About seventy years ago a St. Andrews professor invented the word Epistemology. It has been immensely popular, though we could perhaps have done without it. He held, however, that this Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge, was a barren thing in itself, and would not bring us a step nearer reality, unless it was supplemented by a Theory of Ignorance. That was, I think, a suggestion much to the purpose. Unhappily he thought proper to call this part of his system by the repellent name of Agnoiology, with the result that it has been overlooked and indeed forgotten.
Yet it is surely true that we have far more experience of ignorance than of knowledge, and also, as Aristotle puts it, that we ought to start with what is 'more known to us'. That, at least, was the conviction of Socrates; and it certainly seems 'suitable to such a being as man, in such a world as the present one'.
For us Platonists light is thrown on the problem of Ignorance by the kindred, and at bottom identical, problem of Sin. It cannot, I believe, be denied that, on the whole, the theologians have been more successful in dealing with the question of Conduct than the moral philosophers, and I think that is just because they have approached it on this side. Disquisitions on Virtue or the Summum Bonum leave us cold; but Sin is a thing of which we have intimate and personal experience, so that, if we start from the sense of sin, we may reasonably hope to make some advance.
Plato certainly thought so, and that is why we do not fully understand what the Republic is about till we come to Books VIII and IX which deal with Sin. I think it certain that these books were present to his mind, at least in outline, from the outset, and that everything else was intended to lead up to them. In the same way, I would suggest that our only chance of reaching a satisfying theory of Knowledge and Reality is to start from our immediate experience of Ignorance.
These, however, are high matters which it would be foolish to enter upon in a single lecture, even were I competent to deal with them. I only refer to them in order to put what I have to say in its proper setting. I am not going to develop an 'Agnoiology' of my own, or even to expound that of Plato, though that is an attractive theme. All I have to offer is a contribution to a very pressing social problem, which I can illustrate from my own experience, illuminated by such light as I have been able to get from Plato, whom I have always found to be the surest guide in difficult places.
The problem I wish to discuss is the growth of ignorance at the present day, a problem which is generally overlooked just because, instead of beginning with ignorance, we fix our attention on knowledge, which at least appears to be increasing. Moreover, when I speak of the growth of knowledge, I am not referring specially to what are sometimes called 'the masses'. Among them we certainly find a great increase, if not of knowledge, at any rate of the desire for knowledge, and the Labour Party has a sincere belief in education.
Unfortunately they are apt to speak as if there existed somewhere a stock of ready-made knowledge which has only to be doled out liberally to satisfy all needs. That was the view of Lord Brougham and other pioneers of popular education in the first half of the nineteenth century, but it is altogether wrong. If we start, as we should, from a consideration of ignorance, we shall be struck first of all, by its passivity and inertness, and this raises a presumption that knowledge is above all, as Plato held it to be, an activity of the soul.
But, if so, it follows that it cannot be communicated at all, except in so far as the active soul can induce other souls to share in its activity. What can be supplied from stock is merely the sediment of dead knowledge, though even that is valuable, as I hope to show, since it furnishes us with the necessary tools for the real activity of knowing. But it is not itself the real thing. The only knowledge worth distributing is living, first-hand knowledge, and that, from the nature of the case, can only be realized in its fullness by the few.
It is, however, the only reservoir from which the needs of the many can be supplied, and it is therefore important to consider from time to time whether it is being maintained at the proper level. In the long run, everything depends on higher education, and so it remains true that the chief purpose of education is to form an élite, not for its own sake, but for that of society. That is Plato's doctrine.
The Guardians in the Republic are the hardest worked and least remunerated class in the community, and those who have ascended to the light of the true day must descend once more in turn to the Cave to release the prisoners from their bonds. This is not to be done by lecturing to them, but only by overcoming their resistance to liberation. Plato understood human nature much better than Lord Brougham. The question I propose to ask, then, is this. Are we taking the best way just now to secure the maintenance of that higher education on which all the rest depends?
