override Iran’s objection. And we don’t need Russia or China in order for us to get that override. And if they continue to object, we’re in a position to snap back sanctions and declare that Iran is in violation and is cheating. 现在，如果伊朗反对，我们可以推翻它。在协议中，我们已经设置了可以推翻伊朗反对的机制。而且我们不需要俄罗斯或中国来获得这种推翻权。如果他们继续反对，我们就能够迅速恢复制裁，并宣布伊朗违反协议、在作弊。
As for the fact that it may take 24 days to finally get access to the site, the nature of nuclear programs and facilities is such, this is not something you hide in a closet. This is not something you put on a dolly and kind of wheel off somewhere. And, by the way, if we identify an undeclared site that we’re suspicious about, we’re going to be keeping eyes on it. So we’re going to be monitoring what the activity is, and that’s going to be something that will be evidence if we think that some funny business was going on there that we can then present to the international community. 至于最终进入该地点可能需要24天这一事实，核计划和设施的性质决定了，这不是你可以藏在壁橱里的东西。这不是你可以放在手推车上、推到什么地方去的东西。而且，顺便说一句，如果我们发现一个我们怀疑的未申报地点，我们会一直盯着它。所以我们会监控那里的活动，如果我们认为那里有什么可疑的勾当，那将成为证据，然后我们可以提交给国际社会。
So we’ll be monitoring that that entire time. And, by the way, if there is nuclear material on that site, high school physics will remind us that that leaves a trace. And so we’ll know that, in fact, there was a violation of the agreement. 所以我们会全程监控。而且，顺便说一句，如果那个地点有核材料，高中物理就会提醒我们，那会留下痕迹。所以我们会知道，事实上，协议遭到了违反。
So the point is, Jonathan, that this is the most vigorous inspection and verification regime by far that has ever been negotiated. Is it possible that Iran decides to try to cheat despite having this entire inspection verification mechanism? It’s possible. But if it does, first of all, we’ve built in a one-year breakout time, which gives us a year to respond forcefully. And we’ve built in a snap-back provision so we don't have to go through lengthy negotiations at the U.N. to put the sanctions right back in place. 所以关键是，乔纳森，这是迄今为止谈判达成的最严格的检查和核查机制。伊朗是否有可能决定尽管有这整个检查核查机制还是要作弊？这是可能的。但如果它这样做了，首先，我们已经设定了一年的突破时间，这给了我们一年的时间来做出有力回应。而且我们已经设定了快速恢复制裁的条款，所以我们不必在联合国经过漫长的谈判才能把制裁重新加回去。
And so really the only argument you can make against the verification and inspection mechanism that we’ve put forward is that Iran is so intent on obtaining a nuclear weapon that no inspection regime and no verification mechanism would be sufficient because they’d find some way to get around it because they're untrustworthy. 因此，实际上，你能对我们提出的核查和检查机制提出的唯一反对论点是，伊朗获得核武器的意图如此强烈，以至于任何检查机制和核查机制都不够，因为他们会找到某种方法来绕过它，因为他们是不可信任的。
And if that's your view, then we go back to the choice that you have to make earlier. That means, presumably, that you can't negotiate. And what you're really saying is, is that you've got to apply military force to guarantee that they don't have a nuclear program. And if somebody wants to make that debate -- whether it’s the Republican leadership, or Prime Minister Netanyahu, or the Israeli Ambassador or others, they're free to make it. But it’s not persuasive. 如果这是你的观点，那么我们就回到了你之前必须做出的选择。这意味着，据推测，你无法进行谈判。而你真正想说的是，你必须使用军事力量来保证他们没有核计划。如果有人想进行那场辩论——无论是共和党领导层，还是内塔尼亚胡总理，还是以色列大使或其他人，他们都可以自由地进行。但这没有说服力。
Carol Lee. 卡罗尔·李。
Question: Thank you, Mr. President. I want to ask you about the arms and ballistic missile embargo. Why did you decide -- agree to lift those even with the five- and eight-year durations? It’s obviously emerging as a sticking point on the Hill. And are you concerned that arms to Iran will go to Hezbollah or Hamas? And is there anything that you or a future President can do to stop that? 记者：谢谢你，总统先生。我想问你关于武器和弹道导弹禁运的问题。为什么你决定——同意解除这些禁运，尽管有五年和八年的期限？这显然正在成为国会的一个症结。你是否担心运往伊朗的武器会流向真主党或哈马斯？你或未来的总统能做些什么来阻止这种情况？
And if you don't mind, I wanted to see if you could step back a little bit, and when you look at this Iran deal and all the other issues and unrest that's happening in the Middle East, what kind of Middle East do you want to leave when you leave the White House in a year and a half? 如果你不介意的话，我想请你稍微退一步，当你审视这项伊朗协议以及所有其他问题和中东正在发生的动荡时，你希望在一年半后离开白宫时留下一个什么样的中东？
President Obama: So the issue of the arms embargo and ballistic missiles is of real concern to us -- has been of real concern to us. And it is in the national security interest of the United States to prevent Iran from sending weapons to Hezbollah, for example, or sending weapons to the Houthis in Yemen that accelerate a civil war there. 奥巴马总统：武器禁运和弹道导弹的问题确实是我们关切的问题——一直是我们关切的问题。防止伊朗向真主党运送武器，或者向也门的胡塞武装运送武器以加速那里的内战，符合美国的国家安全利益。
We have a number of mechanisms under international law that give us authority to interdict arms shipments by Iran. One of those mechanisms is the U.N. security resolution related to Iran’s nuclear program. Essentially, Iran was sanctioned because of what had happened at Fordow, its unwillingness to comply with previous U.N. security resolutions about their nuclear program. And as part of the package of sanctions that was slapped on them, the issue of arms and ballistic missiles were included. 我们有若干国际法机制授权我们拦截伊朗的武器运输。其中一个机制是与伊朗核计划相关的联合国安全决议。从本质上讲，伊朗受到制裁是因为福尔多发生的事情，因为它不愿遵守联合国以往关于其核计划的安全决议。作为对其实施的一揽子制裁的一部分，武器和弹道导弹问题也被包括在内。
