President Obama: You already heard my statement, so I'm going to take a couple of question, starting with Kathleen Hennessey of AP. Where's Kathleen? Where are you? There you are. 奥巴马总统：你们已经听过我的声明了，所以我来回答几个问题，先从美联社的凯瑟琳·亨尼西开始。凯瑟琳在哪？你在哪？在那儿啊。
Question: Thanks for doing this, Mr. President. In the lead-up to this trip, there was a lot of talk about strains in the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, some of it stemming from your comments about Gulf partners being "free riders," and specifically that Iran and Saudi Arabia should "share the neighborhood." I'm wondering if after your meeting you feel like you've eased any of those tensions, if that was your goal. 记者：总统先生，感谢您接受提问。在此次访问前夕，有很多关于美沙关系紧张的议论，部分源于您称海湾合作伙伴为"搭便车者"的言论，特别是您提到伊朗和沙特应"共享周边"。我想知道，在会谈之后，您是否认为已经缓解了其中一些紧张局势——如果这是您的目标的话。
Question: And if you can point to any evidence of greater cooperation or engagement in the campaign against ISIL. Do you feel now that the Gulf partners are carrying their weight? 记者：另外，您能否指出在打击ISIL的行动中有更多合作或参与的证据？您现在认为海湾合作伙伴是否在尽自己的一份力？
President Obama: Well, I think that a lot of the strain was always overblown. The fact of the matter is, is that the friendship and cooperation that exist between the United States and the Gulf countries has been consistent for decades. During the course of our administration, the GCC countries have extensively cooperated with us on counterterrorism, on curbing the financing of terrorist activities. They are part of the counter-ISIL coalition that has made progress both in Syria and in Iraq. 奥巴马总统：嗯，我认为很多紧张关系一直被夸大了。事实是，美国与海湾国家之间的友谊与合作数十年来始终如一。在本届政府任期内，海合会国家在反恐、遏制恐怖活动融资等方面与我们开展了广泛合作。他们是打击ISIL联盟的成员，该联盟在叙利亚和伊拉克都取得了进展。
If you think about last year, when we had the Camp David meeting, you were already seeing the onset of conflict in Libya as well as in Yemen. And as we come to this meeting in part because of the collective efforts of members of the GCC, we have a new government in Libya that is very nascent, but has the opportunity finally to organize itself in a way that we haven't seen in a couple of years. That would not have happened had it not been for the effective diplomatic pressure that was applied by all the GCC countries, as well as the United States and the United Nations. 回想去年我们举行戴维营会晤时，利比亚和也门的冲突已经开始爆发。而我们这次之所以能举行会晤，部分归功于海合会成员国的共同努力——利比亚成立了新政府，虽然尚处于雏形，但终于有机会以近几年来未曾有过的方式实现自治。如果没有海合会各国以及美国和联合国施加的有效外交压力，这一切都不会发生。
In Yemen, we now have a cessation of hostilities that allows us to build a peace process that can relieve the suffering of the people inside of Yemen. That would not have happened had it not been for the GCC-U.S. cooperation. We would not have gotten an Iran deal to get their nuclear weapons had not the GCC been supportive of it. 在也门，我们目前已达成停火，这使我们能够构建和平进程，缓解也门人民的苦难。如果没有海合会与美国的合作，这一切都不会实现。如果没有海合会的支持，我们也无法就伊朗核武器问题达成协议。
So what is true between the United States and the GCC, as is true with all of our allies and friends, is that at any point in time, there are going to be differences in tactics. And part of the goal here, as well as the meeting at Camp David, is to make sure that not only do we share a broad common vision of how prosperity and stability and peace are achieved in this region and how we counter extremist activity, but that we have knowledge of what each party is doing on an ongoing basis. 因此，美国与海合会之间的真实情况，同我们与所有盟友和伙伴之间的情况一样，就是在任何时候都会存在策略上的分歧。本次会晤以及戴维营会晤的部分目标，就是确保我们不仅对如何实现该地区的繁荣、稳定与和平以及如何打击极端主义活动拥有广泛的共同愿景，而且了解各方正在持续开展的工作。