The nineteenth century had a simple faith in the progress of knowledge and enlightenment, but we know too much history now to have any assured confidence in that. There have been Dark Ages before, and they have generally supervened on periods when knowledge of a sort was more widely distributed than ever. So far as we can see, the decay has always set in at the top. I am not thinking only of what are specially known as the Dark Ages, the period from the closing of the schools by Justinian in the sixth century to the patriarchate of Photius in the ninth.
We know vaguely too of dark ages even in prehistoric times, and it sometimes looks as if oscillation rather than progress were the law of history. Nor can it be denied that there are warnings and portents at the present day such as have before now heralded an age of darkness. It is no wonder that some who are skilled in reading the signs of the times should feel uneasy.
No doubt it seems absurd at first sight. Even since 1900, science of every kind has made advances hardly to be matched at any other period of the world's history. In the course of a generation Physics and Chemistry have been completely transformed, so that those of us who tried to learn these things forty years ago can hardly recognize them now.
I was present the other day at a lecture on the structure of the atom; and I felt very much as a Greek of the fifth century b.c. might have done, if suddenly transported from the rather crass air of Abdera to the sunnier climes of Tarentum or the Epizephyrian Locri. And the advances in our knowledge of man have been as great or greater. Even in 1900 hardly any one knew anything worth knowing about Knossos or the Aegean civilization of the second and third millennia b.c., and it still remains for us to adjust the rest of our historical knowledge to that new world.
And we can go back to millennia still remoter than that. The astounding revelations of prehistoric archaeology have hardly yet been grasped. What are we to make of a highly developed art at a date which it is not safe to fix even approximately, but of which we may say with confidence that the monuments of Egypt and Babylon are, in comparison, things of yesterday?
There is, however, another side to the picture. The only true knowledge is living and first-hand knowledge, and such knowledge has no actual existence unless it is known by some one. Now it is plain that no one can possibly know more than a fraction of what is worth knowing. It seems rather that the more there is to be known, the less of it can we know, so that the growth of what, for any one of us, can be potential knowledge, is necessarily to the same extent a growth of actual ignorance. Our knowledge bears a diminishing proportion to the mass.
Libraries and museums are the great storehouses of potential knowledge; but, if all possible knowledge were duly stored up in the Bodleian and the British Museum, what would it profit us? The very existence of such an accumulation would discourage the best of us. What is the use of trying to make some fraction of the mass our own, when it can only have an infinitesimal ratio to the whole, and when it will be distorted besides by its detachment from the context which alone can make it intelligible? I do not say that such a feeling is justified, but it is surely very natural.
We are told, to be sure, that specialism is a remedy, and that is no doubt true in a sense. But specialism has its drawbacks. Not long before the war I attended a congress of prehistoric archaeologists at Geneva. The whole proceedings were very interesting to me, but that was only because I had the advantage of knowing next to nothing about the subject. It was impossible not to observe, however, that the interest of the distinguished archaeologists present had curious limits.
We were chiefly concerned with the palaeolithic age, though communications about the neolithic were listened to with frigid politeness. When, however, an unfortunate gentleman tried to say something about the bronze age, it was impossible to hear him for the slamming of doors and the heavy tread of archaeologists leaving the room. There must be something wrong here; for this system, if pushed to its logical conclusion, would land us in a society where no one knew anything that any one else knew. The mass of men would take refuge in scepticism, and the dark age would be upon us at once.
Now, even though that prospect may seem remote, it must, I believe, be admitted that the recent enormous growth of potential knowledge has been accompanied by a corresponding growth of actual ignorance. It will hardly be denied that those who have constantly to do with young people, and who have sufficient imagination to recall their own youth, are in the best position to judge the tendency of the times. For that reason I make no apology for drawing on my own personal experience.