Now, under the terms of the original U.N. resolution, the fact is that once an agreement was arrived at that gave the international community assurance Iran didn't have a nuclear weapon, you could argue just looking at the text that those arms and ballistic missile prohibitions should immediately go away. 现在，根据最初联合国决议的条款，事实是，一旦达成一项让国际社会确信伊朗没有核武器的协议，仅看文本你就可以争辩说，那些武器和弹道导弹禁令应该立即取消。
But what I said to our negotiators was given that Iran has breached trust, and the uncertainty of our allies in the region about Iran’s activities, let’s press for a longer extension of the arms embargo and the ballistic missile prohibitions. And we got that. We got five years in which, under this new agreement, arms coming in and out of Iran are prohibited. And we got eight years with respect to ballistic missiles. 但我对我们的谈判代表说的是，鉴于伊朗已经违背了信任，以及我们在该地区的盟友对伊朗活动的不确定性，让我们争取更长时间地延长武器禁运和弹道导弹禁令。我们做到了。我们争取到了五年时间，根据这项新协议，进出伊朗的武器被禁止。我们争取到了八年的弹道导弹禁令。
But part of the reason why we were willing to extend it only for five, let’s say, as opposed to a longer period of time, is because we have other U.N. resolutions that prohibit arms sales by Iran to organizations like Hezbollah. We have other U.N. resolutions and multilateral agreements that give us authority to interdict arms shipments from Iran throughout the region. And so we’ve had belts and suspenders and buttons, a whole bunch of different legal authorities. 但我们愿意只延长五年，而不是更长时间的部分原因是，我们还有其他联合国决议禁止伊朗向真主党等组织出售武器。我们还有其他联合国决议和多边协议授权我们在整个地区拦截来自伊朗的武器运输。所以我们有腰带、背带还有纽扣，一大堆不同的法律授权。
These legal authorities under the nuclear program may lapse after five or eight years, but we’ll still be in possession of other legal authorities that allow us to interdict those arms. 这些核计划下的法律授权可能在五年或八年后失效，但我们仍将拥有其他允许我们拦截这些武器的法律授权。
And truthfully, these prohibitions are not self-enforcing. It’s not like the U.N. has the capacity to police what Iran is doing. 说实话，这些禁令不是自动执行的。不是说联合国有能力监管伊朗在做什么。
What it does is it gives us authority under international law to prevent arms shipments from happening in concert with our allies and our partners. And the real problem, if you look at how, for example, Hezbollah got a lot of missiles that are a grave threat to Israel and many of our friends in the region, it’s not because they were legal. It’s not because somehow that was authorized under international law. It was because there was insufficient intelligence, or capacity, to stop those shipments. 它的作用是在国际法下赋予我们权力，与我们的盟友和伙伴一道防止武器运输的发生。而真正的问题是，如果你看看真主党是如何获得大量对以色列和我们在该地区许多朋友构成严重威胁的导弹的，那不是因为它们是合法的。不是因为不知何故那是国际法授权的。而是因为没有足够的情报或能力来阻止那些运输。
So the bottom line is, Carol, I share the concerns of Israel, Saudis, Gulf partners about Iran shipping arms and causing conflict and chaos in the region. And that’s why I’ve said to them, let’s double down and partner much more effectively to improve our intelligence capacity and our interdiction capacity so that fewer of those arms shipments are getting through the net. 所以底线是，卡罗尔，我和以色列、沙特、海湾伙伴一样，对伊朗运送武器、在地区造成冲突和混乱感到担忧。这就是为什么我对他们说，让我们加倍努力，更有效地合作，提高我们的情报能力和拦截能力，以便更少的武器运输能够漏网。
But the legal authorities, we’ll still possess. And obviously, we’ve got our own unilateral prohibitions and sanctions in place around non-nuclear issues, like support for Hezbollah. And those remain in place. 但法律授权，我们仍然会拥有。而且显然，我们有自己在非核问题上的单边禁令和制裁，比如对真主党的支持。这些仍然有效。
Now, in terms of the larger issues of the Middle East, obviously that’s a longer discussion. I think my key goal when I turn over the keys to the President -- the next President -- is that we are on track to defeat ISIL; that they are much more contained and we’re moving in the right direction there. That we have jumpstarted a process to resolve the civil war in Syria, which is like an open sore in the region and is giving refuge to terrorist organizations who are taking advantage of that chaos. 现在，关于中东更大的问题，显然那是一个更长的讨论。我认为，当我把钥匙交给下一任总统时，我的关键目标是：我们正走在击败伊斯兰国的轨道上；他们受到更多遏制，我们正在朝着正确的方向前进。我们已经启动了解决叙利亚内战的进程，叙利亚内战就像该地区的一个开放性伤口，为恐怖组织提供了避难所，他们正在利用这种混乱。
To make sure that in Iraq not only have we pushed back ISIL, but we’ve also created an environment in which Sunni, Shia and Kurd are starting to operate and function more effectively together. 确保在伊拉克，我们不仅击退了伊斯兰国，还创造了一个逊尼派、什叶派和库尔德人开始更有效合作与运作的环境。
And to be in a conversation with all our partners in the region about how we have strengthened our security partnerships so that they feel they can address any potential threats that may come, including threats from Iran. And that includes providing additional security assurances and cooperation to Israel, building on the unprecedented cooperation that we have already put in place and support that we’ve already put in place. It includes the work that we’ve done with the GCC up at Camp David, making sure that we execute that. 并与我们在该地区的所有伙伴对话，讨论我们如何加强安全伙伴关系，让他们感到能够应对可能出现的任何潜在威胁，包括来自伊朗的威胁。这包括向以色列提供额外的安全保证和合作，在我们已经建立的前所未有的合作和支持的基础上继续发展。这包括我们在戴维营与海湾合作委员会所做的工作，确保我们执行那项工作。