I think it is no doubt true that when we entered into the negotiations with Iran around the nuclear deal, there was concern that in the interest of getting the deal done, we would somehow look the other way with respect to their other destabilizing activities. 我认为毋庸置疑的是，当我们就核协议与伊朗进行谈判时，有人担心为了达成协议，我们会在某种程度上对伊朗其他破坏稳定的活动视而不见。
And in fact, what we are able to report is not only have we seen Iran do what it was supposed to do under the deal and the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon is greatly reduced, but what we've also seen, what the GCC has seen, is our continued cooperation in, for example, interdicting Iranian efforts to arm the Houthi militias inside of Yemen. That, I think, has created some confidence. 而事实上，我们可以报告的是，我们不仅看到伊朗履行了协议规定的义务、伊朗核武器的威胁已大大降低，而且我们还看到——海合会也看到——我们在继续合作，例如拦截伊朗向也门境内胡塞武装提供武器的行动。我认为，这建立了一定程度的信任。
But one of the things, at a time when the region is so fraught with so many different problems and challenges, is the need for more consistent institutionalized communication at every level of government. And that's part of what we've been able to achieve through these two summits. And my hope is, is that it will continue into the next administration. I think it has been highly useful, because the possibilities of misunderstanding increase when there's so much activity taking place. 但在该地区充斥着如此众多问题与挑战之际，我们需要的一件事就是在政府各个层面建立更加一致、制度化的沟通机制。这是我们通过这两次峰会所取得的部分成果。我希望这一机制能延续到下一届政府。我认为这非常有意义，因为当局势纷繁复杂时，产生误解的可能性就会增加。
I'll give you one last example. Inside of Iraq, there are understandable concerns about Iranian influence in the Iraqi government at a time when the Iraqi government is also critical for us fighting ISIL. It was very important I think for us to describe our assessment that Prime Minister Abadi is in fact effectively fighting against ISIL and trying to reach out to Sunnis inside of Iraq, while acknowledging that there are significant problems in terms of government stability inside of Baghdad. 我再举最后一个例子。在伊拉克，伊朗对伊拉克政府的影响引发了可以理解的担忧，而与此同时，伊拉克政府对我们打击ISIL又至关重要。我认为，我们阐明自己的评估非常重要——即阿巴迪总理实际上在有效打击ISIL，并努力争取伊拉克境内逊尼派的支持，同时我们也承认巴格达在政府稳定方面存在重大问题。
And that's a reason for us not to withdraw, but rather to get more involved in helping to stabilize areas like Anbar, where we've not cleared out ISIL but the towns that they were governing have been left devastated. If we want Sunni communities to be able to rebuild themselves and to get back into the lives they were leading before ISIL took over, then we're going to have to help the Iraqi government respond. 因此，我们不应撤出，而应更多地参与帮助稳定安巴尔等地区——在那里，我们虽已击退ISIL，但其曾控制的城镇已满目疮痍。如果我们希望逊尼派社区能够重建，并恢复ISIL占领前的生活，就必须帮助伊拉克政府应对这一局面。
The same is true with respect to Syria. Right now, the cessation of hostilities is very fragile and may be breaking down in part because of the Assad regime's continuing attacks on areas where they perceive they have an advantage. This is part of the reason why I called Mr. Putin on Monday, indicating to him that in the same way that we are continually urging the moderate opposition inside of Syria to abide by the cessation of hostilities, he needs to be holding the regime into account. 叙利亚的情况也是如此。目前，停火协议非常脆弱，可能正在破裂，部分原因是阿萨德政权继续对其认为具有优势的地区发动攻击。这也是我周一致电普京先生的部分原因——我向他表明，正如我们持续敦促叙利亚境内温和反对派遵守停火协议一样，他也需要让政权方面承担责任。