I can only speak with any authority on the youth of Scotland, but I do claim to know something about that, and if we are to understand the growth of ignorance with any hope of finding a remedy, it can only be by each stating our own experience and comparing it with that of others. In the first place, then, I have no doubt that the young men of the present day are, on the whole, healthier in body and mind and more intelligent than those of my own generation. I hope that we should have behaved as well if the same call had come to us as came to them in 1914, but frankly I am not sure.
On the other hand, I am certain that the young men of today are absolutely and relatively more ignorant than those of forty years ago and, what is worse, that they have less curiosity and intellectual independence. In Scotland, at any rate, that is true. Every university teacher in that country whose memory can carry him back a generation knows that we have had to lower our standard of teaching and examination progressively for the last thirty years in every department except the physical and natural sciences.
With that exception, no doubt a considerable one, I hear the same thing on every side. The complaints of teachers in the Department of English Literature are still more vocal than ours in the Department of Classics, though English is a compulsory subject in the schools, and no one can enter the Faculty of Arts without passing a Leaving Certificate Examination in that subject.
Now I have said that my scientific colleagues do not seem to share the anxieties we feel in the Faculty of Arts, and the reason seems to be that they are not, to any extent worth mentioning, dependent on the schools for the subject-matter of their studies. A student who is to all intents and purposes a beginner can take up Chemistry, for instance, and be doing original research of a fairly high order in that department at the end of four years. It is different with the teachers of humanistic subjects.
Whether we deal with the ancient or the modern humanities, we have been taught to depend on the schools for a foundation on which to build, and we find this growing more shaky every year. I do not much blame the schoolmasters for that. They are no longer free agents, and the worst that can be said of them is that they are too ready to acquiesce in such a state of affairs, and even to claim that the requirements of the universities should be modified in accordance with it.
I do blame the system under which the teaching of the schools is determined by the necessities, real or imaginary, of an external examination, particularly when, as in Scotland, this is an identical written examination imposed on all schools alike by a government department. I blame still more the educational theorists of the last generation, whose theories are apt to find their way into departmental regulations and circulars just when they have been proved wrong even in theory.
These notions were generally commended by a preposterous etymology of the word 'education', which was supposed to mean 'drawing out', just as if it were ' eduction ' and there were no difference between a long and a short u. Etymologies prove nothing even when they are right, and they may work much mischief when they are wrong. The word educare is really, like so many other Latin words, an agricultural metaphor and means 'to grow' a crop. It can also be used of breeding pigs and poultry.
Now it does not take a profound knowledge of farming to see that, if you keep 'drawing out' without putting anything in, you will end by exhausting the soil, and that, or something like it, is the chief explanation of the growth of ignorance we complain of. Here again I must draw on my own experience, and I make no apology for referring to some very elementary things. Nothing is so trivial that it may not illustrate the working of important principles.
That being so, I feel that I cannot illustrate my point better than by going back to my own early experiences of grammar. When I was at school we certainly thought it 'beastly', as we called it, that we should have to learn such things as irregular verbs by heart. On the other hand, it was not particularly laborious for us at that age, and we could more or less see the use of it. It was clearly the way to get the power of reading Homer and Virgil without constant interruption, and I honestly believe that most of us enjoyed that.
Of course we should not have dreamed of confessing it to one another, and still less of admitting it to 'old so-and-so', our master, who was doing the best he could for us with scant hope of reward and no expectation of gratitude. To do so would have violated that mysterious schoolboy code, which is not only a beneficent provision of nature to protect society from juvenile prigs, but springs from a native instinct of the young soul to preserve the solitude so needful for the growth of its inner life.
Of course the time came later when we were ready to admit, very shyly at first, to one another that we did like Homer and Virgil, but at first we were quite content to learn our irregular verbs. There is no great mystery in that. Mere memorizing comes natural to the young, and it does not matter at all whether they understand what they memorize or not. Children have always invented things—counting-out rhymes and the like—the main purpose of which is to be memorized. Think of the undying popularity of The House that Jack Built.