If we’ve done those things, then the problems in the Middle East will not be solved. And ultimately, it’s not the job of the President of the United States to solve every problem in the Middle East. The people of the Middle East are going to have to solve some of these problems themselves. But I think we can provide that next President at least a foundation for continued progress in these various areas. 如果我们做到了这些，中东的问题仍然不会得到解决。归根结底，解决中东的每一个问题不是美国总统的工作。中东人民将不得不自己解决其中一些问题。但我认为我们可以为下一任总统提供至少一个在各个领域继续取得进展的基础。
The last thing I would say -- and this is a longer-term issue -- is we have to address the youth in the region with jobs and opportunity and a better vision for the future so that they are not tempted by the nihilistic, violent dead-end that organizations like ISIL offer. Again, we can’t do that entirely by ourselves, but we can partner with well-intentioned organizations, states, NGOs, religious leaders in the region. We have to do a better job of that than we’ve been doing so far. 我最后要说的一点是——这是一个更长期的问题——我们必须为该地区的年轻人提供就业、机会和更美好的未来愿景，这样他们才不会被伊斯兰国等组织提供的虚无主义、暴力的死胡同所诱惑。同样，我们不能完全靠自己做到这一点，但我们可以与善意的组织、国家、非政府组织、该地区的宗教领袖合作。我们必须在这方面比迄今为止做得更好。
Michael Crowley. 迈克尔·克劳利。
Question: Thank you. You alluded earlier to Iran’s role in Syria, just to focus on that for a moment. Many analysts and some former members of your administration believe that the kind of negotiated political settlement that you say is necessary in Syria will require working directly with Iran and giving Iran an important role. Do you agree? And is that a dialogue you’ll be actively seeking? 记者：谢谢。你之前提到了伊朗在叙利亚的角色，让我们暂时聚焦这个问题。许多分析人士和你政府的一些前成员认为，你所说的叙利亚所必需的那种谈判达成的政治解决方案，将需要与伊朗直接合作，并赋予伊朗重要角色。你同意吗？这是你会积极寻求的对话吗？
And what about the fight against ISIS? What would it take for there to be explicit cooperation between the U.S. and Iran? 那么打击伊斯兰国的斗争呢？美国和伊朗之间需要什么条件才能进行明确的合作？
President Obama: I do agree that we’re not going to solve the problems in Syria unless there’s buy-in from the Russians, the Iranians, the Turks, our Gulf partners. It’s too chaotic. There are too many factions. There’s too much money and too many arms flooding into the zone. It’s gotten caught up in both sectarian conflict and geopolitical jockeying. 奥巴马总统：我确实同意，除非俄罗斯人、伊朗人、土耳其人、我们的海湾伙伴都参与进来，否则我们无法解决叙利亚的问题。那里太混乱了。派系太多了。太多的资金和太多的武器涌入该地区。它已经陷入了宗派冲突和地缘政治博弈之中。
And in order for us to resolve it, there’s going to have to be agreement among the major powers that are interested in Syria that this is not going to be won on the battlefield. So Iran is one of those players, and I think that it’s important for them to be part of that conversation. 为了让我们解决它，对叙利亚感兴趣的主要大国之间必须达成一致，即这不会在战场上取胜。伊朗是其中一个参与者，我认为让他们成为对话的一部分很重要。
I want to repeat what I said earlier. We have not -- and I don’t anticipate any time in the near future -- restored normal diplomatic relations with Iran. And so I do not foresee a formal set of agreements with Iran in terms of how we’re conducting our counter-ISIL campaign. 我想重申我之前说过的话。我们没有——而且我预计在不久的将来也不会——恢复与伊朗的正常外交关系。因此，我不预见会与伊朗就我们如何开展打击伊斯兰国行动达成一套正式协议。
But clearly, Iran has influence in Iraq. Iraq has a majority Shia population. They have relationships to Iran. Some are natural. We expect somebody like Prime Minister Abadi to meet with and negotiate and work with Iran as its neighbor. Some are less legitimate, where you see Iran financing Shia militias that in the past have killed American soldiers and in the future may carry out atrocities when they move into Sunni areas. 但显然，伊朗在伊拉克有影响力。伊拉克有什叶派多数人口。他们与伊朗有关系。有些是自然的。我们预计像阿巴迪总理这样的人会与伊朗会面、谈判并合作，因为伊朗是其邻国。有些则不那么正当，你可以看到伊朗资助什叶派民兵，这些民兵过去曾杀害美国士兵，未来当他们进入逊尼派地区时可能会实施暴行。
And so we’re working with our diplomats on the ground, as well as our military teams on the ground to asses where can we appropriately at least de-conflict, and where can we work with Prime Minister Abadi around an overall strategy for Iraq to regain its sovereignty, 因此，我们正在与我们在当地的外交官以及我们在当地的军事团队合作，评估我们可以在哪些地方适当地至少进行冲突化解，我们可以在哪些地方与阿巴迪总理合作，围绕伊拉克恢复主权的总体战略展开工作，
and where do we tell Abadi, you know what, what Iran is doing there is a problem, and we can’t cooperate in that area, for example, unless you get those folks out of there because we’re not going to have our troops, even in an advisory or training role, looking over their shoulders because they’re not sure of what might happen to them. 以及我们在哪些地方告诉阿巴迪，你知道吗，伊朗在那里做的事情是个问题，我们不能在那个领域合作，例如，除非你让那些人离开那里，因为我们不会让我们的部队，即使是在顾问或训练角色中，也要时刻提防，因为他们不确定可能会发生什么。
And those conversations have been ongoing. I think they will continue. 这些对话一直在进行。我认为它们会继续下去。
The one thing you can count on is that any work that the U.S. government does, or the U.S. military does in Iraq with other partners on the ground is premised on the idea that they are reporting to -- under the chain of command of the Iraqi government and Iraqi security forces. If we don’t have confidence that ultimately Abadi is directing those soldiers, then it’s tough for us to have any kind of direct relationship. 你可以指望的一件事是，美国政府或美国军方在伊拉克与其他当地伙伴开展的任何工作，都基于这样一个前提，即他们服从——在伊拉克政府和伊拉克安全部队的指挥链之下。如果我们没有信心最终是阿巴迪在指挥那些士兵，那么我们很难有任何形式的直接关系。