For us to be able to describe the specifics of that conversation in a setting like this to give the opportunity for the other heads of state to ask questions about Russian intentions I think was extremely useful. 我认为，我们能够在这样的场合介绍那次会谈的具体情况，让其他国家元首有机会就俄罗斯的意图提出问题，是非常有益的。
Question: Were you able to secure any new commitments on the stabilization effort? I mean, you were asking for aid. Did you get any? 记者：您是否争取到了关于稳定工作的新承诺？我的意思是，您当时在寻求援助。有收获吗？
President Obama: We've been able to secure additional commitments with respect to the counter-ISIL campaign more broadly. With respect to direct help to the Iraqi government, what I recommended was that we wait to assess how the current government turmoil in Iraq plays itself out over the next couple of weeks before we make final decisions about how useful particular offers of assistance will be. 奥巴马总统：我们已经在更广泛的打击ISIL行动方面争取到了更多承诺。关于对伊拉克政府的直接援助，我建议我们先等一等，观察伊拉克当前的政府动荡在未来几周内如何发展，然后再最终决定各项援助提议的实际效用。
President Obama: Although, already what we've seen is, for example, the government of Kuwait over the last year has deferred payments that were required under the U.N. resolution between Iraq and Kuwait. That's worth a couple of billion dollars to the Iraqi government. And we described our efforts to make sure that in addition to the military assistance that we're providing Iraq, that we're also focusing on these stabilization functions. 奥巴马总统：不过，我们已经看到的是，例如科威特政府在过去一年中推迟了伊拉克与科威特之间联合国决议规定的付款。这对伊拉克政府来说价值数十亿美元。我们也说明了我们的努力方向，即除了向伊拉克提供军事援助外，我们还在着力推进这些稳定工作。
But frankly, right now in Baghdad, there's some big challenges in terms of Prime Minister Abadi forming a new government -- or a new cabinet. Until that's settled, I think it's important for us to make sure that any additional stabilization dollars that are put in are going to be effectively spent. 但坦率地说，目前巴格达在阿巴迪总理组建新政府——或者说新内阁——方面面临一些重大挑战。在这一问题解决之前，我认为重要的是确保任何额外投入的稳定资金都能得到有效使用。
Greg Jaffe. 格雷格·贾夫。
Question: I was going to ask, since you just spoke about Prime Minister Abadi, how concerned are you about his hold on power? Are there things that the GCC partners can do to help solidify his government? And then, did you guys talk about a plan B in Syria if the cessation of hostilities falters? And then lastly, I was just going to ask, have you contemplated adding additional Special Forces in Syria to bolster the counter-ISIL fight? And what might it take for you to make that decision? 记者：我想请问，既然您刚刚提到了阿巴迪总理，您对他执掌权力的担忧程度如何？海合会伙伴国有没有什么可以做的来帮助巩固他的政府？另外，你们有没有讨论过如果叙利亚停火失败的B计划？最后一个问题，您是否考虑过在叙利亚增派特种部队以加强打击ISIL的行动？您做出这一决定可能需要什么条件？
President Obama: Good. On the first item, I'm concerned. I think Prime Minister Abadi has been a good partner for us. But interestingly enough, right now in Baghdad, the challenges within the government don't fall along the usual lines of Kurdish-Sunni-Shia. There's actually significant dissension and disputes even among the Shia power blocks. 奥巴马总统：好的。关于第一个问题，我确实感到担忧。我认为阿巴迪总理一直是我们的良好合作伙伴。但耐人寻味的是，目前巴格达政府内部的挑战并非沿着库尔德—逊尼—什叶派的通常路线展开。实际上，即使在什叶派权力阵营内部也存在重大分歧和争议。
Obviously, ultimately it's up to the Iraqis to make these decisions. It's not up to us, it's not up to the Iranians, it's not up to GCC countries. It's up to the Iraqi people to determine the government that they form. 显然，最终要由伊拉克人来做出这些决定。这不取决于我们，不取决于伊朗人，也不取决于海合会国家。要由伊拉克人民来决定他们组建什么样的政府。