We may say, indeed, that they have a passion for rigmarole, and small boys retain a great deal of this. One would think that our educational system would take advantage of that, and so it does in matters of absolute necessity like the multiplication table. Unhappily we have not the same pressing need of declensions and conjugations, so the educational theorist has a free hand here.
He lays down certain canons, such as that grammar should be taught 'inductively', by which he means that the phenomena of accidence and syntax should be dealt with only as they occur and that the rules should evolve themselves gradually out of the examples. That, of course, is how the mature scholar goes to work, but it is something utterly alien to the boy's mind. No normal boy ever worked so, and no normal boy ever will.
He knows that, for him, grammar is only a disagreeable necessity, and he rightly feels that he is not called upon to do over again for himself what has been done once for all already. He may not be able to formulate his protest clearly, but he will probably tell you that it is 'all in the book', and he will refuse to work it out inductively to please you. He has other employment for such reasoning powers as he possesses, and he will not waste them on a thing like grammar.
In this he shows a perfectly sound instinct, and boys have a glorious power of resistance to what they regard as the wrong way of doing things. The result is that he will not learn grammar at all, which is no great loss in itself, but it will also be that he will not learn to read Homer and Virgil, and that is a calamity. The new plan of teaching grammar takes so much time and leads to so little accomplishment that reading gets crowded out altogether. And then people complain that boys who have had a classical education do not read the classics in later life. How can they?
They have never acquired the necessary facility. They often play games in later life, but that is because they have acquired a certain automatism in them at an early stage, which they could never have acquired on the methods which are recommended to us for the teaching of languages. Fancy inductive cricket!
No doubt we memorized too much grammar in my day. The rhyme about the gender of artifex and opifex was easily learnt indeed, but it conveys no very valuable information, and, such as it is, might have been picked up later, inductively if you care to call it so. But it remains true that nothing can ever take the place of the instinctive and automatic responsiveness to grammatical forms which we certainly acquired on the old method, and which can hardly be acquired otherwise.
Of course it is perfectly true that Plato barely knew the difference between a noun and a verb, and that he had never heard of a subjunctive mood. In the Euthyphro he takes nearly a page to explain the difference between the active and the passive voice, things for which he has no name, but which every elementary schoolboy knows now. But then he had heard them used rightly from his childhood and so they had become instinctive and automatic to him.
We cannot reproduce that now (though anything that can be done in the way of making boys speak the language they are learning is to be eagerly welcomed), and we are driven to secure the automatism in another way. That was the great discovery of Dionysius Thrax. In his day the instinctive feeling for the living speech was dying, and many were beginning to speak it for whom it was a foreign tongue.
The whole apparatus of moods and tenses, declensions and conjugations, introduced by him was really a labour-saving device, and was eagerly adopted as such and applied to their own language by the practical Romans, who took little interest in grammatical theories, but wished to acquire the power of reading and speaking Greek in the quickest and easiest way. Is it fair to deprive the modern boy of all this, seeing that he can acquire it quite easily and then go on to something more interesting?
The multiplication table is acquired because it has, or can be made to have, a certain rhythm of its own which fixes it for ever in the memory. Declensions and conjugations have a rhythm of the very same kind, or at any rate such a rhythm can be imposed upon them. That, by the way, is why boys so persistently make false quantities in repeating them; they are only trying instinctively to adjust them to their own rhythmical scheme. It was a great mistake when our grammars disturbed the traditional order of the cases.
It was supposed that brevity was secured by placing the accusative next to the nominative, but that is based on a psychological fallacy. Within limits it is actually easier to memorize a longer series than a shorter, especially when the last term of the series makes a return, as it were, on the first. When the accusative came where Dionysius, for excellent reasons, put it, after the dative, it provided a satisfactory framework for the whole rhythmical pattern, and I feel sure that the declensions were easier to learn than they are now.