Major Garrett. 梅杰·加勒特。
Question: Thank you, Mr. President. As you well know, there are four Americans in Iran -- three held on trumped-up charges, according to your administration; one, whereabouts unknown. Can you tell the country, sir, why you are content, with all the fanfare around this deal, to leave the conscience of this nation and the strength of this nation unaccounted for in relation to these four Americans? 记者：谢谢你，总统先生。如你所知，有四名美国人在伊朗——根据你的政府，三人因莫须有的罪名被关押；一人生死未卜。先生，你能不能告诉全国人民，为什么你在围绕这项协议大张旗鼓的同时，对这四名美国人相关的国家良知和国家力量置之不理？
And last week, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, under no circumstances should there be any relief for Iran in terms of ballistic missiles or conventional weapons. It is perceived that that was a last-minute capitulation in these negotiations. Many in the Pentagon feel you’ve left the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff hung out to dry. Could you comment? 上周，参谋长联席会议主席说，在任何情况下都不应该在弹道导弹或常规武器方面给伊朗任何缓解。人们认为这是谈判中的最后一刻妥协。五角大楼的许多人觉得你让参谋长联席会议主席陷入了孤立无援的境地。你能评论一下吗？
President Obama: I got to give you credit, Major, for how you craft those questions. The notion that I am content as I celebrate with American citizens languishing in Iranian jails -- Major, that’s nonsense, and you should know better. 奥巴马总统：梅杰，我得称赞你，这些问题设计得真巧妙。说我在庆祝的时候对美国公民 languishing 在伊朗监狱里感到心安理得——梅杰，这是胡说八道，你应该更清楚这一点。
I’ve met with the families of some of those folks. Nobody is content. And our diplomats and our teams are working diligently to try to get them out. 我见过其中一些人的家属。没有人感到心安理得。我们的外交官和团队正在努力工作，试图把他们救出来。
Now, if the question is why we did not tie the negotiations to their release, think about the logic that that creates. Suddenly, Iran realizes, you know what, maybe we can get additional concessions out of the Americans by holding these individuals. It makes it much more difficult for us to walk away if Iran somehow thinks that a nuclear deal is dependent in some fashion on the nuclear deal. And, by the way, if we had walked away from the nuclear deal, we’d still be pushing them just as hard to get these folks out. That’s why those issues are not connected. 现在，如果问题是为什么我们没有把谈判与他们的释放挂钩，想想这会造成什么逻辑。突然间，伊朗意识到，你知道吗，也许我们可以通过扣押这些人从美国人那里获得更多让步。如果伊朗认为核协议在某种程度上取决于核协议，那我们就更难抽身离开了。而且，顺便说一句，如果我们从核协议中抽身，我们仍然会同样努力地推动他们把这些人救出来。这就是为什么这些问题不相关联。
But we are working every single day to try to get them out, and won’t stop until they’re out and rejoined with their families. 但我们每天都在努力争取让他们获释，在他们获释并与家人团聚之前不会停止。
With respect to the Chairman’s testimony, to some degree I already answered this with Carol. We are not taking the pressure off Iran with respect to arms and with respect to ballistic missiles. As I just explained, not only do we keep in place for five years the arms embargo under this particular new U.N. resolution, not only do we maintain the eight years on the ballistic missiles under this particular U.N. resolution, 关于主席的证词，在某种程度上我已经回答了卡罗尔的问题。我们没有在武器和弹道导弹方面放松对伊朗的压力。正如我刚才解释的，我们不仅根据这项新的联合国决议将武器禁运维持了五年，不仅根据这项新的联合国决议将弹道导弹禁令维持了八年，
but we have a host of other multilateral and unilateral authorities that allow us to take action where we see Iran engaged in those activities whether it’s six years from now or 10 years from now. 而且我们还有一系列其他多边和单边授权，允许我们在伊朗从事这些活动时采取行动，无论是六年后还是十年后。
So we have not lost those legal authorities. And in fact, part of my pitch to the GCC countries, as well as to Prime Minister Netanyahu, is we should do a better job making sure that Iran is not engaged in sending arms to organizations like Hezbollah. And as I just indicated, that means improving our intelligence capacity and our interdiction capacity with our partners. 所以我们没有失去那些法律授权。事实上，我向海湾合作委员会国家以及内塔尼亚胡总理推销的一部分内容是，我们应该做得更好，确保伊朗不参与向真主党等组织运送武器。正如我刚才指出的，这意味着与我们的伙伴一起提高我们的情报能力和拦截能力。
April Ryan. 爱普丽尔·瑞安。
Question: Thank you, Mr. President. I want to change the subject a bit. Earlier this year, on the flight to Selma, you said, on matters of race, as President your job is to close the remaining gaps that are left in state and federal government. Now, how does criminal justice reform fit into that equation? And what gaps remain for you towards the end of your presidency? And also, what does it mean to travel to Kenya, your father’s homeland, in the next couple of weeks as President to the United States? And lastly, would you revoke the Medal of Freedom from Bill Cosby? 记者：谢谢你，总统先生。我想稍微换个话题。今年早些时候，在前往塞尔玛的航班上，你说过，在种族问题上，作为总统，你的工作是缩小州政府和联邦政府中剩余的差距。那么，刑事司法改革如何融入这个等式呢？在你总统任期即将结束之际，还有哪些差距有待弥补？另外，再过几周作为美国总统访问肯尼亚——你父亲的故乡——意味着什么？最后，你会撤销比尔·考斯比的总统自由勋章吗？
President Obama: You stuffed a lot in there, April. 奥巴马总统：你塞了好多问题进去啊，爱普丽尔。
Question: I learned from my colleagues. 记者：我从我的同事们那里学来的。
President Obama: Say, who did you learn from? Jonathan Karl? Is that what you said? 奥巴马总统：说，你从谁那里学的？乔纳森·卡尔？你是这么说的吗？