We do think, however, that it is vital for the health and stability of Iraq that the cabinet and the makeup of government is finalized and stabilized. And we've been urging them to get the job done. 但我们确实认为，内阁和政府组成的最终确定与稳定，对伊拉克的健康与稳定至关重要。我们一直在敦促他们完成这项工作。
And we have contacts with all the various factions and parties, saying to them they have to take the long view and think about the well-being of the country at a time when they're still fighting Daesh, Mosul is still under ISIL control; at a time when, because of low oil prices, they've got challenges with respect to their budget. There's a dam that needs to be fixed. They've got a lot on their plate. Now is not the time for government gridlock or bickering. 我们与各个派系和政党都有接触，告诉他们必须着眼长远，在仍在打击达伊沙、摩苏尔仍处于ISIL控制之下的时刻，在油价低迷导致预算面临挑战的时刻，考虑国家的福祉。还有一座水坝需要修复。他们要应对的事务千头万绪。现在不是政府陷入僵局或争吵不休的时候。
With respect to Syria, we had discussions about what options are available to us should the current cessation of hostilities break down. None of the options are good. It has been my view consistently that we have to get a political solution inside of Syria and that all the external actors involved have to be committed to that as well as the actors inside of Syria. Certainly that's what the Syrian people want -- they want an end to the bombing. They want to be able to go back to their homes. They want to be able to farm their lands and run their businesses and send their kids to school. 关于叙利亚，我们讨论了如果当前停火破裂我们有哪些选择。没有一个选择是理想的。我一贯的看法是，我们必须在叙利亚境内实现政治解决，所有相关外部行为体都必须致力于此，叙利亚境内的行为体也必须如此。这当然也是叙利亚人民所希望的——他们希望轰炸结束，希望能够重返家园，希望能够耕种土地、经营生意、送孩子上学。
And the problem with any plan B that does not involve a political settlement is that it means more fighting, potentially for years. And whoever comes out on top will be standing on top of a country that's been devastated and that will then take years to rebuild. So the sooner we can end fighting and resolve this in a political fashion, the better. 而任何不涉及政治解决的B计划的问题在于，它意味着更多的战斗，可能持续数年之久。而无论谁最终胜出，都将站在一个满目疮痍的国家之上，重建又需要数年时间。因此，我们越早结束战斗并以政治方式解决这一问题越好。
The primary reasons that we have been emphasizing the need for Assad to go is not just because he's killed his people and barrel-bombed women and children; it's that it is hard to conceive of him being at the head of a government that would end the fighting because it was perceived as legitimate. That's what we have to emphasize, that's what we have to work on. 我们一直强调阿萨德必须下台的主要原因，不仅仅是因为他杀害了自己的人民、用桶式炸弹轰炸妇女和儿童；更在于很难想象由他领导的政府能够结束战斗，因为这样的政府不会被视为具有合法性。这是我们必须强调的，也是我们必须努力的方向。
I'm going to take one last question. I assume this is Arab press, not just you. Go ahead, but there are other people here. 我再回答最后一个问题。我想这是阿拉伯媒体的提问，不只是你一个人。你请说，但还有其他人等着呢。
Question: What, Mr. President, do you think the main issue or case that you have a different opinion between GCC and the United States and this -- something you think there is different? 记者：总统先生，您认为海合会与美国之间存在意见分歧的主要问题或情况是什么——您认为有什么不同之处？
President Obama: I think that, overall, there's a broad consensus in assisting each other in our collective security. The GCC hosts the United States, and we could not operate effectively militarily in the region if it weren't for GCC countries. Our intelligence-sharing is vital in fighting against terrorism, and has consistently improved. 奥巴马总统：我认为总体而言，双方在共同安全方面相互协助有着广泛共识。海合会为美国提供驻地，如果没有海合会国家，我们无法在该地区有效开展军事行动。我们的情报共享在反恐斗争中至关重要，而且一直在不断改善。