In any case, you will never induce boys to learn grammar by any other process than this of rhythmical memorizing which I have tried to describe.
For the grown man, of course, grammar may be one of the most dangerously fascinating studies, but for the boy it is just what I have called the sediment of dead knowledge, to be acquired as speedily as may be for the sake of its results and not for itself. This is quite understood in many other branches of training. It is really a good deal easier to read Homer than it is to play the piano, and yet the proportion of people who learn to play the piano, at least to their own satisfaction, is far greater than that of those who learn to read Homer.
In this case every one can see that the first thing to be done is to acquire the necessary automatism, and the methods of acquiring it have been more or less systematized. If you had to think of every chord, you would never play anything. On the other hand, no one imagines that the traditional scales and exercises are music. They are simply practice, directed to the acquisition of automatic power, and that is how grammar should be treated at school.
It is an historical fact that, when this method was followed, a large number of people did acquire the power of reading Homer, and that a very considerable number continued to read him all their days.
Moreover, it is just this acquisition of automatic power that can be quite precisely and accurately tested by a school examination, and I do not think that anything else can be fairly tested at all at this stage. As it is, we are prone to test schoolboys by setting them to do 'unseens', which are the proper criteria of riper scholarship, but which really tell us nothing of what it is much more important for us to know, namely, whether the boy has ever read a complete book with understanding.
What we really judge in this way is the power of guessing, a power not to be despised indeed, but a very unfair test for the purpose in view. The result of all this is that grammatical knowledge remains sloppy and inaccurate, and there is nothing at all to take its place. That is why we find our pupils more ignorant than they used to be.
Now this consideration of one minor but fundamental department of humanistic education suggests certain conclusions which I believe would be verified by a similar consideration of others, and equally by an examination of the foundations of scientific teaching. In the first place, we must learn to draw a hard and fast line between education and training. It is not a novel distinction, but its implications are by no means fully realized. The end of training is to secure automatic facility, and it is absolutely essential as a foundation for everything else.
Where it is a matter of life and death we know that well enough. During the war most of us at least saw something of the training of platoons, companies, and battalions. The object of that was to secure automatic response to the word of command, and this was successfully accomplished by the system known as drill. Of course no one but an occasional sergeant-major ever imagined that drill alone would make a soldier, but every one knew it was the necessary first stage in the process. It is exactly the same with education.
Unless the power of spontaneous response to certain stimuli has been acquired, so that no process of conscious thinking is called for to deal with them, it is useless to attempt anything further. To face a boy who has had no sufficient drill with Homer and Virgil is as wicked as it is to send an untrained recruit into the firing line.
And this suggests the further consideration that, if ignorance merely means the absence of active and conscious knowledge, it may in certain cases be a good and salutary thing. It may be doubted, indeed, whether, if knowledge is an activity, it is really possible for any one to know more than one thing at a time in the full sense of the word. It seems rather as if the full light of knowledge can only illuminate a single spot in the field of consciousness at a given moment.
That spot is surrounded by a sort of penumbra of potential knowledge shading gradually away into ignorance and utter darkness, and it is this penumbra that makes all the difference. A great mathematician and a child may both be said to know that two and two make four, and it would not be easy to show that there is any actual difference in the bare content of their knowledge at the time. The difference, which is really enormous, seems to lie wholly in the surroundings by which it is accompanied.
In the very same way, a schoolboy and a great scholar may give a verbally identical translation of a passage, but here again there is a wide divergence. It is impossible to dispense with metaphors and analogies in a matter such as this; for the difference is not quantitative but qualitative. It is like the difference in timbre between two notes of identical pitch sounded on different instruments.
It is the presence or the absence of the overtones that makes the difference between the knowledge of the educated and the uneducated man, and it is plain that education in this sense is not a thing that can be handed over ready-made. It is also plain that it depends wholly on potential knowledge which may at a given moment be very dimly realized or not realized at all. I have never been able to discover what the Austrian socialist Pernerstoffer meant when he defined education as 'the sum of all we have forgotten'. He may only have intended a paradox, but he uttered a very great truth.