Question: On criminal justice reform, obviously I gave a lengthy speech yesterday, but this is something that I’ve been thinking about a lot; been working first with Eric Holder, now with Loretta Lynch about -- we’ve been working on along with other prosecutors of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. It’s an outgrowth of the task force that we put together, post-Ferguson and the Garner case in New York. 记者：关于刑事司法改革，显然我昨天发表了一篇冗长的演讲，但这是我思考了很多的事情；我先是与埃里克·霍尔德合作，现在与洛雷塔·林奇合作——我们一直在与联邦检察官办公室的其他检察官一起努力。这是我们在弗格森事件和纽约加纳案之后成立的工作组的成果。
And I don’t think that the criminal justice system is obviously the sole source of racial tension in this country, or the key institution to resolving the opportunity gap. But I think it is a part of the broader set of challenges that we face in creating a more perfect union. 我认为刑事司法系统显然不是这个国家种族紧张局势的唯一来源，也不是解决机会差距的关键机构。但我认为它是我们在创建一个更完美联盟过程中面临的更广泛挑战的一部分。
And the good news is, is that this is one of those rare issues where we’ve got some Republican and Democratic interest, as well as federal, state, and local interest in solving the problem. I think people recognize that there are violent criminals out there and they’ve got to be locked up. We’ve got to have tough prosecutors, we have to support our law enforcement officials. Police are in a tough job and they are helping to keep us safe, and we are grateful and thankful to them. 好消息是，这是那些罕见的问题之一，我们有共和党和民主党的兴趣，以及联邦、州和地方各级的兴趣来解决这个问题。我认为人们认识到外面有暴力罪犯，他们必须被关起来。我们必须有强硬的检察官，我们必须支持我们的执法官员。警察的工作很艰难，他们帮助保护我们的安全，我们感激他们、感谢他们。
But what we also know is this huge spike in incarcerations is also driven by non-violent drug offenses where the sentencing is completely out of proportion with the crime. And that costs taxpayers enormous amounts of money. It is debilitating communities who are seeing huge proportions of the young men in their communities finding themselves with a criminal record, rendering them oftentimes unemployable. So it compounds problems that these communities already have. 但我们也知道，监禁人数的大幅激增也是由非暴力毒品犯罪驱动的，在这些案件中，量刑与犯罪完全不成比例。这花费了纳税人巨额资金。它正在削弱社区，这些社区中很大比例的年轻人发现自己有犯罪记录，这往往使他们无法就业。因此，它加剧了这些社区已经存在的问题。
And so I am very appreciative of folks like Dick Durbin and Cory Booker, alongside Mike Lee and Rand Paul and other folks in the House who are working together to see if we can both reduce some of these mandatory minimums around non-violent drug offenses. Because again, I tend not to have a lot of sympathy when it comes to violent crime. But when it comes to non-violent drug offenses, is there work that we can do to reduce mandatory minimums, create more diversion programs like drug courts? 因此，我非常感谢像迪克·德宾和科里·布克这样的人，以及迈克·李和兰德·保罗，还有众议院的其他一些人，他们正在共同努力，看看我们是否可以减少一些针对非暴力毒品犯罪的强制性最低刑期。因为再说一次，我对暴力犯罪往往没有太多同情。但当涉及到非暴力毒品犯罪时，我们能不能做些工作来减少强制性最低刑期，创建更多像毒品法庭这样的分流项目？
Then, can we do a better job on the rehabilitation side inside of prisons so that we are preparing these folks who are eventually going to be released to reenter the workforce? On the back end, are we doing more to link them up with reentry programs that are effective? 然后，我们能不能在监狱内的康复方面做得更好，以便我们为这些最终将获释的人重新进入劳动力市场做好准备？在出狱后，我们是否在更多地将他们与有效的重新融入社会项目联系起来？
And this may be an area where we could have some really significant bipartisan legislation that doesn't eliminate all the other challenges we’ve got. Because the most important goal is keeping folks from getting in the criminal justice system in the first place, which means early childhood education and good jobs, and making sure that we're not segregating folks in impoverished communities that have no contact with opportunity. 这可能是一个我们可以达成一些真正重要的两党立法的领域，这并不能消除我们面临的所有其他挑战。因为最重要的目标是首先不让人们进入刑事司法系统，这意味着幼儿教育和好的工作，以及确保我们不会把人们隔离在贫困社区里，让他们没有机会接触。
But this can make a difference. I met these four ex-offenders, as I said, yesterday, and what was remarkable was how they had turned their lives around. And these were some folks who had been some pretty tough criminals. One of them had served 10 years; another was a repeat offender that had served a lot of time. And in each instance, somebody intervened at some point in their lives -- once they had already been in the criminal justice system, once they had already gotten in trouble -- and said, you know what, I think you can live a different way, and I’m willing to help you. 但这可以产生影响。正如我昨天所说，我遇到了这四名前罪犯，令人惊叹的是他们如何扭转了自己的生活。这些人中有些曾是相当恶劣的罪犯。其中一人服刑10年；另一人是惯犯，服了很长时间的刑。在每个案例中，都有人在他们生命中的某个时刻介入——在他们已经进入刑事司法系统之后，在他们已经惹上麻烦之后——然后说，你知道吗，我认为你可以过一种不同的生活，我愿意帮助你。
And that one person, an art teacher, or a GED teacher, or somebody who was willing to offer a guy a job -- I want to give a shout-out to Five Guys, because one of the guys there was an ex-felon, and Five Guys gave him a job. And he ended up becoming a manager at the store and was able to completely turn his life around. But the point was, somebody reached out to that person and gave him a chance. 而那个人，一位美术老师，或者一位普通教育发展证书老师，或者某个愿意给一个人一份工作的人——我要给五家伙点赞，因为那里有一个人是前重罪犯，五家伙给了他一份工作。他最终成为了店里的经理，并且能够彻底扭转他的生活。但关键是，有人向那个人伸出了援手，给了他一个机会。