We're starting to see the need to cooperate on new threats like cyberattacks, for example. Our efforts as a consequence of these summits to form a unified ballistic missile defense is very important. Our belief that the prosperity and stability of the region depends on countries treating all their citizens fairly and that sectarianism is an enemy of peace and prosperity -- that if people are seeing themselves not as a citizen of a country but as a member of a particular branch of Islam, that that is a recipe for countries falling apart. I think there's broad agreement there. 例如，我们开始看到有必要在网络攻击等新威胁方面开展合作。通过这些峰会，我们为建立统一弹道导弹防御体系所做的努力非常重要。我们认为，该地区的繁荣与稳定取决于各国公平对待所有公民，宗派主义是和平与繁荣的敌人——如果人们不把自己视为国家公民，而是视为某一伊斯兰教派的成员，那将是国家分崩离析的根源。我认为在这一点上双方有着广泛共识。
Probably the biggest area where there's been tactical differences has been with respect to Iran. And the issue is not the need for shared cooperation to deter against Iranian provocations -- on that, we're all agreed. I think that there has been concern, even when we were working on the Iran nuclear deal, that if we were in discussions with them about these issues, that somehow Iran would feel emboldened to act more provocatively in the region. 可能存在最大策略分歧的领域是伊朗问题。问题不在于是否需要共同合作以遏制伊朗的挑衅行为——在这一点上，我们完全一致。我认为，即便在我们致力于伊朗核协议的时候，也有人担心，如果我们就这些问题与伊朗进行讨论，伊朗可能会觉得有恃无恐，从而在该地区采取更加挑衅的行动。
And what I've said to them is we have to have a dual track. We have to be effective in our defenses and hold Iran to account where it is acting in ways that are contrary to international rules and norms. But we also have to have the capacity to enter into a dialogue to reduce tensions and to identify ways in which the more reasonable forces inside of Iran can negotiate with the countries in the region, with its neighbors, so that we don't see an escalation of proxy fights across the region. 我对他们说的是，我们必须采取双轨策略。我们必须建立有效的防御，并在伊朗的行为违反国际规则和规范时追究其责任。但我们也必须有能力开展对话，以缓解紧张局势，并找到途径，让伊朗内部较为理性的力量能够与该地区各国、与其邻国进行谈判，从而避免代理人战争在整个地区升级。
And I think that that view is one that is consistent with how many in the GCC view it, but because there's been so much mistrust that's been built up -- in part because of Iranian provocations -- that people are cautious and want to make sure that nobody is naive about what Iran may be doing to stir up problems in other countries. 我认为这一看法与海合会许多人的看法是一致的，但由于长期以来积累了太多不信任——部分是由于伊朗的挑衅行为——人们持谨慎态度，希望确保没有人会天真地看待伊朗可能在其他国家挑起事端的所作所为。
And what we've consistently shown them is we're not naive. But as I pointed out, during the height of the Cold War, both Democratic Presidents like John F. Kennedy and Republican Presidents like Ronald Reagan still negotiated with the Soviet Union. Even when the Soviet Union was threatening the destruction of the United States, there was still dialogue so that we could find ways to reduce tensions and the dangers of war and chaos. 而我们一直向他们表明，我们并不天真。但正如我所指出的，在冷战最激烈的时期，无论是约翰·F·肯尼迪这样的民主党总统，还是罗纳德·里根这样的共和党总统，都仍在与苏联谈判。即便在苏联威胁要摧毁美国的时候，双方仍保持对话，以便我们能够找到办法缓解紧张局势，降低战争与混乱的危险。
And that's the same approach that we have to take. Even as Iran is calling us "The Great Satan," we were able to get a deal done where they got rid of their nuclear stockpiles, and that makes us safer. That's not a sign of weakness, that's a sign of strength. 而这也是我们必须采取的同样策略。即使在伊朗称我们为"大撒旦"的时候，我们仍达成了协议，让他们销毁了核储备，而这让我们更加安全。这不是软弱的表现，而是力量的象征。
Thank you very much, everybody. 非常感谢各位。