It is not only such things as grammar and the multiplication table that can become automatic, but also such elusive things as taste and judgement. In the case of these, however, nothing is to be achieved by drill. That is only suitable for bare necessities which it is desirable to get out of the way as quickly as possible. It is not easy—indeed it is impossible—to lay down rules for this higher spiritual education. It consists above all in bringing the youthful soul into contact with the really big things in letters, science, and art, and letting it make what it can of them.
There is no need to tell it what it should think about them; it must find out that for itself. Above all it is wrong for a teacher to insult his pupils by talking down to what he imagines to be the level of their capacity. That is probably a good deal higher than he supposes, and in any case his condescension is sure to be resented. After all, it is very little that a teacher can do by direct teaching. He can certainly look after the preliminary drill, but beyond that it is mainly by being himself that he can do any good.
If he cares for great things, and if his pupils are capable of caring for them too, there is every chance that they will learn to do so. For the rest, we can add little or nothing to what is written in the Epistle to the Friends and Companions of Dion, where we are told, in a sentence that surely no one but Plato can have written, that this kind of knowledge is a thing that comes in a moment 'like a light kindled from a leaping spark which, once it has reached the soul, finds its own fuel'.
Finally, if it is true that what seemed to us an alarming growth of ignorance is mainly due to the confusion of training with education, and our neglect of the fundamental differences between the methods proper to each, we may find comfort in the reflection that it is not yet too late for us to retrace our steps.
Now these elementary pedagogical considerations have made it clear, I trust, that the value of all knowledge depends on something that is not actual knowledge. That presupposes in the first place an automatic facility of response to stimuli that can only be acquired by practice and drill. We have seen further that the quality of knowledge depends on a fringe of associations which is for the most part subconscious and belongs to what I have called the penumbra. But what of ignorance itself, the outer ring of darkness which surrounds the field? Has it too a part to play?
It is easy to see that it may serve as a foil or background for knowledge, just as a light is thrown up by the surrounding darkness, but there is more in it than that. Ignorance is, after all, only another name for the possibility of knowledge; it is essentially what Aristotle calls a στέρησις. No one can be taught anything of which he does not feel ignorant. We do not speak of a dog, or even a savage, as ignorant of Greek or of Mathematics. Dogs know all they need to know and all they can know.
In that sense of the word—and no other is really intelligible—man is more ignorant than any other animal, and it is just because he is so that he stands higher in the scale of being. It is the possibility of ignorance and sin that makes man what he is, and so he cannot wish it away without contradiction. Huxley once said:
I protest that if some great Power would agree to make me think always what is true and do what is right on condition of being turned into a sort of clock ... I should instantly close with the bargain.
Happily he was not taken at his word, and, if he had been, I do not believe he would have made any such suicidal choice. No one can possibly wish to have anything on condition of being turned into something else. Being what we are, we must regard liability to error and wrongdoing as our privileges, since it is only the sense of ignorance and the sense of sin that enable us even to conceive of righteousness and knowledge. Why we are such as we are, we are not bound, and probably not able, to say; but I venture to think that here, too, Plato may help us to a partial understanding.
Of course in his published writings he has only treated the problem by way of myth, but I think it a fair interpretation of his meaning to put it something like this. Plato believed in a Creator, but he did not believe in anything like foreknowledge or predestination. These are Stoic inventions. For Plato it was unworthy of the Creator to create souls which were not themselves creators in their degree. Being creators they are free; but, being also creatures, they may fall into sin and ignorance.
Something like that, I think, is what Plato meant; but, however that may be, it is plain that such is indeed our nature, and that we must make the best of it we can. If we try to do that we need not fear the return of the Dark Ages, which could only be brought about by our ignoring both the limits and the possibilities of beings such as we most undoubtedly are.