And so part of our question should be, how about somebody reaching out to these guys when they’re 10, or 11, or 12, or eight, as opposed to waiting until they’ve already gone through a criminal justice program. That’s part of why we’re doing My Brother’s Keeper. But this is an area where I feel modestly optimistic. 因此，我们的部分问题应该是，不如在他们十岁、十一岁、十二岁或八岁的时候就有人向这些孩子伸出援手，而不是等到他们已经经历了刑事司法程序。这就是我们开展"兄弟守护者"项目的部分原因。但在这个领域，我感到适度乐观。
I think in the meantime we’ve got to stay on top of keeping the crime rate down, because part of the reason I think there’s a conversation taking place is violent crime has significantly dropped. Last year, we saw both incarcerations and the crime rate drop, and this can always turn if we start seeing renewed problems in terms of violent crime. And there’s parts of the country where violent crime is still a real problem, including my hometown of Chicago, and in Baltimore. 我认为与此同时，我们必须继续控制犯罪率，因为我认为现在有这场对话的部分原因是暴力犯罪已经大幅下降。去年，我们看到监禁人数和犯罪率都下降了，如果我们开始看到暴力犯罪方面的新问题，这种情况随时可能逆转。而且在该国一些地区，暴力犯罪仍然是一个真正的问题，包括我的家乡芝加哥，还有巴尔的摩。
And part of what I’ve asked Attorney General Lynch to do is to figure out how can we refocus attention. If we’re going to do a package of criminal justice reforms, part of it would be actually having a greater police presence and more law enforcement in the communities that are really getting hit hard and haven’t seen some of the drops in violent crime that we’ve seen in places like Manhattan, for example. 我要求林奇总检察长做的部分工作是弄清楚我们如何重新集中注意力。如果我们要推出一揽子刑事司法改革，其中一部分实际上将是在那些真正受到严重打击、没有像曼哈顿等地那样看到暴力犯罪下降的社区增加警力和更多执法力量。
With respect to the visit to Kenya, it’s obviously something I’m looking forward to. I’ll be honest with you, visiting Kenya as a private citizen is probably more meaningful to me than visiting as President because I can actually get outside of a hotel room or a conference center. And just the logistics of visiting a place are always tough as President, but it’s obviously symbolically important. 关于访问肯尼亚，这显然是我期待的事情。老实跟你说，作为普通公民访问肯尼亚对我来说可能比作为总统访问更有意义，因为我实际上可以走出酒店房间或会议中心。而且作为总统，访问一个地方的后勤工作总是很困难，但这显然具有象征意义。
And my hope is, is that we can deliver a message that the U.S. is a strong partner not just for Kenya, but for Sub-Saharan Africa generally; build on the progress that’s been made around issues of health and education; focus on counterterrorism issues that are important in East Africa because of al-Shabaab and some of the tragedies that have happened inside of Kenya; and continue to encourage democracy and the reduction of corruption inside that country that sometimes has held back this incredibly gifted and blessed country. 我的希望是，我们可以传递这样一个信息，即美国不仅是肯尼亚的强大伙伴，也是整个撒哈拉以南非洲的强大伙伴；在健康和教育问题上取得的进展基础上继续前进；关注东非重要的反恐问题，因为青年党以及肯尼亚境内发生的一些悲剧；并继续鼓励该国的民主和减少腐败，这些有时阻碍了这个极具天赋和得天独厚的国家。
And with respect to the Medal of Freedom, there’s no precedent for revoking a medal. We don’t have that mechanism. And as you know, I tend to make it a policy not to comment on the specifics of cases where there might still be, if not criminal, then civil issues involved. 关于总统自由勋章，没有撤销勋章的先例。我们没有那种机制。而且如你所知，我倾向于制定一项政策，不对可能仍涉及——如果不是刑事的话，就是民事的——案件的具体细节发表评论。
I’ll say this: If you give a woman -- or a man, for that matter -- without his or her knowledge, a drug, and then have sex with that person without consent, that’s rape. And I think this country -- any civilized country -- should have no tolerance for rape. 我要说的是：如果你给一个女人——或者就此而言一个男人——在他或她不知情的情况下下了药，然后在未经同意的情况下与那个人发生性关系，那就是强奸。我认为这个国家——任何文明国家——都不应该容忍强奸。
All right. Have we exhausted Iran questions here? I think there’s a helicopter that’s coming. But I really am enjoying this Iran debate. Topics that may not have been touched upon, criticisms that you’ve heard that I did not answer? Go ahead. I know Josh is getting a little stressed here -- but I just want to make sure that we’re not leaving any stones unturned here. Go ahead. 好的。我们是不是已经把伊朗问题都问完了？我想有架直升机要来了。但我真的很享受这场伊朗辩论。有没有可能还没被触及的话题，或者你们听到的我没有回答的批评？请说吧。我知道乔希在这里有点紧张——但我只是想确保我们没有遗漏任何问题。请说。
Question: Thanks, Mr. President. I’ll be brief. The argument has been made that Iran now has a cash windfall, billions to spend. Your people seem confident they’re going to spend it at home. Why are you confident they’re not going to spend it on arming Hezbollah, arming Bashar al-Assad, et cetera? 记者：谢谢，总统先生。我会简短的。有人提出论点说，伊朗现在获得了一笔现金意外之财，有数十亿美元可花。你的人似乎相信他们会把钱花在国内。你为什么有信心他们不会把钱花在武装真主党、武装巴沙尔·阿萨德等上面？
President Obama: I think that’s a great question and I’m glad you brought it up. I think it is a mistake to characterize our belief that they will just spend it on daycare centers, and roads, and paying down debt. We think that they have to do some of that, because Rouhani was elected specifically on the premise of improving the economic situation inside of Iran. That economy has tanked since we imposed sanctions. 奥巴马总统：我认为这是个好问题，我很高兴你提出来。我认为把我们的信念描述为他们只会把钱花在日托中心、道路和偿还债务上是错误的。我们认为他们必须做一些这样的事情，因为鲁哈尼当选总统正是基于改善伊朗国内经济状况的纲领。自从我们实施制裁以来，经济已经崩溃。
So the notion that they're just immediately going to turn over $100 billion to the IRGC or the Quds Force I think runs contrary to all the intelligence that we’ve seen and the commitments that the Iranian government has made. 因此，认为他们会立即把1000亿美元交给伊斯兰革命卫队或圣城旅的想法，我认为与我们看到的所有情报以及伊朗政府做出的承诺背道而驰。
Do we think that with the sanctions coming down, that Iran will have some additional resources for its military and for some of the activities in the region that are a threat to us and a threat to our allies? I think that is a likelihood that they’ve got some additional resources. Do I think it’s a game-changer for them? No. 我们是否认为，随着制裁的解除，伊朗将有一些额外的资源用于其军队以及该地区一些对我们和我们的盟友构成威胁的活动？我认为他们有一些额外资源是有可能的。我认为这对他们来说是游戏规则的改变吗？不。
They are currently supporting Hezbollah, and there is a ceiling -- a pace at which they could support Hezbollah even more, particularly in the chaos that's taking place in Syria. So can they potentially try to get more assistance there? Yes. Should we put more resources into blocking them from getting that assistance to Hezbollah? Yes. Is the incremental additional money that they’ve got to try to destabilize the region or send to their proxies, is that more important than preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon? 他们目前正在支持真主党，而且有一个上限——他们可以在多大程度上更多地支持真主党，特别是在叙利亚正在发生的混乱中。那么他们是否有可能试图在那里获得更多援助？是的。我们是否应该投入更多资源来阻止他们向真主党提供援助？是的。他们用来试图破坏地区稳定或送给其代理人的增量资金，比阻止伊朗获得核武器更重要吗？
No. So I think -- again, this is a matter of us making a determination of what is our priority. 不。所以我认为——再说一次，这是我们确定什么是我们的优先事项的问题。
The other problem with the argument that folks have been making about, oh, this is a windfall and suddenly Iran is flushed with cash, and they're going to take over the world. And I say that not tongue-in-cheek, because if you look at some of the statements by some of our critics, you would think that Iran is, in fact, going to take over the world as a consequence of this deal -- which I think would be news to the Iranians. 人们提出的另一个论点的问题是，哦，这是一笔意外之财，伊朗突然有了花不完的钱，他们要统治世界了。我这么说不是在开玩笑，因为如果你看看我们一些批评者的声明，你会认为伊朗事实上会因为这项协议而统治世界——我认为这对伊朗人来说会是个新闻。
That argument is also premised on the notion that if there is no deal, if Congress votes down this deal, that we're able to keep sanctions in place with the same vigor and effectiveness as we have right now. And that, I can promise you, is not true. That is absolutely not true. 这个论点还基于这样一种观念，即如果没有协议，如果国会否决这项协议，我们就能以与现在同样的力度和有效性维持制裁。而这一点，我可以向你保证，是不正确的。那绝对是不正确的。
I want to repeat: We're not writing Iran a check. This is Iran’s money that we were able to block from them having access to. 我想重申：我们不是在给伊朗开一张支票。这是伊朗的钱，我们能够阻止他们获得。
That required the cooperation of countries all around the world, many of whom really want to purchase oil from Iran. The imposition of sanctions -- their cooperation with us -- has cost them billions of dollars, made it harder for them. They’ve been willing to do that because they’ve believed we were sincere about trying to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully, and they considered that a priority -- a high enough priority that they were willing to cooperate with us on sanctions. 这需要世界各国的合作，其中许多国家非常想从伊朗购买石油。实施制裁——他们与我们的合作——已经让他们损失了数十亿美元，让他们更加困难。他们愿意这样做是因为他们相信我们真诚地试图和平解决核问题，他们认为这是一个优先事项——一个足够高的优先事项，以至于他们愿意在制裁问题上与我们合作。
If they saw us walking away, or more specifically, if they saw the U.S. Congress effectively vetoing the judgment of 99 percent of the world community that this is a deal that resolves the Iranian weapons program -- nuclear weapons program in an equitable way, the sanctions system unravels. And so we could still maintain some of our unilateral sanctions, but it would be far less effective -- as it was before we were able to put together these multilateral sanctions. 如果他们看到我们抽身而去，或者更具体地说，如果他们看到美国国会实际上否决了99%国际社会的判断，即这是一项以公平方式解决伊朗核武器计划的协议，制裁体系就会瓦解。因此，我们仍然可以维持一些单边制裁，但效果会差得多——就像我们在能够建立这些多边制裁之前一样。
So maybe they don't get $100 billion; maybe they get $60 billion or $70 billion instead. The price for that that we’ve paid is that now Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon. We have no inspectors on the ground. We don't know what’s going on. They’re still getting some cash windfall. We’ve lost credibility in the eyes of the world. We will have effectively united Iran and divided ourselves from our allies. A terrible position to be in. 所以也许他们得不到1000亿美元；也许他们得到600亿或700亿美元。我们为此付出的代价是，现在伊朗正在追求核武器。我们没有实地检查员。我们不知道发生了什么。他们仍然获得一些现金意外之财。我们在世界眼中失去了信誉。我们实际上将团结了伊朗，并将我们自己与盟友分离开来。这是一个可怕的处境。
I'm just going to look -- I made some notes about any of the arguments -- the other arguments that I’ve heard here. 我只是要看看——我做了一些笔记，记录了我在这里听到的任何论点——其他论点。
Question: What about -- [off-mic] -- the end of the deal? 记者：那——（麦克风外）——协议结束时怎么办？
President Obama: Okay, yes, that’s a good one. The notion -- 奥巴马总统：好的，是的，这个很好。那种看法——
Question: At the end of the deal they could go back -- 记者：协议结束时他们可以回去——
President Obama: Right. Well, so let’s address this issue of -- because that’s the other big argument that’s been made. All right, let’s assume that the deal holds for 10 years, Iran doesn’t cheat. Now, at the end of 10 years, some of the restrictions have been lifted -- although, remember, others stay in place for 15 years. So for example, they’ve still got to keep their stockpiles at a minimal level for 15 years. 奥巴马总统：对。好吧，让我们来解决这个问题——因为这是另一个被提出的重要论点。好的，让我们假设协议维持10年，伊朗没有作弊。现在，在10年结束时，一些限制已经解除——尽管请记住，其他限制将继续实施15年。例如，他们仍然必须将库存保持在最低水平15年。
The inspections don’t go away; those are still in place 15, 20 years from now. Their commitment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not go away; that’s still in place. The additional protocol that they have to sign up for under this deal, which requires a more extensive inspection and verification mechanism -- that stays in place. 检查不会消失；那些在15年、20年后仍然有效。他们根据《不扩散条约》做出的承诺不会消失；这仍然有效。他们根据这项协议必须签署的附加议定书——要求更广泛的检查和核查机制——仍然有效。
So there’s no scenario in which a U.S. President is not in a stronger position 12, 13, 15 years from now if, in fact, Iran decided at that point they still wanted to get a nuclear weapon. Keep in mind, we will have maintained a one-year breakout time, we will have rolled back their program, frozen their facilities, kept them under severe restrictions, had observers. They will have made international commitments supported by countries around the world. 因此，如果伊朗在12年、13年、15年后决定他们仍然想要获得核武器，在任何情况下，美国总统都不会处于更弱的地位。请记住，我们将维持一年的突破时间，我们将已经削减了他们的计划，冻结了他们的设施，使他们处于严格的限制之下，有观察员在场。他们将做出得到世界各国支持的国际承诺。
And -- hold on a second -- and if at that point they finally decided, you know what, we’re going to cheat, or not even cheat -- at that point, they decide openly we’re now pursuing a nuclear weapon -- they’re still in violation of this deal and the commitments they’ve made internationally. ——等一下——如果在那个时候他们最终决定，你知道吗，我们要作弊，或者甚至不作弊——在那个时候，他们公开决定我们现在要追求核武器——他们仍然违反了这项协议和他们在国际上做出的承诺。
And so we are still in a position to mobilize the world community to say, no, you can’t have a nuclear weapon. And they’re not in a stronger position to get a nuclear weapon at that point; they’re in a weaker position than they are today. And, by the way, we haven’t given away any of our military capabilities. We’re not in a weaker position to respond. 因此，我们仍然能够动员国际社会说，不，你不能拥有核武器。而且他们在那个时候获得核武器的地位不会更强；他们比今天更弱。而且，顺便说一句，我们没有放弃任何军事能力。我们在回应方面不会处于更弱的地位。
So even if everything the critics were saying was true -- that at the end of 10 years, or 12 years, or 15 years, Iran now is in a position to decide it wants a nuclear weapon, that they’re at a breakout point -- they won’t be at a breakout point that is more dangerous than the breakout point they’re in right now. They won’t be at a breakout point that is shorter than the one that exists today. 因此，即使批评者所说的一切都是真的——在10年、12年或15年结束时，伊朗现在有能力决定它想要核武器，他们处于突破点——他们所处的突破点也不会比他们现在所处的突破点更危险。他们所处的突破点也不会比现在的突破时间更短。
And so why wouldn’t we at least make sure that for the next 10, 15, years they are not getting a nuclear weapon and we can verify it; and afterwards, if they decide if they’ve changed their mind, we are then much more knowledgeable about what their capabilities are, much more knowledgeable about what their program is, and still in a position to take whatever actions we would take today? 那么，我们为什么不至少确保在未来10年、15年里他们不获得核武器，并且我们可以核实这一点；之后，如果他们决定改变主意，我们对他们的能力有更多了解，对他们的计划有更多了解，并且仍然有能力采取我们今天会采取的任何行动？
Question: So none of this is holding out hope that they’ll change their behavior? 记者：所以这一切都没有寄希望于他们会改变行为？
President Obama: No. 奥巴马总统：没有。
Question: Nothing different -- 记者：没有什么不同——
President Obama: No. Look, I'm always hopeful that behavior may change for the sake of the Iranian people as well as people in the region. There are young people there who are not getting the opportunities they deserve because of conflict, because of sectarianism, because of poor governance, because of repression, because of terrorism. And I remain eternally hopeful that we can do something about that, and it should be part of U.S. foreign policy to do something about that. But I'm not banking on that to say that this deal is the right thing to do. 奥巴马总统：没有。听着，我一直希望行为可能会改变，为了伊朗人民和地区人民的利益。那里有年轻人，因为冲突、宗派主义、治理不善、压迫、恐怖主义，他们得不到应有的机会。我永远抱有希望，我们可以为此做些什么，这应该是美国外交政策的一部分。但我并不是把赌注押在这上面来说这项协议是正确的选择。
Again, it is incumbent on the critics of this deal to explain how an American President is in a worse position 12, 13, 14, 15 years from now if, in fact, at that point Iran says we’re going to pull out of the NPT, kick out inspectors and go for a nuclear bomb. If that happens, that President will be in a better position than what happened if Iran, as a consequence of Congress rejecting this deal, decides that’s it, we’re done negotiating, we’re going after a bomb right now. 再说一次，这项协议的批评者有责任解释，如果伊朗在12年、13年、14年、15年后说我们要退出《不扩散条约》，驱逐核查人员，去制造核弹，那么一位美国总统怎么会处于更糟糕的境地。如果发生这种情况，那位总统的处境将比以下情况好得多：如果国会否决这项协议，伊朗决定就这样吧，我们不谈了，我们现在就去造炸弹。
The choices would be tougher today than they would be for that President 15 years from now. And I have not yet heard logic that refutes that. 今天的选择将比15年后那位总统面临的选择更加艰难。我还没有听到反驳这一点的逻辑。
All right. I really have to go now. I think we’ve hit the big themes. But I promise you, I will address this again. All right? I suspect this is not the last that we’ve heard of this debate. 好的。我现在真的得走了。我想我们已经谈到了主要议题。但我向你们保证，我会再次讨论这个问题。好吗？我怀疑这不会是我们最后一次听到这场辩论。
